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1 Abstract
Within last decades, significant measures have been taken to create an integrated market for
financial institutions as it is widely acknowledged that this leads to the ultimate goal of the
European Union, creating a Single European Market. However a unprecedented wave of mergers
and acquisitions (M&As) in the 1990s, had primarily of domestic nature. Hence, this thesis
attempts to uncover which factors caused low cross-border activity. The first two parts of this
thesis examine the macro-level, concluding that national interests and a fragmented supervisory
infrastructure held financial integration back. The third part of the thesis looks at the micro-level,
analyzing the ex-ante and ex-post stage of M&As. It concludes that firms seem to favor domestic
transactions because synergies are more obvious and easier to extract, the fragmentation of
Europe' s financial industry offers substantial opportunities in the home markets, and attempting to
grow to a size also needs to be accomplished in one (domestic) market. The last part of the thesis
studies two cases of recent cross-border M&As, respectively Nordea and HSBC.
V posIednf desetiIetfch byla pfijata vyznamna opatrenf za iicelem vytvorenf spolecneho financnfho
trhu, ktery je povazovan za vyznamny postupny krok pro vytvofenfjednoho spoleeneho trhu
v rarnci Evropske Unie. Paradoxne, bezprecedentnf vIna fuzf a akvizic v devadesatych Ietech rnela
prirnarne narodnfch charakter. Tato prace si kIade za cfl odhalit faktory vedoucf k relativne male
mezinarodnf aktivite fUzf a akvizic. V prvnfch dvou castech jsem se zamefil na makro iirovefi a
dosel k zaveru, ze narodnf zajmy a nejednotny dohled byly hlavnf duvody pro pomalejsf integraci.
V tretf casti jsern se zarneril na ex-ante a ex-post stadia frizf a akvizic a vyvodiI, ze firmy preferujf
domacf transakce, protoze potencialnf synergie jsou snaze dosazitelne, fragmentace jednotlivych
dornacfch trhu nabfzf radu akvizicnfch pfflezitostf a velikost 'too big to fail' je take jednoduseji
dosazitelna na lokalnim trhu. V poslednf casti studuj i dva aktualnf pffpady mezinarodnfch akvizic.
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Thesis
Financial industry is one of the driving forces of economy, and M&A activity is often in multi
billion terms. Appealing prospects in further consolidation attracted my attention and therefore aim
of my master thesis will be assessment of activity in area of cross border mergers and acquisitions.
The overall research question could be formulated as: What factors restrain wider cross-border
M&A activity in Europe' s banking industry?
This high level question will be further drilled down into particular subquestions. To answer my
research question I wiII apply both quantitative and qualitative methods. My aim is not to write a
pure statistical thesis therefore, the quantitative method and the accompanied numerical data will
be merely used to SUppOl1 my conclusion, as I don't intend to perform statistical tests. The main
research method will be therefore of qualitative nature which I find most suitable for gaining an
understanding about the marginal use cross-border transactions.
Structure of my envisioned thesis wiII follow these dimensions: i) Europe's Financial Market
Infrastructure assesemt, ii) Consolidation Activity in Europe, iii) Motives for M&A' s, iv) Case
Studies - here I plan to examine Nordea and HSBC - CCF cases.
Literature which helped to shape my thoughts and will be used during the course of writing thesis
is as follows:
• Adam K., Jappelli, T. Menichini, A. Padula, M. and Pagano, M. "Study to analyse,
compare, and apply alternative indicators and monitoring methodologies to measure the
evolution of capital market integration in the European Union", European Commission ,
2002
• Altunbas, Y, and Ibanez, D.M. "Mergers and acquisitions and bank performance in Europe,
the role of strategic similarities", ECB, Working Paper Series No. 398, October 2004
• Baeie, L. Ferrando, A. Hoerdahl, P. Krylova, E. and Monnet, C. "Measuring financial
integration in the euro area", ECB Occasional Paper Series, No. 14, April, 2004
• Berger, A.N, DeYoung, R. Genay, H. and Udell, G. F. "Globalization of Financial
Institutions: Evidence from Cross-Border Banking Performance", Brookings-wharton
Pap ers on Financial Services 3: 23-158,2000.
• Bikker,1. A. "Competition and efficiency in a unified European banking market", Edward
Elgar, 2004
• Bank for International Settlements, "Capital requirements and bank behaviour: The impact
of the Basle Accord", Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Working Papers, 2000
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• Blokland, J. and Zec h, J. "Draft report on financial services in the EEA" , Europ ean
Econo mic Area Joint Parliamentary Committee, November 20, 2002, available at:
http ://www.europar!.eu.int/meetdocs/del egation s/eeau/20021 126/04.pdf
• Bower, 1. L., "Not all M&A ' s are alike - and that matters" Harv ard Business Review, 200 1
• Boot, A. W. "Consolidation and Strat egic Posi tioning in Banking with Implications for
Euro pe", University ofAmsterdam Workin g Paper, 2003
• Co rhay, A. and Rad, A.T. "International Acquisitions and Shareholder Wealth - Evide nce
from the Netherl ands" , International Rev iew ofFinan cial Analysis , Vol. 9, pp. 163-174 ,
2000
• Davies, H. "Creating a single financi al market in Europe, what do we mean?" , Lecture at
the London School of Economic s, avail able at:
http://www.lse.ac.uk/colle ctions/LS EPubl icLecturesAndE vents/pdflcreatingAsingleFinanci
alM arketlnEurope.pdf
• DeLong, G. "Stockholder gains from focusin g versus diversifying bank mergers", Journal
of Financial Economics, Vo!. 59, pp. 22 1-252, 200 1
• Demirguec-Kunt, A. and Huizinga, H. "The taxation of dome stic and foreign banking" ,
Journal ofPublic Economics, Vol. 79, 2001
• Fazio, A. "Regulation and supervision in financial markets", Presentation at the Europ ean
Banking Congres s 2004, Frankfurt, November 19, 2004
• "Me rgers and acquisitions invo lving the EU banking industry - facts and implications" ,
ECB Press Releas e, December 20, 2000 available at:
http ://www.ecb.int/press /pr/da te/2000/html/prOO 1220.en.html
• Nicolo, G. D., Batholomew, P., Zaman, J., and Zephirin, M. "Bank consolidation ,
internationalization, and conglomeration: trends and implications for financial risk" , IMF
Wo rking Paper, WP/0311 58, July 2003
• Pablo, A. "Determinants of acquisition integration level: a decision-making perspective" ,
Academy ofManagement Journal, Vol . 37(4), pp.803-836, 1994
Padoa-Schioppa, T. "The evo lving European financial landscape: integration and
regulation" , a Colloquium organized by Groupe Caisse des Depots/KfW , Berlin , March 22 ,
2004
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2 Introduction
The European Council at Lisbon I set the key strategic goal for the EU to become by 20 I0 ' the
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world' . One crucial element to
achieve this goal is an integrated financial market, which can act as a catalyst for growth across all
sectors of the economy and rival the North American capital market in terms of its depth, liquidity,
and flexibility.
An assumption behind an integrated financial market is that cross-border competition fosters
efficient, low-cost banking by allowing more efficient banks to move across borders and compete
with less-efficient banks that were formerly protected by their nation's borders. This competition
forces the inefficient banks either to improve or to leave the market, driving prices closer to
. I ?margma costs."
Economic theory and empirical findings support this idea, suggesting that the integration and
development of financial markets is likely to contribute to economic growth by removing frictions
and barriers to exchange, thereby allowing the allocation of capital to be more efficient. Industry-
level studies like that of Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that financial development causes
economic growth, and Giannetti et al. (2002) suggests that the European manufacturing industry
would grow up to I percent faster if financial markets across the Community developed to US
levels. Even the most critical evaluations of the potential gains from establishing an integrated
market in financial services expect considerable benefits.'
In the past two decades significant milestones where ratified towards setting a level playing field
that encourages the integration of Europe's financial markets. The Single Market, the Monetary
Union, and the growing internal and external competition, triggered by developments in IT,
overcapacity, globalization, and increased shareholder pressure for financial performance", have
led to a massive and unprecedented consolidation in Europe. One of the most notable features of
I Meeting held in Lisbon from the 23rd - 24th of March, 2000
2 Bcrger, A. N. and Smith, D. C. "Global integration in the banking industry", Federal Reserve Bulletin, November issue, 2003
3 A working paper from the Commission of the European Communities, May 26, 2003, "Tracking EU Financial Integration"
estimates that if the EU manufacturing industry was given access to a financial market similar to that of the US, the output of this
sector would increase at an annual rate of 0.8 to 1.0%. Evcn though the additional growth this could generate would be unevenly
distributed among Member States depending on the development of their financial sector and the existing financing possibilities for
manufacturing firms, all would gain. London Economics estimates that pooling the present regional bond and equity markets would
move the EU to a new equilibrium point characterized by higher GDP (1.1%) and employment (0.5%). These estimates relate only
to the macroeconomic benefits that can be expected to flow from removing static inefficiencies (wider bid-offer/credit spreads and
adverse price impacts) associated with the fragmentation of European equity and corporate bond markets.
4 Nicolo, G.D. Batholomew, P. Zaman, J. and Zephirin, M. "Bank consolidation, internationalization, and conglomeration: trends
and implications for financial risk", IMF Working Paper WP/03/1 58, July 2003
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this indu stry roll-up was the ongoing consolidation of banks that reshaped Europe ' s financial
landscape (Group of Te n, 200 I).
Surpris ing ly though, this co nsolidat ion wave has been in all industry segme nts dominated by
domestic mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Also Europe' s financial markets, which received most
attention in terms of integration enhancing policies, saw only marginal cross-border activi ty. In
fac t was cross-border M&A within the EU far less common in the financial sector than in other
sectors of the economy. To that com es that the few cross -border dea ls in the financ ial industry that
were recorded mainly involved at least one institution from outside Europe, thereby no trend
towards wider cross-border M&As within Europe could be discerned.' This observation was
particularly disappointing, as it was believed that if banks were able to take full advantage of the
freedoms tha t exis t for them in a single European market , then they would be able to contribute
more fully to the EU's wider Lisbon Agenda goals of competitive ness and growth/'
3 Research Objective
T he unprecedented M&A acti vity in Europe in the I990s and the extensive measures to support
wides pread cross-border activ ity in Europe's financial industry on the one hand, and the marginal
effect on intra -Europea n conso lidation on the other hand, caught my interest. Interest ingly, there
are various theoretic al and empirica l studies on the causes and co nsequences of domestic mergers,
though significa ntly less is know n about cross-border mergers, es pecia lly those invo lving EU
partn ers' This appare nt gap in the academic literature motivated me to look into this matter and
research what the major causes of the marginal cross-border activity were.
Th e overall research question , which I will attempt to answe r in this thesis, is therefore the
followi ng :
• What factors restrain wider cross-border M&A activity in Europe's banking industry?
To address this research question sys tematica lly, my analysis will be based on a number of sub-
questions that will help me to get a better understanding of the industry, which seems necessary to
analyze and answer the research question properly. I will therefore start by reviewing the various
poli cies und ert aken by the EU that were supposed to enhance the integrat ion of Europe's financial
5 "Mergers and acquisitions involving the EU banking industry - facts and implications", ECB Press Release, December20. 2000
6 "Cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector: follow-up to Scheveningen informal ECOFIN", European
Commission - DG Internal Market and Services - Banking Advisory Committee, December2004
7 leuo-Gillies, G. Mesehi, M., Simonctti, R. "Cross-border mergers and acquisitions: patterns in the EU and effects", available at
www.merit.unimaas.nl/tser/teis021.pdr
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markets. In addition, I will analyze how far integration has progressed and outline inhibiting
factors to wider integration. Furthermore, I intent to review how these measures have affected the
financial industry, i.e. did they causes greater cross-border activity within the EU. Hence, the first
sub-question that I will address is the following:
• How far have Europe's regulatory- and supervisory institutions progressed in terms of
creating an integrated European financial market and how has this affected the
consolidation activity of Europe' s financial institutions?
While the first sub-question was primarily concerned with reviewing the progress of financial
integration and its impact on the consolidation activity from a macro-level perspective, I will in the
second sub-question turn to the micro-level and investigate the ex-ante stage of M&As and outline
what the motivating factors and influences are that let firms engage in M&As. Followed by that, I
will review the ex-post stage of M&As and review the occurrences subsequent to a transaction in
terms of integration and performance in the light of the high failure rates in delivering the promises
of the ex-ante stage. The second question is therefore the following:
• With empirical evidence indicating that the majority of all M&A's do not live up to the
announced promises, what is the motivation for firms to engage in mergers and
acquisitions, what causes the high failure rate, and is there a difference in domestic versus
cross-border transactions in terms of performance?
Having analyzed financial integration and consolidation from both the macro-level and the micro-
level, I will use these findings and gained insights to apply them in a specificcase study of two
recent cross-border transactions in Europe's banking industry. The purpose of the two case studies
is to complement the general causes and consequences of consolidation in Europe with the specific
experience of these two cases. In addition, the reviewof these two cases will help to explain why
one transaction appeared to be more successful than the other. Hence, the third and final sub-
question in this thesis is the following:
• Analyzing two of the most spectacular cross-border transactions of recent years, notably
between Merita, Nordbanken, Unidanmark and Christiannia on the one hand, and HSBC
and CCF on the other hand, is there an explanation as to why one appears to have
performed more successfully than the other?
The more general insights I gained from researching and answering the first two sub-questions are
therefore complemented by the more specific insights of the two case studies, which should permit
me to give a sound and qualified answer to the overall research question.
The value and originality of my study lies in the attempt, which to my knowledge has not done
14
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before, to ana lyze the marginal cross- border transaction in Europe 's financial industry from bo th a
hol istic ang le by reviewing var ious streams of literature on the macro - and micro perspective of
consolidation. In addi tion, I complement the analysis with the insights gained from two specific
and highly relevant case stud ies on EU cross-border transaction s.
4 Delimitation
Due to the broad scope of my study variou s streams of literature exists, that focus on many specific
issue s e.g. financ ial regulation, cultural differences in M&A, financial performa nce etc. Parall el to
that some issues have received a grea t deal of attention, e.g. financial integration in the EU,
resulting in a vast body of literature, while information is scarce on issues that e.g. attempt to
review and explain cross-border consolidat ion within the EU banking sector. As the intent ion of
this thesis is not to analyze one specific issue in depth but to analyze the various angles, i.e. the
macro and micro perspective, as well as two case studies, that can help to shed light on the
research ques tion, I have reviewed a vast body of literature, which was freely access ible.
Particularl y in respect to numerical data on M&As it would have been advantageous to have access
to e.g. Th ompson Financia l to obtain the latest statistics on EU cross-border M&As, though this
proved impossible without subscribing to their services. In addition, I was unfortunately not ab le to
obtain act ive co-opera tion from the two respective corporations dealt with in the case study, du e to
time-constraints from their side. Obviously, first-ha nd information through e.g. interviews or
internal material would have been of great value to the information depth and analysis.
Nevertheless, through using LexisNex is Professional extensively, I reviewed numerous articles
from major global newspapers and magazines on the respective cases of the last 5-8 years, and
through that, I believe to have gained a good understanding of the developments as well as an
objective and broad assessment of the respective cases .
Th roughout the thesis I use the terms 'Europe', 'E U' when referrin g to the 15 European count ries
that were par t of the EU prior to May 1,2004, or ' the old Europe' to quote Donald Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense. The terms 'euro-area' , 'euro-zone' refer more specifically to the EU
co untries that are memb ers of the European Monetary Union. Although using the term 'financial
institutions' frequently in this thesis, the emphasis of this study is on the banking secto r, not least
due to the vast literature that focuses on this segment.
5 Methodology and Structure
In this sec tion, I will introduce the research approach of this study that I choose to answer the
above stated question s. In addition, I will explain the structure of the thesis, and define some of the
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theoreti cal conce pts that are used throughout the thesis related to consolidation and M&A.
5.1 Methodology
Generally , one distinguishes between two main research methods, the quantitati ve approach and
the qua litative approach. The quantitative method is focusing on statistical analysis of collec ted
numerical data and attempts to find answers for questions concerned with 'how much' , ' how
many' , ' to what ex tent' etc. The qualitative method is not concerned on numbers but on words and
observations, or as Zikmund (2000) puts it "any source of information may be informally
investigated to clari fy which qualities or charac teristics are assoc iated with an object, situat ion, or
issue ." Compared to quantitative research, qual itative research is concerned with finding answers
to questions that begin with 'w hy and how ' . Which method appears to be the most applicable
vari es depending on the research question as well as the data avail able. To answer my research
question I app ly both quanti tative and qua litative methods. Nevertheless, the quantita tive method
and the accompanied numerical data is mere ly used to support my conclusion, as I do not perform
statistica l tests. The main research method is therefore of qualitative nature as it is most suitable
for gai ning an understanding abo ut the marginal use cross-border transactions.
Zikmund (2000) furthermore identifies three broad research approaches, the exploratory, the
descripti ve, and the explanatory approach. While exploratory research is conducted to clarify
ambiguous problems and define the nature of a problem for example with the help of case studies,
the descriptive research aims at examining and describing characteristics of a populatio n or
phenomenon in detail and is based on previous understanding of the nature of the researc h pro blem.
Explanatory research is conducted to identi fy cause-a nd-effect relationships among variables by
for example test ing different hypotheses.
For my research, I will make use of both the exploratory approach and the descriptive approach. In
the first three major parts of my thesis, the descriptive approach is made use of when reviewin g the
developments in the EU in terms of reg ulatory and supervisory developments. The exp lorato ry
approach is applied in the last sect ion of the thesis, as it is thought of complemen ting the
descriptive review by "obtaining information from one or a few situations that are similar to the
researcher ' s problem situatio n" (Zikmund, 2000). Yin (1989) compares cases studies to other
research methods and co ncludes : "case studies are the preferred strategy when 'how' or 'why '
questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the foc us
is on a co ntemporary phenomenon within some real-life context".
According to e.g. Kam (199 0) there are two ways to form theory, the deductive approac h and the
indu ctive approach. The deductive method is characterized by the fact that premises are intended to
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pro vide support for the conclusion that is so strong that, if the premises are true, it would be
impossibl e for the co nclusion to be false. An example of the deductive approach is the verifica tion
of ex isting theories by empirical evide nce . In the inductive approach, the premises are intended
onl y to be so strong that, if they are true, then it is unlikely that the conclusion is false. Here an
example co uld be the formulation of a new theory, based on sound findings.
As my research objective is to attempt findin g possible explanations for the marginal number of
cro ss-border transactions that occu rred in Europe despite the encouraging framework conditio ns,
my appro ach ca n be term ed inducti ve as my analysis of the framework conditions and the
expl orat ory research of the case studies will lead to a possible explanation.
There are three major criteria for eva luating scientific research, reliability, validity, and sensitivity
(Zikmund, 2000), though ju st the former seems applicable to the nature of this study. Broadly
defined, reliability is the degree to which measures are free from error and therefore yield
consistent result s. An investigation with good reliabilit y is not affected by who conducts it or by
the surroundings, and should give the same results if other researchers are conducting the same
anal ysis using the same sources. For my research I relied on sources from both academic journals
and non-academic origin , such as the European Commi ssion , the European Central Bank , the
GECD, the Bank of International Settl ements etc. that all have dealt, directly or indirectly , with my
research qu estion and the affected indu stry. Although I am aware that relying on secondary
information yields several shortcomings, not least becaus e "they are not designed specifically to
meet the researcher' s need"s, I believe to have marginalized these shortcomings by using
recognized and much-respected sources , and am therefore convinced of the reliability of my study.
5.2 Concepts and Definitions of M&As
In general, consolidation causes the resources of the industry becoming more tightly controlled,
because either the number of key firms is smaller or the rivalry between firms is reduced.
Con solidation may result from combinations of existing firms, growth among leading firms , or
indu stry exit of weaker institutions.
Broadly speaking there are two alternatives for firms combining with each other , either through
M&As or through joint ventures and strategic alliances. Each has its strengths and weaknesses and
may be particularly appropriate in certain situations, This thesis is particularly concerned with the
8 Zikmund, W. G. "Business research method s" , The Dryden Press, 6l!1 edition, 2000
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for mer of the two alterna tives as they represent the primary method of consolidation employe d by
firm s (Group of Ten, 200 I ). Mergers and acqui sitions can broad ly be defined to include mergers,
acq uisit ion s, tender offe rs, purchase s of stakes, divestures, and leveraged buyouts - the most
co mmon type is though the acquisition (Smith and Waiter, 2003).
An acqui sit ion is defined by the UNCTAD (2000) as a transact ion where a company (acquirer)
takes ove r another one (targe t) and clearly becomes the new owner . From a legal point of view, the
target company ceases to exist and the acquirer "swallows" the business, while stock of the
acquirer co ntinues to be traded. Similarly, a transaction that happens when two firms, often abo ut
the same size, agree to go forward as a new single entity rather than remain separately owned and
operated is ca lled a merger - often this is also referred to as a "merger of equals","
Acquisitions can, depending on the degree of ownership, be sub-divided into three ca tegories : I )
full asse t acqui sition, 2) majority acquis ition, and 3) partial (or minority) acquisition . As this thesis
focuses on the development s in the EU, it might be interesting to point out that particul arly the
third category is a very European modu s operandi , being almost three times as prevalent in
transact ion s involvin g non-UK Europea n corporations. 10 A gradual commitment to a final
arr angeme nt as so far often favored by European companies, as it appears cheaper and reversibl e.
Len gth y EU liaisons and courtships, or ' trial marriages' , may lead to full M&A' s that prove to be
more lasting and beneficial than some of the more impul sive, opportunistic US acquisi tions that
often appear to fail in deliverin g expected benefits (Smith and Walter, (2003)).
Depending on the geographic scope, mergers and acquisitions can be categorized into three broad
categories: I) Inter-EU M&A ' s where the acquirer and the target origin from the same country, 2)
Intra-EU M&A' s where the acquirer and the target are origin not from the same country but still
are located in the EU, and 3) EU-Global M&A 's where the acquirer is a company fro m an EU
country while the target is from a country outside the EU or vice versa (letto-GiIlies et al). While
the inter-Ell transaction is by definition a purely domestic deal, both the Intra-EU and the EU -
Global M&A' s are cross -border transaction s.
Furthermore, depending on the scope of business of the acquirer and the target, lets the UNCTAD
distingui sh between three types of transactions, I) the horizontal M&A, which refers to a si tua tion
9 In practice, however, actual mergers of equals do not happen veryoften as one company will buy another and, as part of the deal's
terms, simply allow the acquired tiro! to proclaim that the action is a merger of equals, even if it's technically an acquisition. Being
bought out often carries negative connotations, therefore, using the term "merger" instead allows dealmakers and top managers to
make the takeover more palatable In other words, the real difference between mergers and acquisitions lie in how the purchase is
communicated to and received by the target company's board of directors, employees and shareholders.
10 Smith, R. C. Waiter,!. "Global Banking", Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2003
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in which the merger or acquisition takes place between firms operating in the same industry , 2) the
vertica l M&A that involves firms ope rating at different stages of a sequential production process,
and 3) the conglomerate M&A which is a transaction between firms that are not related to eac h
other in terms of industrial output.11
5.3 Structure
To answer the research question I will follow Figure I, which outlines the structure of this thesis.
Th e first two major parts of this thesis will look at the macro-level , reviewing the developments in
Europe 's financi al market from a regulatory perspective followed by an analysis of the
co nso lida tion ac tivity that has taken place in recent years . Subsequ ently, I turn to the micro-level
in the third part, where I analy ze the ex -ante and ex-post proces ses in M&A transactions. In the
final part of the thesis will use my find ings from the macro- and micro-level and complement it
with the case-specific insights from two of the first and most spec tacular European cross-border
deals in banking.
Figure 1: Structure of the thesis
Sound Base of Sources for Quantitative
and Qualitative Research Methods
Source : Own illustration
6 Part 1 - Europe's Financial Market Infrastructure
I will begin this section by briefly explaining what a financial market is and what part icipants are
11 Several other classi fications exist, e.g. Bower (200 I) who provides a more elaborate typology which differentiates between five
different types of M&A 's, namely ; I) the overcapacity M&A, 2) the geographic roll-up M&A, 3) the product or market extension
M&A , 4) the M&A as R&D, and 5) the industry convergence M&A.
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operating in it. Due to the special characteristics of financial markets, I will then outline why it is
necessary to have regulatory and supervisory institutions and what their respective areas of
responsibility are.
This preliminary section will then be followed by a review of how the financial market evolved in
Europe over the past two decades by discussing some of the major policies taken to align
regulatory and supervisory structures among member states. At last, I will review the progress of
financial market integration within Europe by reviewing and discussing several indicators of both
quantitative and qualitative nature to conclude eventually whether integration of Europe's financial
market has succeeded.
6.1 What are Financial Markets?
A financial market can broadly be defined as an economic space wherein operators of various
kinds - banks, mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds, etc. - offer financial instruments
and services (Di Girogio and Di Noia, 200I). Its essential economic function is to channel funds
from households, firms, and governments that have saved surplus funds, to those that are in need
of funds because they wish to spend more than they currently have (Mishkin, 2004).
The channeling of funds from lenders to borrowers can happen in two ways. In direct financing,
borrowers borrow funds directly from lenders by selling them securities that are claims on the
borrower' s future income or assets. As this can be very time consuming and risky, an alternative
and today very common way is to leave this task to financial intermediaries that stand between the
lender and the borrower, hence the name indirect financing. Indirect financing or fin ancial
intermediation, is today the primary route for moving funds from lender to borrowers, and is
generally a far more important source of financing than the securities markets, also for
corporations (Mishkin, 2004).
The prime reason for financial intermediation obtaining its importance and influence in today' s
economy is that they resolve the information conflict faced by borrowers and generally enjoy
substantial economies of scale in processing and analyzing information. In addition, they can
provide their customers with liquidity services that make it easier and economically more viable
for customers to conduct transactions. This specialization and expertise allows them to more
efficiently and successfully screen out bad credit risks from good one, thereby reducing losses due
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to adverse selection.V In addition, financial intermediaries have developed an expertise in
monitoring the parties they lend to, thus reducing the losses due to moral bazard." Another aspect
of financial intermediaries is that they help investors to reduce their exposure to risk by creating
and selling assets with risk characteristics that individuals are comfortable with. Furthermore, their
often-large size!" allows them to take advantage of their scale, reducing the transaction costs per
dollar of transaction (Mishkin, 2004) making thereby the services of financial intermediaries more
attractive and accessible to a larger pool of customers.
6.1.1 Participants of Financial Markets
The financial intermediaries operating in financial markets can be classified into four broad
categories, namely 1) commercial banks, 2) insurance firms, 3) securities companies, and 4) asset
management firms. Depending on the purpose, different and finer subdivisions are possible e.g. by
risk characteristics, the maturity of their assets or liabilities, and the particular services they
provide. For the purpose of this thesis I will though adopt the above categorization, and introduce
the four respective categories briefly.
6.1.2 Commercial Banking
Probably the most publicly visible financial intermediary, as almost everybody has a bank account,
is the commercial banking sector, which also is the biggest sector in terms of people employed.
The clientele of commercial banks is very diverse, providing services to individuals, small
businesses and large organizations and institutions. As the needs and characteristics of individual
customers differ greatly from that of large-scale customers such as corporations and institutions,
the terms of accepting demand and other deposits as well as making commercial and consumer
loans are different. Therefore, commercial banks often segment their costumers to serve these
different needs accordingly. Alternatively, some commercial banks specialize entirely on one
segment e.g . small private banks focusing on very wealthy customers.
Because commercial banks are such an important component of the money supply for a countries
12 Asymmetric information occurs when a borrower has better information about the potential returns and risk associated with the
investment project for which funds are earmarked than the lender does. Adverse selection is the problem created by asymmetric
information before the transaction occurs. Adverse selection in financial markets occurs when the potential borrowers who are the
most likely to produce an undesirable (adverse) outcome - the bad credit risks - are the ones who most actively seek out a loan and
are thus most likely to be selected.
13 Moral haza rd is the problem created by asymmetric information after the transaction occurs. Moral hazard in financial markets is
the risk (hazard) that the borrower might engage in activities that are undesirable (immoral) from the lender's point of view,
because they make it less likely that the loan will be paid back.
1425 of the Worlds lOO largest corporations, ranked annually by the Financial Times are financi al institutions, see "Financial Times
Deutschland" , May 26, 2004
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economy, special attention is given to this group by the regulatory and governmental authorities to
ensure a proper functioning and conduct (Mishkin, 2004).
6.1.3 Insurance
The second most popular financial intermediary category is the insurance segment, which is
specialized in providing contingent promises by underwriting economic risks associatedwith
death, illness, damage to or loss of property, and other exposure to loss. Similar to commercial
banking, insurance companies are divided into two groups, life insurance and non-life insurance.
The distinction between the two lies largely in the long-term risks that reside in life insurance
compared with the short-term nature of most other insurance risk.
What is characteristic about non-life insurance, which includes social- and market insurance, is the
fact that social insurances for events such as the loss of labor income and the basic amenities of
life as a result of unemployment, disability and other medical problems, and natural disasters are
almost exclusively run by public-government owned firms. The reason why private insurers
usually do not provide this type of coverage is because: I ) losses are difficult, if not impossible to
predict, 2) losses and the events that trigger them can be difficult to defineprecisely, 3) the insured
is often able to withhold information important to the assessment of risk, and 4) the existence of
insurance can alter the insured's behavior. Insurance provided by private insurers is more common
in areas such as casualty and property where the problems listed above are less of a concern.
6.1.4 Asset Management
One reason that asset management recorded a considerable growth in recentyears is due to the
rapid aging of population. The share of savings invested in pension funds but also in the above-
mentioned life insurance sector has increased significantly and is expected to increase further due
to the inability of the public 'pay-as-you-go' pension schemes to supply adequate revenues in the
future (Dermine, 1999).
Asset management is concerned with investing the pooled resources of individuals and firms into
collective investment vehicles, consisting of a wide range of equity, debt, andderivativepromises.
The distinguishing characteristic of these vehicles is that they transform the underlying promises
into an equity promise by the vehicle. That is, the ultimate risk inherent in the underlying
investment portfolio is borne by the shareholders in the vehicle. Although thereare many
variations of collective investment vehicles around the world, most fall into one of the two main
types: either open-end or closed-end mutual funds. Open-endfunds issue newshares to the
investing public to generate new investments and typicallystand ready to buy back or redeem the
shares at their net asset value. Closed-end funds issue a fixed number of sharesonly. The
22
Why Are They Only Slowly Picking Up?
Low Level of Cross Border Mergers and Acquisitions in EU Banking Seetor
shareholders in a closed-e nd fund access the value of their investments by selling their shares on
the market.
Wh at distin gu ishes contrac tual sav ings institutions, such as insurance companies and mutual fund s
from commercia l banking, is that they acqu ire funds at periodic intervals on a contrac tual basis.
Thereby they ca n predict with reasonab le accuracy how much they will have to pay out in benefits
in the co ming years, and henc e they do not have to worry as much as depository instituti on s abo ut
losing funds (i .e . bank run s). As a result, the liquidity of assets is not as important a considera tion
for them as it is for depository institutions, and they tend to invest their funds primaril y in long-
term sec ur ities such as corporate bond, stocks, and mortgages,
6.1.5 Securities
The securities dea lers (including investment banks, stock brokers, and other financia l
intermediari es that stand ready to buy or sell securities) gained significant populari ty towards the
end of the 1990s through the global stock market hype. Their business is to make markets in new
sec urities by underwriting their issue and facilitating their distribution to individual and
institutional investors. They make sec ondary markets in these securities by taking principal
positions as buyers and sellers of existing securities. Securities dealers range from small firm s
spec ializing in single product lines to large diversified firms offering a broad range of services ,
including position-taking, brokerin g, margin lending to customers, investment banking services,
mon ey management, and research . Hence, these institutions can be viewed as specialists in
providin g liquidity services by in the same time reducing the searc h- and information costs
involved for customers in determining the fair value of partic ular securities.
Th e abov e four categori es of financi al market participants are though often interrelated as in
Europe the universal banking principle was and still is prevalent" , allowing e.g. commercial banks
to engage in a full range of securities acti vities in a direct way rather than through separately
incorporated subsidiaries. In addition, the rapid deve lopment s in IT and the genera l growth in the
size of banks due to con solidation, elaborated on in section 7.2, encouraged the spread of universal
banks that combine both retail - and whol esale functions as well as simultaneously performing
15 T hough was the UK an exception as it separated commercial banking from e.g. securities operations, similarly to the G1ass-
Steagall Act in the US. which the Gramm -Leach-Bli ley Act of 1999 though abolished.
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vario us or all of the four general acti vities." This interrelatedness between basic financial market
activities is well - illustrated in Figure 2 and does not only apply to commercial banks , altho ugh
they are the most frequent exa mples, but to all financial institutions.





Source: adapted from Smith and Waiter (2003)
Having introduced and given an overview of the main participants of financia l markets , I will now
explain why the financi al services sector is tightly regulated and supervised.
6.2 Purpose of Regulation and Supervision
The financia l services industry in general and banks in particular, represent the core of a countries
eco nomy.17 Therefore, every country regulates its financial industry with the objec tive of
maintaining a safe and sound banking system - one that is resistant to collapse and avoid s
contamina tion of the payment system and the credit allocation sys tem (and therefore the real
eco nomy) , yet without precluding the failure of institutions that are not competitively viable or are
poorly managed. IS
Financial regulators and supervisors have therefore the crucial tasks of identifying the 'bad '
institutions at an early stage and either prevent them from trading by refusing authorization,
16 Fazio, A. "Regulation and supervision in financial markets" Presentation the European Banking Congress 2004, Frankfurt,
November 19, 2004
17 The importance of a sound, well-regulated financial sector, of which the banking system is a crucial part, is sine qua non for
macroeconomic stability and sustained growth, says for example IMF' s Anne O. Krueger, "Banking needs of a global economy", at
the Bankers Conference in New Delhi, India, on November 10, 2004 to be found at:
http://www.imf.orglextemaUnp/speechesl2OO4/1 11004.htm
18 The main three major objectives of regulation are 1) to pursue macroeconomic and microeeonomic stability, 2) ensure
transparency in the market and of intermediaries, as well as protecting investors, and 3) to safeguard and promote competition in the
financial intermediation sector (Di Giorgio and Di Noia, 2001).
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improve their standards through regulation, or force them to close down. An economy that would
not pursue regulation and supervision of its financial institutions would increase the likelihood for
systemic risk, which is commonly known as the domino effect and refers to a situation where the
failure of one financial institution triggers the collapse of others, e.g. through bank-runs, thereby
putting the entire well-being of the economy at jeopardy. As Steil (1992) notes: "Systemic risk is
the market version of acid rain; it may be produced in only one jurisdiction, but its effects know no
boundaries."
The increasing interrelatedness of the four basic financial functions and the consequent increase in
financial conglomerates illustrates, according to Morrison (2002), the potential that the chances for
systemic risk have increased in recent years, highlighting furthermore the necessity of financial
regulation and supervision.
However, in the same turn as financial regulation and supervision protects an economy, it also
impacts the efficiency of a domestic financial system, which is why Smith and Waiter (2003)
consider the loss in efficiency as something of an "insurance premium" which offsets sometimes
results in gains in the safety and stability of the system. Therefore, by both imposing benefits and
costs on participants, countries should strive for optimumrather than minimumregulation that will
attract transaction flows to particular markets.19
Unfortunately, there is often no easy differentiation between the regulatory and supervisory tasks
of the controlling bodies.i" Figure 3 gives an illustration of the general conflicting objectives
between efficient financial markets on the one side, and regulatory objectives on the other side.
Hence, to ensure a sound- and properly functioning financial market, financial regulators set the
level playing field for the actors in the financial markets by means of directives, laws, and codes of
conduct, while financial supervision is seen as the executive force controlling for compliance with
the regulatory restrictions.
19 Smith, R. C. Waiter, I. "Global Banking", Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2003
20 www.wwz.unibas.ch/cofi/efmalpapers/l 03.pdf
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Figure 3: Overview of the regulatory and supervisory system for financial institutions
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Source: Adapted from Smith and WaIter (2003)
Traditionally, most EU countries relied (at least in part) on their respective central bank, or an
independent supervisory agency working in cooperation with the central banks, for all aspects of
regulation and supervision of the financial markets and its participants (usually except for
insurance and in some cases specialized activities like mortgage banking placed underseparate
regulatory authorities).
In the next chapter I will attempt to review the major regulatory and supervisory policies taken by
the EU to integrate Europe's financial market and attempt to evaluate if and how they caused the
desired output - namely integration.
6.3 Regulatory and Supervisory System across the EU
The First Banking Directive of 1977is widely acknowledge being the first concrete step towards a
single European financial market. Although this directivedoes not directly encourage pan-
European financial service provisionper se, it seeks to ease market entry for European Community
(EC) banks into other EC memberstate" by laying down certainbasic common standards,
attempting to prevent discriminatory barriers to market entry?2Initially, the First Banking
Directive relied on host country regulation, which however was ratified in 1979 via the twin pillars
of mutual recognition of their respective regulatory systems and home MemberState control of
pan-EC market activity, ensuring that all MemberStates weresubject to minimum standards in the
interests of investor protection, systemic stability, and effective mutual-recognition. Rather than
establishing uniform regulation and supervision for a single financial market, the principles of
21 At that time Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
22 These conditions include the requirement for new potential entrants to maintain capital separate from the resources of the main
company, to meet a certain initial capital requirement test, and, finally, to be directed by at least two persons of "sufficient repute"
and of "sufficient experience"0
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home country control, harmonization of essential principles, and mutual recognition were applied,
assuming that mutual recognition and market forces would interact to yield convergence in the
regulatory env ironment.F
These developments led to the Single Market Act (SMA), which was originally announced in
1983, agreed on in 1987, and implemented at the end of 1992. The SMA of was a part of the EC' s
White Paper 24, which was an "action to achieve a single market by 1992"by means of allowing
the free movement of goods, capital, people, and ideas. The goal was to enhance economic growth
in the EC (from now on referred to as the EU) by moving toward free markets and more open
competition.f Amongst others, with this White Paper the EU adopted an approach for banking,
insurance, and securities providing a regulatory passport under which issuers, collective
investment schemes, and investment firms could operate across the EU free of obstructive- and
costly host Member State rules.26
This initiative was furthermore complemented and strengthened by the Second Banking Directive
of 1989. The Second Banking Directive (SBD) henceforth permitted companies to secure a license
in their home countries and use this as a 'passport' to offer its services anywhere in the EU?? The
SMA came together with the SBD into force in 1993 and provided the framework for an integrated
banking sector.
Due to the national differences inherent in the different Member countries prior to these
developments, potential conflicts were though arising which needed additional amendments.i''
Hence, to ensure and restore fairness, harmonization of capital requirements were the solution to
create a level playing field, the Own Funds Directive and the Solvency Ration Directive sought to
establish common ground rules, Le. the Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) that was to regulate
functions instead of institutions. The CAD established uniform capital requirements applicable to
both universal banks' securities operations and non-bank securities firms.
Parallel, the Basel Committee established in 1988 an agreement regarding common capital
23 Gjersem, C. "Financial market integration in the cure-area", OECD Workillg Paper, No. 368, October 2003
24 from 1985, to be found at hltp:/Ieuropa.eu.intlconunloff/pdf/1 985_031O_Cen.pdf
25 Smith, R. C. Waiter, I. "Global Banking", 0 4 0rd University Press, 2nd edition, 2003
26 Molony, N. "The Lamfulussy Legislative model: a new era for the EC securities and investment services regime", Interna tional
and Comparative Law Quarte rly, 52(2), 2003
27 At the same time, the directive established certain minimum standards that home country authorities need to apply in granting
such licenses, including a minimum authorizedcapital of 5 million ECUs, the provision of information on majorshareholders, and
limitations on a bank's holdings in non-financial institutions.
28 The Continental or German model of universal banking would be competing with the Anglo-Saxon, or British model that
generally separates banking and securities activities. As a result would for example the securities operations of Germany's universal
banks be competing with Britain's non-bank securities firms, which caused distortion in respect to the fairness of competition.
27
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adequacy requirements which also came into force in 1993. Because the EU's CAD was developed
at the same time as the Basel Committees Capital Accord" , the two initiatives influenced each
other and one might say that what Europe was pursuing locally was what Basel was pursuing
globa lly.i''
Perhaps the biggest step towards integrating Europe's financial marketcame with the Maastricht
treaty and the subsequent agreement to create a European Monetary Union (EMU) that included
the use of a common currency, the euro. Mr. Duisenberg, former presidentof the European Central
Bank that was established as a consequence of the EMU, said that "the introduction of the euro has
had - and will continue to have - a powerful influence on European financial market developments
and integration".
In light of the EMU just a minor thing, the Investment Services Directive (ISO), which came into
force in 1996, heralded the completion for pan-European operation of the three major financial
services (banking, insurance, and investment services), by creating a 'European Passport' for non-
bank investment firms to carry out a wide range of investment businesses as well as certain
additional services (such as investment advice, adviceon mergers and acquisitions), in all Member
States.31 Unlike the single license in banking, however, this 'European Passport ' did not go as far
was the SBD, thus, the establishment of e.g. insurance branches in other countries still requires the
authorization of the host country.
One would expect that all possible and necessary steps were ratified and that Europe's financial
services industry would rapidly integrate. However, by 1998 it became clear that the progress was
disappointing. For example was the legal structure, which constructed and regulated the EU
securities and investment services market, failing as large areas of regulation remained largely
unharmonised (e.g., control of market manipulation, conduct of business regulation, and securities
trading market regulation) notes Molony (2003). Additionally, Molony finds that that the regime
was ill-equipped to cope effectively with the enormous demands that were placed on it such as the
29 The capital held by any firm helps to absorb possible business losses and thus protect its creditors. Consequently, bank
supervisory agencies have an interest in maintaining adequate capital in the banking system and have used their authority to impose
minimum capital requirements. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision adopted the Basel Capital Accord, which explicitly
linked capital regulations to a bank's degree of risk. By establishing minimum capital requirements that were internationally
comparable, the Busel Accord paved the way for more uniform capital requirements aeross countries, by requiring banks to hold as
capital at least 8% of their risk-weighted assets. Four risk weights or "risk buckets" were created. The first bucket, generally
consisting of claims on OECD governments (which includes thc U.S.), has a zero weight. The second bucket, generallyconsisting
of claims on banks incorporated in OECD countries, has a 20% weight. The thirdbucket, consisting of residential mortgage claims,
has a 50% weight, and the fourth bucket, generally consisting of claims on consumers and corporations, has a 100% weight.
Following the adoption and phasing in of the Accord, the amount of capitalheld by banks increased substantially.
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arrival of the EMU, the Internet 'explosion' , technological developments in the securities trading
environment, and market restructuring (such as the growth of financial conglomerates and the
arrival of competition and consolidation in the securities trading market field), The prime reasons
for this disappointing result were amongst others the inconsistent and delayed implementation of
directives and underdeveloped supervisory co-operation, on which the effectiveness of home
Member State supervision and the systemic stability of the integrated market were dependent.
With the introduction of the common currency and a response to the lacking progress, the
European Commi ssion decided in 1999 to set out a program that investigated what caused the
delay and what needed to be done in order to kick-start financial integration. The result of this
initiative was the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), which outlined forty-two measures (an
overview of these measures is illustrated in Appendix A).
Anxiety about the slow progress of the FSAP resulted in 2000 in the establishment of a Committee
of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets under the chairmanship of
Alexandre Lamfalussy (Blokland and Zech, 2002). It was asked to assess the current conditions for
the implementation of the regulation of securities markets in the EU, how the mechanism for
regulating those markets can best respond to developments, and, in order to eliminate barriers, to
propose scenarios for adapting current practices to ensure greater convergence and cooperation in
day-to-day implementation. 32
The Committee concluded that the EU's current regulatory framework is too slow, too rigid,
complex, and ill-adapted to the pace of global financial market change. Lamfalussy made the
following remarks to the Press" : "The European Union has a great opportunity to strengthen its
economy , improv e its long-run competitiveness and investor returns for all citizens, if it can create
a single financi al market in the next few years. But this can only happen if the European regulatory
system is made more efficient and decisions are taken in a timely way, at the right level. We can
no longer afford the luxury of regulatory inefficiency in the instantaneous Internet age. Financial
markets are changing by the week - and European regulation is simply not up to speed."
For its report , the Committee of Wise Men conducted an online survey" asking about the current
hurdles for greater financial integration across Europe; the results are illustrated in Figure 4.
32 Committee of Wise Men, "Final report of the Committee of Wise Men an the regulation of European securities markets",
February 200 I
33 Summary of remarks made by Alexandre Lamfalussy, Chairman of the Committee of Wise Menon the Regulation of European
Securities Markets, to thc Press concerning the Committee'Sinitial report published on November9,2000
34 For this ad hoc questionnaire in total 69 responses were received from a wide range of market participants all over the European
Union and from third countries (the US and Switzerland).
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securities markets" , February 200 1
Despite not being representative it appears nevertheless, that except for cultural and linguistic
problems, all of the stated obstacles date more or less back to insufficient regulatory and
supervisory harmonization. Legal differences are the most prominent obstacles felt by 43 out 69
respondents, followed by a lack of unified securities legislation and tax differences. Particularly in
respect to the legal problems is Europe's takeover directive a case in point." As Smith and Waiter
(2003) note, regulations for takeovers are numerous'? and until a few years ago, they were vastly
different from one another, creating a confusing and often uneven playing field for participants. In
recent years, efforts have been made to harmonize these regulations, but progress has been modest,
although an end was near in mid-200l after 12 years of work." However, the German government
had second thoughts, which caused further delaysand modifications. Eventually on May 20, 2004
35 The Takeover Directive aims to provide a framework of common principles for cross-border takeover bids, create a level playing
field for shareholders and establish disclosure obligations throughout the Union.
36 These include regulations, securities laws, or regulations relating to fraudulent practice such as required disclosures, trading
restrictions (such as insider trading), and prohibitions against making false markets. There are also rules, codes, and established
procedures prescribed by stock exchanges or self-regulatory bodies that mayor may not be supported by enforcement powers.
These various tiers of regulation can be imposed at national and at the EU levels.
37 The directive required bidders who acquired control of a company to make an offer to all shareholders on the same terms, and
prohibits frustrating defensive tactics unless these have been approved by shareholders - in effect barring poison bills that do not
have shareholder approval. The German government resisted this provision, reflecting a basie antagonism to a free and transparent
market for corpora te control. Yet in absence of this provision, the entire EU takeover code is relatively meaningless.
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the directive was ratified - after 14 years of negotiations." The final outcome caused a great deal
of criticism because it was characterized by 'too much' consensus, thereby making it in many eyes
weak and ineffective.
The Lamfalussy Committee therefore calls for a four-level approach to decision-making and
implementation of financial-market proposals (illustrated in Appendix B), which will help to kick-
start the integration progress of primarily the equity markets. At the first level, the Council of
Ministers, the European Commission and the European Parliament would agree on 'framework'
legislation and would decide which of the measures to be implemented should be passed to the
next level. At this second level, a newly created 'securities committee', made up of representatives
of the commission and of member states, would reach agreement within three months on the
technicaliti es of the new legislation, which they would do after consulting market participants and
consumers. Levels three and four of the Larnfalussy approach to decision-making involve co-
operation among national regulators via a ' regulators committee' . Its purpose will be to improve
the implementation of EU legislation by the better enforcement of EU rules." While having a large
pool of supporters, Lamfalussy' s recommendation of centralizing capital market regulation in one
pan-European entity, similar to the SEC of the US, also had opponents, e.g. Kern (2002) who
argues that "until EU financial markets become more integrated, a single EUsecurities regulator would
not be an efficient or effective institutional model for EU securities markets." The complexity of this
discussion is therefore similar to the 'chicken and the egg' problem. Are major changes necessary to
advance further in the integration process, or should the EU wait for wider integration before initiating
new measures to avoid an 'integration-overload'?
The same changes that seemed to slow down the integration process in the EU in the end of the
I990s, took its toll on the Basel Capital Accord, or Basel 1. Hence, Basel 2 was proposed in 1998.
As Trichet, President of the ECB, noted in a recent speech: "the average bank of 1988 [... ] is a
very different animal compared with the average bank today".4o
The controversy over the new risk classifications, and the cost to banks of administering the new
approach led to delays, and Basel 2 was first agreed upon on June 25, 2004 and is intended to
38 for a more elaborate review of Europe's takeover directive see for example Bergloef, E. Burkart, M. "European takeover
regulation", Center for Econom ic Policy Research, 2003
39 "A ragbag of reform", The Economist, March 3, 2001
40 Trichet, J. C. "Integration of the European financial sector", Introductory remarks at the International Banking Event, Frankfurt
am Main, June 29, 2004
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come into force in stages from the end of 2006.41 Unlike its predecessor, Basel2 will be based on
three pillars'", the most noteworthy being the introduction of more comprehensive and risk-
sensitive rules, forcing financial intermediaries to set aside capital not only to take credit risk into
consideration, but also for their operational risk. Although being acknowledged as being a great
improvement to the old Basel accord, Benink and Wihlborg (2001) note that the three pillars of
Basel 2 are not 's trong' enough to avoid banks from 'gaming and manipulating ' with the risk-
weights when using the internal ratings option, which is why they suggest that issuing of
subordinated debt would better help the market discipline pillar, and thereby the overall Basel 2
accord.
From a regulatory perspective, the above mentioned developments seem to be the most formative,
and although not all of them originate and affect solely the EU, i.e. the Basel accord, the
importance of these developments are undisputable.
I will now turn to the supervisory side to investigate whether the above-mentioned regulatory
attempts were supported by an appropriate supervisory infrastructure. As mentioned already and
illustrated in Figure 3, financial supervision controls the compliance of financial market
participants with the regulatory framework. In order to do so, the means for supervision range from
self-control, over public supervision and enforcement, through the criminal and civil justice system.
In addition, stakeholders in general and shareholders in particularare increasingly filling
supervisory functions, by monitoring and reporting any misconduct.
In Europe financial services supervision is nationally organized and enforced through the pan-
European principles of minimum harmonization, home country control, and mutual recognition,
while any further co-operation between those institutions is based on a networkof bilateral
memoranda of understanding (MOUS) .43 Supervision on a national basis permits the authorities to
operate near the entities subject to control, and it favors a constant exchange of information and
direct contact with intermediaries.44
One would suppose this being advantageous, as it is fast and efficient, though on the other hand
41"Basel 2", The Economist, July lst, 2004
42 The first pillar deals with the minimum regulatory capital requirement and contains new rules for calculating more refined risk
weights for different kinds of loans. Moreover, it suggests that capital should beheld against so-called operational risk. The second
pillar is the supervisory review process, which requires supervisors to ensure that each bank has sound internal processes in place to
assess the adequacy of its capital based on a thorough evaluation of its risks. The third pillar aims to bolster market discipline
through enhanced disclosure by banks. Although the new framework' s focus is primarily on internationally active banks, its
underlying principles are intended to be suitable for application to banks of varying levels of complexity and sophistication.
43 http://www.epfsf.orglmeetingsl2002lbriefingslbriefins-S oct2002_more.htm
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this system is also very 'flexible' in terms of interpreting and enforcing regulations, which is of
concern in some Member states when it crosses the interests of 'national champions' that are
threatened by competition from abroad. Moreover, in terms of efficiency for example, the multiple
reporting requirements to various national supervisory institutions implies a cost burden to
institutions operating in more than one member state, which similarly causes a competitive
distortion as large institutions can carry the additional cost burden more easily than small ones. In
addition, the fact that different supervisors enjoy different levels of competence and attach
different relative weights to the objectives, results often in inconsistent implementation of EU
legislation and is therefore a major obstacle to a single market. Also the IMFand the BIS have
raised concerns presuming that the current arrangement of national supervision may not be
conducive to guaranteeing an effective supervision of institutions operating in several Member
States.
The fact that financial institutions of all types are increasingly offering products and services
(directly or through affiliates) that compete not only against those offered by similar types of
institutions but also against those offered by other categories of service providers, complicates the
task of supervision even further.
Trichet (2004) therefore concludes that regulatoryconvergence has to be complemented by
supervisory convergence. To achieve this goal, several proposals are currently underdiscussion;
should there be one single European financial services supervisor or merely an intensification of
bilateral and multilateral co-ordination by steppingup their information exchange and identify best
working practices?
It is widely believed that the most efficient institutional structure is to place financial services
supervision at an independent, but politically accountable agency, which, at the same time is
mandated to maintain a close exchange of information with the central bank.The ECB and many
national central banks have therefore called for banking supervision in Europe to be entrusted to
central banks, while the leading role for co-ordination on a European level would be given to the
existing Banking Supervision Committee of the ECB.
6.4 Degree of Europe's Financial Market Integration
Reaching a single and unambiguous verdict of the degree of integration in the financial sector is
very difficult because the financial services sector is a multi-product industry witha differing
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degree of integration of ducts and markets, notes Padoa-Schioppa." Nevertheless, there is
consensus that the past measures have been considerable, in particular the EMU. Several studies
have been made, notably Adam et al. (2002), Adjaoute and Danthine (2003) and Baele et al
(2004), which attempt to measure the degree of integration. Though first of all its seems important
to define financial market integration. Baele et al (2004) define it as follows:
The market for a given set of financial instruments and/orservices is fully integrated if all potential
market participant s with the same relevant characteristics ( I) face a single set of rules when they
decide to deal with those financial instruments and/or services; (2) have equal access to the above-
mentioned set of financial instruments and/or services; and (3) are treated equally when they are
active in the market.
In other words, full integration requires the same access to banks or trading, clearing and
settlement platforms for both investors and firms, regardless of their region of origin. In addition,
once access has been granted, full integration requires that there is no discrimination among
comparable market participants based solely on their location of origin.
The next ques tion that arises is how can financial integration be assessed or measured? From a
theoretical point of view, a perfectly integrated market is where the 'Law of One Price' holds,
which states that if assets have identical risks and returns, then they should be priced identically
regardless of where they are transacted."
However, basing an assessment on one parameter only, is potentially dangerous due to the possible
bias and one-sided assessment, hence, I will complement this analysis where feasible by means of
other quantitative indicators, such as foreign presence in domestic markets and accessof residents
to other Member States markets. Though it is important to keep in mind that the mere presence of
cross-border activity in a market place does not deliver absolute proof of financial market
integration, it is though an indication that markets are contestable to some degree."
In order to assess financial market integration systematically out of a wide body of literature on
this issue, I will in the following focus on some key segments of the financial market. Also Schtiler
45 Speech by Padoa-Schioppa , T. (member of the executive board of the ECB) "T he evolving European financial landscape:
integration and regulation", a Colloquium organizedby GroupeCaisse des DepotslKfW, Berlin, March 22, 2004
46 1n addition to financial instruments, the law of one price should also apply to the goods market. However, given transportation
costs and other frictions (non-fungibility, non-storability, ctc.) that are impossible or difficuIL to remove, the law of one price is
unlikely to hold as well in the goods market as in financial markets.
47 The reader should be aware that also other means exist to analyze financial integration, such as the 'news-based measures' , used
by Baele et al (2004). Assuming that in a financially integrated area portf~lios .should be w~1I diversified one would expect news
(Le. arrival of new economic information) of a regional character to have little tmpac.to~ prI~e~ , wh~rcas common or ~lob~l ~ews
should be relatively more important. This presupposes that the degree of . syst~ma.LIe .rIsk IS l.denLIe~ ac~oss assets III different
countries. If that is not the case local news may continue to influence asset prices, indicating that integrution IS not complete.
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and Heinemann (2002) argue in the context of measuring integration, the distinction between
wholesale capital markets and retail financial markets becomes crucial. In the following, I will
though adopt a more naITOW view, focusing on four financial market segments, namely the money,
the government bond, the equity, and the credit or retail market."
6.4.1 Money Market
The money market is commonly defined as the market for short-term debt, where 'short-term'
means a maturity of up to one year. Plotting the cross-sectional standard deviation of one- and 12-
month, as well as overnight interest rates of the previous 10years from the 12 euro-area countries,
as shown in Appendix C and Appendix 0 , illustrates that the convergence process started around
1996 or early 199749, and collapsed following the introduction of the euro in 1999 to a very low
level.50 This does, however, not point to a sudden integration but is merely a consequence to the
absence of exchange rate risks and the gradual harmonization of national economic policies, as
Baele et al. (2004) note.
Nevertheless, the measures taken to create an integrated market sphere in the money market have
shown its results with the uniform conditions across the EU and the high degree of integration that
prevailed very shortly after the EMU in 1999. This is supported by the study Santillanet al. (2000)
conducted who investigated the effects of the introduction of the euro in 1999 on euro-area bond
and money markets. Based on measured interest rate differences across countries and market
survey data, they concluded that the unsecured money market segment very quickly became highly
integrated. Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001) support this partially, noting that the impact of the EMU
has been considerable, but the progress towards integration has been uneven across different
market segments. Also Baele et al. (2004) show that not all segments of the market have yet
reached the same level of what might be called 'near-perfect' integration. It is therefore necessary
to distinguish between the unsecured and the secured parts of the money market, where the euro-
denominated interbank unsecured money market is an integrated market, while the secured money
markets are less integrated.I'
48 These markets could also be classified more narrowly, e.g. in terms of transaetion size, instruments, and client groups, though I
do not deem this necessary here.
49 If the market is fully integrated the ratio will be close to one.
50 The remaining dispersion in euro area bank lending rates, as illustrated by th? ' bo~- in - the-box' di agra~ns , is ch i~n.y linked to the
local character of some lending activity and broadly similar to the degree of dispersion than can be registered within some of the
larger Member states. Rates for consumer loans within Germany for example, vary between 5.5 and 13.7 percent for loans up to €
100,000 (Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, July 2003)
51 "Financial Integration Monitor 2004", European Commission DG Internal Market, April28, 2004
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6.4.2 Government Bond Market
Similar to the money market, the commoncurrency had great impacts on conversion in the
government bond market. The potential benefits from an integrated government bond market are
considerable, because governments can reduce the cost of servicing their debt considerably
because it is easier for investors to diversify geographically and thereby largely eliminate their
exposure to purely local economic shocks. This, in turn, should reducethe yield required by
investors and result in lower interest payments for governments.
Adjaoute and Danthine (2003) found in a recent study that considerable convergencehas taken
place, though, according to their estimations, a further integration could potentially reduce debt
servicing costs for the euro-area by €5bn per year. This is in line with the findings from Hartmann
et al. (2003) who find, that the bond market has converged rapidly after the EMU, although to a
lesser extent than the money market.
As eminent from Figure 5, plotting the spread between yields in the various euro-area government
bond markets relative to Germany's bond yields between 1993 and 2003 (Ifl-year maturity
segment), the yield spreads have become very small as of early 1998, with the exception of
Greece.






. -•• - Fwh:.d
• - - N. :hulm<b
- FI1nCe
...... Pcr.u~
• •• C"1u c:t
•._-- Spm
-r-r-r-,--,--.,--,--.--r-.,-,..- ' .,- ,--,- r-r--,--,--,-,--,--,,-,.-r-.-.-.-.-,--,,-,..
-l--I·-+-+-I--+--+-++-·I-I-If-t-t-t--+--+-+-+-H-t-+--+-++-rt-·- '--
Source: Baele et al. (2004)
Although full integration in the government bond market has not yet achieved, Baele et aJ. (2Q04)
found that investors were eager to benefit from the improved diversification benefits of an almost
integrated EU government bond market. As a consequence, investors have considerably increased
their holdings of non-domestic bonds, which is a very positive sign towards full integration,
reducing home bias of bond markets.
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6.4.3 Equity Market
In the equity market, a good sign towards integration is the increased cross-border equity trading
that led some of Europe's stock exchanges to expand, or to consider expansion, across their
national borders. So far, consolidation among exchanges has though been limited to the merger of
the Amsterdam, Brussels, and Paris exchanges in September 2000,which now constitutes
Euronext. However, Deutsche Borses' renewed battle, though now in competition with Euronext,
to take over the London Stock Exchange, as well as considerations in the Nordic countries to
merge their trading platforms, illustrates that there is a strong urge for streamlining and merging
particularly the various small European equity markets.
With a further integration of equity markets in Europe, several potential benefits can be achieved
such as decreasing costs of equity capital and access to a much largerpool of funds for
corporations, widening the supply of financing to the entireeuro-area. Nevertheless, massive
concerns are voiced by entities losing out in the consolidation gameraisingconcerns about
monopoly pricing if e.g. Deutsche Borse' s take-over attempt of the London Stock Exchange
succeeds.V
Figure 6 plots a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered return series53 for the 12 EMU countries from 1973
through 2003, which shows that the HP-filtered returns vary widely during the 1970s and 1980s.
However, from the end of the 1990s these returns move more closely which may suggest that
equity returns across the euro area have become increasingly determined by common euro-area
factors. This rise in correlations may though have been caused by 'cycle' rather than structural
changes in the underlying economy and/or financial system, therefore one has to read this figure
with care.
52 Cohen, N. "Fresh hurdles for Borsc LSE bid", Financial Times,January 11 , 2005
53 The Hodrick-Prcscoll filter is a smoothing method that is widely used among macroeconornists to obtain a smooth estimate of the
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Another, quantitative approach to evaluate the integration of Europe's equity markets is to look at
the degree of foreign listed companies in a countries stock exchange. What appears from Figure 7
is that the major European equity platforms, such as the London Stock Exchange, Euronext, and
Deutsche Borse, have a relatively large proportion of foreign listed companies compared to the
New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq from the US. For the smaller European exchanges, notably
Spain's and Italy's this does not surprisingly lookdifferent, with only marginal foreign listings.
With between 15-25 percent of foreign companies listed on Europe's largest stock exchanges,
taking parallel into consideration that also companies from non-EU states use this option, this
number appears then relatively small.
An inhibiting factor for more extensive foreign listingof especially European companies, are the
various national stock exchanges. And althoughit is generally acknowledged that thereare large
benefits from diversifying equity portfolios across countries and/or sectors, in reality particularly
private investors still seem to allocate a disproportionately large fraction of their equity holdings to
domestic listed firms. This is likely caused by the well-documented highercosts of cross-border
trades compared to the costs of domestic trades, accompanied by the home country advantage in
terms of information search costs.
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Guiso et a1. (2003) find in their study, after analyzing the current state of equity ownership in
several European countries, that while households' equity market participation has increased, there
remain considerable country-specific differences. They conclude from this that euro-area
investor's face different levels of participation costs, which suggests that there are still a number of
barriers that need to be overcome before full integration is reached.
Nevertheless, the study by Adam et al. (2002) shows that institutional investors now increasingly
complement their portfolio with non-domestic shares, though the majority of these non-domestic
shares are non-European . Nevertheless, Baele et al. (2004) illustrate in Figure 8 that the share of
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Figure 8: Asset share of euro-area investment funds with European investment strategy
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Source: Bacle et a!. (2004)
In this respect it is though interesting to note that both Baele et al. (2004) and Ehling and Ramos
(2002) found that the advantages of sector diversification have in 2000 for the first time in the last
30 years surpassed those of geographical diversification . This means that greater benefits can be
derived from investing in different sectors rather than different countries. In addition, equity
returns in general have become increas ingly sensitive to European shocks, rather than pure local
shocks, whic h indicates a considerable degree of integration in the Europe 's equity markets, while
in the same time being an incentive to invest more in non-European equity."
Nevertheless, the degree of integration in Europe's equity markets is relatively weak. Emiris (2002)
concludes for example in his study that European equity markets are not perfectly integrated.
Hartma nn et al. (2003) also found only weak evidence that some integration in equity markets took
place over the pas t few years.
6.4.4 Retail market
Assessing the degree of integration in the retail banking area is probably the most complicated
task , due to two major reasons, the limited availability of data, and the intrinsic characteristic s of
retail banking . Despite the diffic ulties of applying the Law of One Price, one would though expect
to see similar impacts of the EMU in the retail market with price differential s across countries to
diminish gradua lly.
54 "Financial Integration Monitor 2004". European Commission DGInternal Market, April 28, 2004
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A rather simple way to measure integration in the retail market is to compare the cost of
transferring El00 from one country in the EU to another country in the EU. Figure 9 illustrates that
these costs vary significantly, ranging between €16.84 in Luxembourg and €34.79 in France in
1993, to decrea se to between €9.89 in Luxembourg and €31.09 in Greece in 2003.55
The banking industry has pointed out that cross-border payments remain more expensive due to
the lack of an integrated pan-European retail payment system, and that parts of these payments
have to be proces sed manually. The banks argue that the volume is too low (less than I percent of
total transfers) to justify the investment in costly automation and interoperability.f
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Similarly to the costs of cross-border transfers, the time it took before a cross-border transfers was
executed, looks also 'very disintegrated' and far from domestic conditions, despite improvements
in reducing the average time-span to just under 3 days in 2003, compared to 4.5 days in 1993.
So although EU regulation in this area did not result in prices to converge between countries, the
creation of the pan-European clearing system in November 2003 (STEP2)57 can be expected to
foster significant improvement in convergence."
55 Ibidem.
56 Gjersem, C. "Financial market integration in the euro-area", GECD Working Paper, No. 368, October 2003
57 STEP2, offers a clearing system for settling euro payments between countries in the EU. This covers credit transfers of up to
€12,5oo
58 "Financial Integration Monitor 2004 _BackgroundDocument", European Commission DG Internal Market, 2004
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Furthermore, Appendix E illustrates the interest rates forbothshort-term and medium- to long-
term loans to companies. It appears from the graph that overall recent years saw a pattern of
decreasing dispersion for both short-term and medium- to long-term interest rates to companies,
although the short-term dispersion of interest rates has slowly increased since2000. Similarly,
Appendix F illustrates the interest dispersion of interest rates for mortgage loans and consumer
loans since 1990. Also here a general pattern of decreasing dispersion is evident, however, the
dispersion of mortgage loans is relatively low compared to consumer loans. Nevertheless, as
particularly consumer loans also experience widespread differences within countries, and are
dependent on personal characteristics, it is not very surprising that the same pattern appears on a
pan-European scale. Consequently, integration in the retail markets may be considered quite
advanced from a legal perspective, but price differentials remain relatively high andnon-regulatory
barriers to integration continue to exist and are, for instance, due to cultural differences in
consumer behaviors or preferences for different types of credit. To that comes that the retail
market is still a very localized phenomenon with different underlying characteristics of credits,
which might make complete convergence almost impossible.
In its broad assessment of financial integration, the EDCommissiorr" also concludes that lending
activity within the ED remains rather fragmented, particularly when considering the retail end of
the spectrum. Furthermore, Adam et at. (2002) provide evidence that market integration in the
retail segment has so far been modest and is still far from being complete while, which is
supported by Cabral et al. (2002), who note that market segmentation remains strongest in the
retail area. The results of Kleimeier and Sander's (2002) studyindicate though that the EMU had,
and will most probably continue having, an important impact on the emergence of a single retail
banking market in Europe. Padoa-Schioppa (2000) on the otherhand appears though less
optimistic and expects that indications for widespread cross-border operations in retail banking
should not be expected very soon. And while Schtiler and Heinemann (2002) conclude that retail
financial markets still reveal substantial fragmentation they acknowledge thatnational retail
financial markets will remain segmented to a certain degree.
59 "Financial Integration Monitor 2004", European CommissionDOlntemal Market. 2004
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6.5 Conclusion
Significant measures have been undertaken to createa level playing field that wouldencourage the
integration of Europe's financial markets. Hence, the integration appears advanced from a legal
perspective, and Buch and Heinrich (2002) note in their study that the existence of the various
directives affecting banking has led some commentators to suggest that Europe might be
considered as one of the most integrated banking markets worldwide.
The systematic analysis of four key segments of Europe's financial market has however revealed
that there appear to be differences in the progress of integration, illustrated in Table I.
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While the money market appeared to be the most integrated, the credit or retail market showed
least signs of integration. There are though also differences within these broad segments, hence the
unsecured money market appeared more integrated than the secured money market. Similarly, the
interest rate dispersion for the medium- to long-terminterest rates of loans to enterprises showed
more conversion than the interest rate dispersion for consumer loans, which was the most
fragmented market segment.
Nevertheless, the enforcement of the various regulations and directives materialized very slowly
mainly caused by the less unified supervisory structure as well as diverging national interests. In
addition Gjersem (2003) notes that the remaining obstacles to deep integration are rooted in
different legal, administrative, accounting, tax and consumer protection systems, which will need
to be dismantled to achieve to objective of an integrated European financial market.
This is supported by several European bankers who claim that national politics were still hindering
banking consolidation. Asked what was the biggest obstacle to banking mergers in Europe,
Rijkman Groenik, ABN Amro eEG, said: "Politics". He added: "A number of central bankers said
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that in itself supervisory rules are not an obstacle, but of course supervision can be used for
politics,,6o, giving a broad hint to the French and German central bankers. They insisted though
that prudential rules were not being used to protectnational banks from takeover. Instead the lack
of cross-border activity was largely down to different tax rules, consumer protection standards, and
. I h " 61nationa c aractenstics.
7 Part 2 - Consolidation Activity in Europe
In at lecture at the London School of Economics, Howard Davies, the former Chairman of UK's
Financial Services Agency (FSA)62, noted that the ultimate test for an integrated market is whether
it is responding in terms of cross-border consolidation activity and whetherit is producing the
supposed benefits of a deeper and more liquid financial market.
In this chapter of the thesis I will therefore review and analyze the consolidation activity in Europe
of the past decade, before turning more specifically to theconsolidation developments of the
financial services industry and here specifically banking.
7.1 Consolidation Activity
It is undisputed that particularly towards the end of the 1990s an unprecedented wave of M&As
affected not only the European markets but most industrialized countries. The reason for the
increase in European M&A activity has been the growing recognition of the need for industrial
restructuring following the adoption of the single European market and the EMU by EU countries,
note Smith and Waiter (2003). Yet also other factors such as the low-growth high-unemployment
environment which created great pressures to improve the competitive performance and efficiency,
as well as the collapse of the communist powers in Eastern Europe contributed to the restructuring.
Furthermore, innovation and changes in technology, notably IT, indirectly triggered consolidation
being the most dynamic source of change in the wholeeconomy (Cameron, 1997). Steger et al.
(2004) therefore claim that technology also has a great impact on M&A activity with its role being
60 Parker, G. "Bank merger rules to be reviewedby Brussels", Financial Times, September 12, 2004
61 Ibidem.
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threefold: as the initiator, the enabler, and the aim of M&A.63
Different from the previous consolidation wave in the 1980s, where the manufacturing sector
accounted for the majority of deals, the most recent M&A wave'" of the I990s experienced a
relative unimportance of manufacturing - accounting for only 35.1 percent of the total value of
such transactions (Evennett, 2002). The service sector on the other hand was the most active,
particularly financial intermediation, telecommunications, electricity, media, and transportation.
The overall number of M&A's in Europe, as illustrated in Figure 10, grew from 2,257 announced
deals in 1990 to 2,832 in 1995 and reached its peakof 5,577 in the year 2000.
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Source: Metwalli and Ta ng (2003)
Parallel to the increasing number of European M&A's, the value of transactions increased
significantly too. As Figure II illustrates, the total value of M&A deals was ratherconstant in the
first 5 years of the decade hovering around$220bnbefore increasing to $340bn in 1995 and
reaching a record of $1.95 trillion in 1999. The accompanied surge in multi-billion dollar
transactions, also termed mega-rnergers, whichon a worldwide scale saw an almost quadrupling in
the period 1996 and 2000, increasing from 45 multi-billion deals in 1996 to 175 deals in 2000
63 Steger et a!. (2004) furthermore note that this is evident from previous M&A waves, where new production techniques,
innovations in communication and innovative materials acted as initiators for M&As during the industrial revolution. now - during
the information revo lution - infonnationaltechno1ogy is having similar effects.
64 The first Wave was between 1897 _ 1904, the Second Wavc between 1916 - 1929. the Third Wave was between 1965 - 1969.
the Fourth Wave was between 1981 _ 1989, and the Fifth Wave started in the beginning of the 1990' s and ended with 2000/2001
with the bursting do t-eo m bubb le and the 9/1 1attacks (Gaughan, (2002))
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contributed to this phenomenon.f The increasing transaction values and the rising number of
mega-mergers indicate that towards the end of the I990s, consolidation was no longer restricted to
smaller firms, but that more and more large firms were involved in restructuring and consolidating.
The M&A boom in 1999 and 2000 was, however, followed by a dramatic slowdown in 200 I in
line with the global economic recession and terrorist uncertainty. In 2001, while the number of
transactions fell 33 percent to 3,749, the total value ofM&A deals plummeted 51percent to
$745bn, which was the steepest annual M&A value decline since 1990 (Metwalli and Tang, 2003).
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Source: Metwalti and Tang (2003)
All in all, the recent M&A wave saw a total of 40,151 M&A transactions in the EU which had a
total value of about $7.6 trillion, also illustrated in Table 2. The transaction value for targets from
the EU countries amounted to $6.06 trillion, roughly 80 percent, while the value for targets from
non-European countries amounted to $1 .55 trillion, or about 20 percent. Hence, the majority of
Europe' s M&A deals were either domestic or intra-El,l.
The fact that firms from the UK were the most attractive targets with 41percent of all deals and
accounting for 27 percent of the entire transaction value for M&A's in Europe - more than the
numbers of M&A deals made in France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden
65 Evcnctt, S. 1. "The cross-border merger and acquisition wave of the late 1990's", World Trade Institute and CEPR, May 2002
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combined, is astonishing.i" Germanyon the other hand Europe's I t f', arges economy, saw very rew
deals compared to its size, indicating that German companies were not involved in a great deal of
domestic roll-up and the German market did not appear as attractive to enter for foreigners.
However, the large average transaction value indicates that the relatively few M&Adeals in
Germany involved large corporations.
Table 2: M&A transaction value in the EU by nationality of the target firm between 1990 - 2001
Transaction Avg. value p.
Country Value In mln $ % of total No. of deals % of total deal In mln $
dollars dollars
Austria -- - ---- ----~_?!_~-~~---------- 0.6 356 1 .._-_._.._- -~~:~------ -- - - -~- - - ------- .- -.-- ---_.__.._---.
§~!(l.~~_':l:l_ . _______.____•____ ____ ___..~_~_?!~3~_._.._...
-------..._---------------_.-. _. _--_._- ----.._-------.-._-- -- ---- -------......._.-_...
2.2 589 2 275.6-..-----.- -------------.......
Denmark 64,203
.._------....._----- -..._--- _._---------._.__..._-.... .---_.._ --- --- ------------
0.8 539 1 119.1.---_...-----------_.-----.--.. ..-...-.--......._------.--.--. -----.._--
Finland - _ ._ - -----_?_~!_?~~._..._---
----------_._----_.- ._---.._..__.- .--..._.._--. .._.____.__._.4...__.__.._.._. .------_._------ ----------
1 826 2 92.3__.4-·___ ·_··_·_··__··___ ____ __ ._----_.__._._--..._---...._.- .-..._..._._----..-._-_._..-
France 910 ,124
- ---_._----._._..._--._. .-.._.._--- --- --- -------
12 3,776 9 241...----_._- -- -_._...-.._.__. __. ._-.._........_-----..-._..__.- __._____4.._________._.______ ..._._- ----......._.._.._.. -----_._--_.._..__..-..-....
~_~!:':l:l_~~X____________ ____. 868 ,351
..__..._.-_.._---- --- --_._--
11.4 2,148 5 404._--_.--_._._----_.-..---_._- - _______.__.________4._.______ ....-------.--_..__._--- ------------.- --- _._.. _..-._._._-----.__.._-
Greece 34,497 0.5 304 1 113.5----_...---------_._-------_... .------_..__._-------------_.-. ___..______4.__._______.___
Ireland 52,544
.._- --- ---_._- --_._-- --- .._- --- --------- ----_.- ...._...._-..-._-_.--
0.7 662 2 79.4..---------------_.._--------.. - -._.-.-........_..__.._.._-- ----...__.._---- --...._.._-- _._-_._- .._._------ --.__. _._--------.._-_.__. _..--.....-----._...---
~!~IX_. ________________ _______ 727 ,002 9.5 2,110 5 345-----------------------..-_..- -._--- -.-_.._..__._------- _____·___·_..·_.._._4.____ ----------.-_.-- _.._.. ...._..-._- --...-..-----
~~~.~_':l:l~~~~j;)____________ 34,361 0.5 92 na. 374--------------------..-._..._.- -..--..-.-....._.__._-------_.- ._-.-.._...._.._--------._.- .._---------------_._--.-- .-_.--_.-._._--._.-._. __._--
Netherlands -_ ._- ---_.~~.~!_~~~_.._---- 4.5 1,221 3 278---..-------_._-----_..__ ._---- -_._-----------------_.__...- ._.._.._.._._--._..__.- ...._------ --------- --- - --._.__..- ..__.----.._._-
~~~~j;)~~- - - -- - --- - - -- - - -_ . 79,677 1 531 2 150-_.._.__._-------------.--.- - __·_··_·_··__.___·_4._4_.._._ ._----._..-._._..-_.._------ -------_.__._-_..- .- ...- .--..-._.--_.._--_.._------
~p.~~~__ ______________._____ -_._-----_?_~~!~~~-- ---- --- 3.8 .___.______3-'-~~~__.._.... 5 135__._·.____··__·___·.4_4.___ __ .._------------_. _._--.--.-_._---.----
Sweden ._.._....~_g.?!.~~L. _..____ 4 1,565 4 193-------_._------------_._---_. .__._----- --- ----- -- - ---- ._.--_..---._- - _._...._- - ------ - ---- - - ---_. ------_._---_._--
UK 2,075,512 27.3 16,479 41 126
Subtotal intra-EU 6,060,261 79.6 33,358 83 181------------------------- ----- ._------------------.--..--._-. .-...-.-------------.- ------ ._------.--.---------- - - ----- ---------- - _. ---------_.__._----
Subtotal EU-globa l' 1,555,429 20.4 6,793 17 229
Total 7,615,690 100 40,151 100 190
So urce: Metwa lli and Tang (2003)
Generally, EU corporations have in the recent M&A wave been active on three fronts: in inter-EU
consolidation, in intra-EU transactions, and in EU-global deals with particularly the US (Smith and
WaIter, 2003). Cross-border transactions, both intra-EU and Ell-global transactions, accounted in
this period for 26 percent of all M&A transactions, of which more than 2/3 (68 percent) involved
US corporations being the target of EU acquirers. The rapid expansion of the US economy in the
1990s caused fears amongst EU firms of possible US protectionism that would interrupt their
access to the US market. Consequently, many EU companies wanted to be physically present by
66 A partial explanation for this phenomenon is most likely to be found in the UK's rather early privatization and liberalization of
the economy during the Thatcher era, as well as Anglo-Saxon reliance on stock-market financing. While in the UK a great deal of
companies are relying on stock-market financing, different conditions exist on the continent where many companies, including
numerous very large ones, are not organized as publicly owned, limited liability corporations as they are in the UK and US. (Smith
and Waiter, 2003). Rossi and Volpin (2003) found another interesting explanation as their research showed that the volume of
M&A activity is significantly larger in countries with better. accoun~ng stan~ard~ and stronger s~areholde~ prote~tion . As, ~e
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deploying more of their business activities into the US, predominantly done by acquiring or
merging with US targets."
Table 3 gives an interesting country break-down for the four largest EU countries, illustrating the
value origin of M&A transactions. One should note that the total M&A values per country
recorded in Table 3 are generally exceeding the values from the previous Table 2 as also non-
European deals are recorded e.g. when a UK firm acquires a US company.
What is characteristic for all but one of the four countries is the high fraction of domestic M&A
value. Interestingly though does Germany not follow suit here, having a relatively lowshare of
domestic M&A value compared to a rather high share of transactions involving M&A's with
foreign enterprises, indicating that domestic consolidation was not widespread. Though one has to
be aware that these numbers are not recorded in absolute numbers, hence, the few very large mega-
mergers, notably Daimler Benz and Chrysler, could have blurred thesefigures.
Table 3: M&A's completed in France, Germany, Italy, and the UK, 1990-2001
(M&A value in Millions of U.S. $)
France
M&A Value %
Inter-French 626 ,132 42
------------ -------------- -------------------.-----.- ---------_....._----------






.-..__..--------...------- --------------..._.-_. _._. ----------------------
German-Ioreign 525,307 38






_.__.._._---._-_._---_.- -_ __._---- -.---- - __._-----.._-
Uk-foreign 1,093,264 35





Inter-Italian 536 ,734 64
_... __.... _........-._... . ......... _.._-_..... .._.... .._..........-... ._... _...
Italian-foreign 112,179 13..-._--------........ _.. _. ..__.-..__.._.-...-..._... . .. _.. __...__. __._.._------
Foreign-Italian 190,268 23
839 ,181 100
Source: Metwalli and Tang (2003)
As evident from Figure 12, the above-mentioned increase in cross-border transactions was
increasing significantly subsequent to 1996, reaching a peak value of $828bn in 2000. Compared
to the fourth M&A wave (1981-1990), cross-border M&A's only accounted for a maximum value
of $135bn in 1990.68 Hence, various academics point to this phenomenon as an indicator for the
ongoing and increasing age of globalization (e.g. Dunning, 2002). What moreover is noteworthy
67Smith, R. C. WaIter, I. "Global Banking", Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2003
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from Figure 12 is the fact that developing economies contribute only a minute share to the overall
cross-border M&A transaction value.
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To evaluate how the consolidation wave has affected Europe's financial services industry and
whether the trend of increasing cross-borderactivity could also be observed in there, I will in the
following focus on this sector and review the consolidation activity morespecifically.
7.2 M&A in Financial Intermediation
As mentioned before, the service sector was particularly active in the recentM&A wave, out of
which the financial services industry was the most heavily involved as acquirers in European
M&A transactions. Three of the top five most active industries (by value) were investment and
commodity firms, banks, and insurance companies.f Likewise, financial services firms were often
targets in Europe, with banks and insurancecompanies beingamong the topfive most active seller
industries. i''
The major reason for financial institutions beingextremely active in restructuring and
consolidating is to be found in their poor and careless performance of the 1980s (Smith and Waiter,
2003). In this decade most institutions experienced hugelosses from mismatched assets and
liabilities and from non-performingdomestic and international loans. As a result, especially banks
had to undergo a long period of internal restructuring to improve efficiency or alternatively joining
69 di lb .The other two were telecommunications and electric, gas, and water istn ution.
70 Smith, R. C. Waiter, I. "Global Banking", Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2003
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forces by merging with other large banks in their owncountry to regain strength.
The Second Banking Directive, the Capital Adequacy Directive, and the Basel Accord were in this
process particularly influential, as they required all banks to have the sameminimum amount of
capital, making it possible for pan-European competition between them to shift to the quality and
cost of their services. In addition, especially banking was pressured by the stiffening competition
and to offer a wider range of financial products to customers (Bergeret aI. , 1999). This caused
banks to strive for large size to better withstand competitiveassaults fromotherbanks in their
home market and to be able to launch competitive attacks into neighbors markets. The result was a
process of substantial consolidation within EU countries that has changed the European banking
landscape tremendously (Buch, DeLong, 2001).
Figure 13 illustrates that the consolidation activity in the financial sector increased substantially
after 1990, leveling at around 250-300 deals a year, before rising to more than 350 deals in 1999,
indicating that the M&A hype in the end of the 1990s spill over to the financial industry. It is
furthermore evident that banks were generally at the forefrontof consolidating with about60
percent of all deals involving the acquisition of a banking organization.The insurance industry was
interestingly the least active segment in the consolidation process, constituting only about 15
percent of all transactions.
Figure 13: Sectoral overview of M&A's madeby financial institution in the EU
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by securities firms and insurance companies. However, theGroup of Ten (2001) found the
dominance with which banks accounted for the transaction value particularly astonishing with 70
percent compared to about 11 percent and 19percent for the securities- and insurance firms
respectively. The sharp increase in average transaction value towards the end of the decade
suggests that also in the financial sector moreand more large institutions consolidated.
While consolidation in the beginningof the 1990s had the aimof gaining size, restructuring of
basic businesses was gaining popularity, involving the streamlining of branch networks and
upgrading and enlarging the services offered towards theend of the 1990s. In addition, more and
more financial institutions were shifting the mixof its businesses, so that insurance firms and
security firms were suddenly competing with similar products for similar customers as banks and
vice versa. Nevertheless, the majorityof restructuring was undertaken by banks thatacquired,
besides other credit institutions, insurance- and securities firms toenlarge their product variety
according to the pressures of the universal banking principle. In addition, this seems to indicate
that credit institutions generally had larger resources both in financial terms and in expertise of
extracting synergies from cross-selling. Figure 14 indicates a slight trend of increasedcross-
industry activity, though this is only marginal compared to domestic-same industry deals. The
same goes for cross-border deals. There is a slight increase in such transactions, though the
majority remains domestic.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS,2000) notes that the preferences for domestic
consolidation can be explained by the more obvious opportunities for reducing costs and fewer
complications in terms of handling the integration of theentities due to a usually more
homogeneous corporate culture, particularly in retail banking. Therefore, the few cross-border
deals that were taking place in that time were predominantly between banking activities that had a
global focus and similar organizational structure and corporate cultures such as investment
banking and asset management.
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The gradually increasing amounts of cross-border deals in recent years indicates though that the
focus on domestic restructuring and strengthening is approaching in several countries an end, as
either no attractive targets remain or antitrust authorities prohibit a further domestic industry roll-
up (BIS, 2000).
From Appendix G and Appendix H, which illustrate the concentration indices (CR5, the share of
the five largest banks per country) as well as the Herfindahl index for 1997-2002, it is apparent
that the concentration in Europe's banking sectors increased, albeit onlygradually. The five largest
institutions' share of total bank assets amounted to 53 percent in 2003 (on a non-consolidated
basis), up from 46 percent in 1997. A similar trend is visible from the Herfindahl index, which rose
from 383 in 1997 to 540 in 2003. Moreover, it generally appears that the banking market as a
whole is relatively unconcentrated, however, both the CR-5 ratios and Herfindahl indices exhibit a
fair amount of dispersion across the EU countries. Particularly the smaller countries, notably the
Nordic countries and Belgium and the Netherlands, tend to experience a rather high degree of
concentration due to the presence of a few large banks, indicating thatdomestic consolidation has
progressed the furthest here. 71 As a consequence, financial institutions from particularly these
countries engaged in some of the first large-scalecross-border deals (Nordea in the Nordic
71 'OR 004eport on EU banking structure", ECB, November 2
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countries and ING and Fortis in the Benelux states).
On the contrary, the large EU countries, notably Germany, France, the UK, and Italy, still have a
very fragmented banking landscape with low CR5 ratios and Herfindahl indices. This indicates
that particularly these countries can be expected to see greater domestic consolidation before
greater cross-border consolidation activity in Europe willoccur (Bikker, 2004). In addition, the
low frequency and the relatively high uncertainty accompanied with high costs of cross-border
deals can, according to Boot (2003) be explained by the fact thatsuch transactions are typically
viable only for relatively large universal banks, of which the greatest fraction are located in the
four large countries.
Nevertheless, Figure 15 reveals that the frequency of domestic M&As seemsto decrease in
absolute number terms, while the amount of total cross-border deals seems to have increased,
particularly in 1999 and 2000. Furthermore, this tendency of more cross-border transactions seems
to stabilize, as also the years 200I, 2002, and the first quarter of 2003 saw more cross-border
activity than domestic. As Mackintosh (2001) notes, "Domestic consolidation has now almost run
its course, and the continent's biggest banks are looking abroad forfuturedeals.72
Figure 15: Cross-border and domesticbanking M&A's in Europe, 1997-2003 (absolute numbers)
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72 Mackintosh, J. "Weathering the storms", Financial Times, June 27, 2001
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However, Figure 15 makes it obvious that European banks were particularly keen on M&A deals
with targets from outside the EU, particularly prior to 2002. This tendency seems however to be
reversing, as intra-El,l deals increased slightly towards theend of theperiod, while EU-global
deals decreased slightly.
7.3 Conclusion
The above review showed that the 1990s saw an unprecedented activity in merger and acquisitions
across all industries, though with the servicesector being the most affected. Nevertheless, the
majority of the consolidation activity was of domestic nature, with onlygradually increasing
activity across nationa l boundaries. To that comes that a large fraction of the relatively lowcross-
border activity were so-called EU-global transactions, where particularly deals with US targets
were widespread.
A similar pattern is also evident in Europe's financial industry, where the majority of all M&A
transactions were of domestic nature. Nevertheless, several initiatives such as the SBD, CAD, and
not least the EMU caused financial institutions from particularly thesmallerEU Member states to
look beyond national borders and engage in cross-border transactions. However, the frequency of
such intra-El.I dea ls is still very marginal; EU-global deals on thecontrary, particularly between
fi nancial segments that have a global orientation and a similar corporate structure as e.g.
investment banking, accounted for the greatest number of cross-border deals, with the US being
the focus.
Consequently, the, what Davies calls, 'ultimate' test for an integrating European financial market
seems therefore to have fai led, as intra-EU activity is still rather infrequent, which is supported by
Gjersem (2003) who notes that deep integration of financial markets is still far from being a
reality."
8 Part 3 - Motives for M&A's
Having examined the developments from the macro-perspective, it became evident that the
measures taken by the EU to integrate its financial markets fell short of expectations. To better
understand this ' lack of interest' in intra-EU transactions, I will in this section investigate the
consolidation process from the firm- or micro-level perspective by looking at the motivating
73 O' . . . . , h . " OEeD 1I lorkin" Paper No. 368, October2003jersem, C. "Financial market tntcgrauon m t c euro-area , yy , 0
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factors that drive consolidation at the ex-ante stage, and the ex-post consequences of transactions.
8.1 Ex-ante Stage - Motives for M&As
Many explanations have been supplied as to why firms engage in M&As, ranging fromeconomic
reasons to corporate learning and experimentation to emotional and psychological elements such
as the hubris and ego of managers." Yet, there is no consensus on theoretical explanations nor on
the reliability of results from applied investigations." Hopkins (1999) categorized the various
explanations into four broad motives: 1) strategic motives, 2) market moti ves, 3) economic
motives, and 4) personal motives.
Because the first three motives postulate that M&A's are pursued in order to maximize the value to
shareholders of the combined company, they are also termed value-creating motives. The fourth
motive by contrast, is a non-value-creating motive, at least for shareholders, as it suggests that
managers of the acquiring and/or merging companies seek to maximize their own utility at the
expense of shareholders, especially when their compensation is tied to the size of the company in
terms of revenues or assets.76
In the following, I will review first the value-creating motives before I turn to the non-value-
creating motives.
8.1.1 Strategic Motives
M&A transactions that aim at improving the strength of a firm's strategy are of strategic nature
(Hopkins, 1999). The most frequently cited strategic rationales aresynergy effec ts, which are
either of static- or dynamic character (UNCTAD, 2000).
Static synergies include the pooling of management resources (one head officeinstead of two),
revenue enhancement by using each others' marketing and distribution networks, purchasing
synergies (greater bargaining power), cost reductions in production through the avoidance of
duplication of production, R&D or other activities. Dynamic synergies on the otherhand may
involve the matching of complementary resources and skills to enhance a firm's innovatory
capabilities with long-term positive effectson sales, market shares, andprofits.
74 . . . . I ?" . "M' naging complex mergers" edited by Morosini P. andMorosini, P. "Arc mergers and acquisitions about creatmg va ue. , III a
Steger U. Prentice Hall Financial Times, 2004 .
75 [etto-Gillies, G. Meschi, M., Simonetti, R. "Cross-border mergers and acquisitions: patterns in the EUand effects", available at
www.meriLunirnaas.nlltser/teis02I.pdf . . .
76 • I ?" . "M naging complex mergers" edited by Morosini P. andMorosini, P. "Are mergers and acquisitions about creating va ue. , Ill a
Steger U. Prentice Hall Financial Times, 2004
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The increasing competitive pressures, falling prices, and excess capacity in the 1990s caused
financial institutions, and particularly banks, to search for static synergies. The rapid developments
in IT on the other hand triggered the importance of dynamic synergies pressuring financial
institutions to offer more sophisticated products and products that exceeded the traditional
competencies of banks e.g. insurance services. In addition, dynamic synergies made it possible to
improve the service-level of banks by setting up an intemet-banking infrastructure.
A dynamic synergy that specifica lly applies to cross-border acquisitions, although it partially
belongs to the market motive discussed in the subsequent section, relates to the idea of 'national
differences' . Morosini et al., (1998) found that the greater the cultural distance of countries in
which merger partners are based the greater the benefits." Therefore, cross-border transactions
allow firms to locate different activities in places with appropriate mixes of locational advantages
allowing these firms to realize the scope for rationalization and improving company performance
by achieving an international specialization of the value chain (UNCTAD, 2000). The
phenomenon of EU financial institutions engaging in cross-border transactions with US targets,
mentioned briefly before, is a good illustration as it allows EU banks to acquireexpertise and leam
from the more advanced US financial market and vice versa.
Although synergies seem as a good reason to engage in consolidation particularly between
horizontal transactions, Sirower (1997) argues that synergy effects rarelyjustify the premium paid
by the acquirer, as "many acquisition premiums require performance improvements that are
virtually impossible to realize even for the best managers in the best of industry conditions".
Another ubiquitous motive of banks to acquire other banks is to strive for monopolistic market
structures, which allow them to extract economic rents from consumers or users of financial
services and redistribute them to shareholders, cross-subsidize other areas of activity, or reduce
pressure for cost-containment." The related issue of large size and 'too big to fai l' is discussed
further in section 8.1.3.
Although strategic consolidation is a vital step leading to greater market power, eventually it is a
superior product and service offering that ties customers to a particular financial institution.
Therefore, consolidation leads to market power only by exploiting static and dynamic synergies
wisely to improve the strategic position vis-a-vis competitors.
77 Though one should note that combining and making effective use of distant cultures is not an easy task and resulted in great
problems and several failed acquisition attempts.
78 Smith, R. C. Wailer, I. "Global Banking", Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2003
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The growing number of universal banks seems to be a case in point, as they, through continues
M&As enhanced their branch network and exploit synergies to thereby achieve a better service




The market motive is particularly relevant for M&A activity that exceeds national boundaries, as it
is a way to enter new markets.f" Entering a new market is often triggered by a countries
macroeconomic condition. A country with a highereconomic growth rate, low unemployment, or
an ageing population that is increasingly investing into pension funds are just a few examples of
the many opportunities that can arise when expanding to foreign markets. Similarly, a general
stock market undervaluation can be a good opportunity for acquirers to 'get hands' on an attractive
target in another country at a 'bargain' price.
Acquiring already existing firms in forei gn markets has become the fastest way for already
established firms to get a foothold in a new country. The UNCTAD (2000) shows for example that
M&A's are the most important method of foreign direct investment (FDI). Compared to the global
overall M&A activity of $1.6 trillion, global cross-borderdeals had a value of $276bn in 1997,
resembling not even 20 percent of global M&A value. Compared to global FDI, however, the
value of cross-border M&A represented approximately 60 percent of all FDl inflows. Hopkins
(1999) therefore suggests that cross-border M&As have become by far the single biggest means of
integrating the world ' s economies.
When a market becomes deregulated, firms from othercountries may see acquisitions of the
formerly regulated or state-owned operations as the fastest way to gain a strong position in the new
market. In addition, it is a way to gain entry without adding additional capacity to a market that
already may have excess capacity. This appears particularly important in mature industries and
markets, with banking being one of them. For example, HSBC's recent acquisition of a minority
stake, 19.9 percent, in China's 'Bank of Communication' wasan attempt to enter the promising
79 SEll and Swedbank abandoned a $5.2 bn merger in September 2002 that would have formed Scandinavia's second-biggest bank,
after EU regulators objected to the combined bank's dominance of the Swedish banking market, implying that bank mergers have
roone about as far as they can in Sweden. . . . . .
Olher modes of entry include exporting, licensing, franchising, joint ventures, or wholly owned subsidiaries, WhIle. exporung,
licensing, and franchising all have in common that they offer a low degree of control/risk, low nee.d for resource commltm~nt, and
f~S I implemcntation, joint ventures, M&As, and wholly owned subsidiaries have in common a hJ~h~r degree of controllnsk and
higher necd for resource co mmitment, In addition, especially M&As offer more control than a joint venture and are faster to
Implemcnlth an a wholly owned subsidiary.
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Chinese market and strengthen its foothold there." Similarly, the Financial Times82reported
recently that Deutsche Bank is vying with INO, to buya stakeof up to 25 percent in 'Bank of
Beijing' in a deal that could be worth about $200m and give one of the foreign groups an
important platform in China's capital. The Financial Times furthermore says that 'the interests by
two of Europe's largest banks in a medium-sized Chinese lender underlines the country's growing
importance to overseas financial groups seeking to capitalize on the country's rapid economic
growth and rising wealth '.
Unlike other industries, e.g. telecommunications, it is though interesting to note that the
deregulation of financial services in the EU did not see a widespread rush forcross-border deals. A
partial explanation for this phenomenon is to be found in the before-mentioned greater domestic
fragmentation compared to telecommunications upon deregulation. While the telecommunication
industry was grapping the chance in acquisition frenzy, Europe's financial institutions were
struggling to roll-up the domestic market first.
8.1.3 Economic Motives
Economic motives for M&As include many important reasons related to economies of scale and
scope. These motives generally suggest that a firm is able to decrease costs by increasing the
volumeof output of products and services it produces,
The financial services industry should have, due to its very information- and distribution-intensive
characteristics, abundant potential for economies of scale. Similarly, diseconomies of scale should
be prevalent by arising with disproportionate increases in administrative overhead, management of
I ' f Id ' in firm si 83comp exrty, agency problems, and other cost actors re ate to increases I .ir size.
Closely related to economies of scale are economies of scope (WaIter, 1999), which are
competitive benef ts to be gained by selling a broader range of products, resulting in cost savings
through sharing of overheads and improving technology viajoint production of generically similar
services,84 Moreover, economies of scope can impact a firm 's revenue when the cross-selling of
multiple financial services products makes it cheaper" for the buyerto purchase them from one
81
82 Sun, M. "China's banking industry enters global integration", China Daily, December20, 2004
Guerrera, F, "Deutsche in talk to buy Bank of Beij ing", Financial Times, January 17, 2005
83S ' I nd di 2003mil l, R. C, Wailer, I. "Global Banking", Oxford University Press, 2 e iuon,
84 . • th ith i dDiseconomies of scope arise from such factors as inertia and lack of responsiveness and creauvuy at may~o~e Wit ~ncre~se
firmsize and bureaucmtization, ' turf" and profit attribution conflicts that increase costs and erode product quality I~ meetl~g client
~i~ds , or serious cultural differences across the organization that inhibitseamless delivery of a broad r:mge of financial services
inclUding the cost of the service, plus information search, monitoring, contracting and other transacnon costs
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. I I' 86instead at severa supp iers.
Although objec tive measuring of scale and scope economies is rather difficult for financial
services, as Boot (2003) notes, various studies have been conducted on this issue. For example
have Shaffer and David (1991), Cornett and Tehranian (1992), Mester (1992), Mitchell and
Onvural (1996) and Clark (1996) and Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) all found no evidence
for scale economies in financial services, though with the exception of relatively small banks with
total assets ranging between $100 million and $ lObn. In an interview with The Banker, Ingo
Waiter, who is a professor at the Stern School of Business, said "There have been about 55 studies
into this and there is no evidence of economies of scale in large mergers.t''"
Similar to economies of scale, consistent empirical evidence has illustrated that scope economies
arean elusive objec tive when it comes to consolidation, note Berger and Humprhey (1997) and
(Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999). Nevertheless,Smith and Waiter (2003) suggest that
revenue economies of scope and scale may indeed exist, but that these are likely to be very specific
to the types of services provided and the types of clients served. Therefore, while economies of
scale and scope are certainly relevant and applicable to most industries, the validity of this motive
for the financial services industry in general seemsquestionable.
Another economic motive which is often cited to justify M&A's is related to the size of a
company. In a globalizing economy, greater size can be a crucial parameter, as size in itself can
serve as an inhibiting factor that prevents from being taken overand, therefore, can have a
protective function (UNCTAD, 2000). Particularly for banks the common notion "too big to fail"
ensures that in case of financial problems, a "too big to fail" bank can rely on the government to be
bailed out in order to avoid possible bank runs. Consequently, the strategyto reach a "too big to
fail" size allows all uninsured liabilities to have de facto insurance coverageand hence maximizes
the value of the implicit guarantees received from the government (Penas and Unal, 200I). Not
surprisingly then do bankers regularly argue that 'bigger is better' from both systemic and
shareholder value perspectives'", as such banks can engage in riskieractivities while in the same
time being certain that they will be saved in case something goes wrong - which dates back to the
moral hazard problem. In addition, the larger a bank grows, the greater its (indirect) political
86 Diseconomies of scope could arise through agency costs that may develop when the multi-product financial firm acts against the
interests of the client in the sale of onc service in order 10 facilitate the sale of another, or as a result of internal information transfers
~?nsidered disadvantageous 10 the client's interests,
88 Piggou, c, Will They Be Happy'! 71,e Banker, Vo!. ISO, No. 898, December 1, 2000.
Wailer. I. "Financial services strategies in the Euro-zone", European ManagementJournal, Vol. 17, No. 5, 1999
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influence will grow, which can be an interesting feature for someCEO's, leading me to the
discussion on non-value maximizing motives.
8.1.4 Personal Motives
The last general cause identified by Hopkins are the personal motives (or the behavioral
explanation) which argues that corporate managers operate in their own self-interest, especially
where corporate governance is weak (a manifestation of what economists have denoted the
"principal-agent" problem'") when pushing through a transaction. M&As can therefore serve as
means of "empire building" to enhance executives' power, prestige, job-security or remuneration,
even when this is not technically efficient or in the interest of shareholders (Baumol, 1967).
Similarly, management hubris or ego as well as what Bower (2001)refers to as 'bluefish
phenomenon' or 'herd effect' are other motives that can drive managers to engageselfishly in
transactions where the economic benefits appear rather abstract. The M&A hype towards the end
of the 1990's saw, despite the severe overvaluation of the market, particularly many transactions,
which to a certain extent can be related to personal motives (UNCTAD, 2000).
While all of the above-mentioned factors are important to consider when explaining why firms
undertake M&A' s, it is seldom only one of the four broad categories that is decisive. In fact, in a
cross-national comparison, testing several of the motives for M&As, no examined hypothesis
received consistent confirmation, suggesting that there are multiple reasons simultaneously at work
(Mueller, 1980). To put it in Scherer and Ross' (1990) words: "Mergers occur fo r a myriad of
reasons, and in any given case, several different motives maysimultaneously influence the
merging parties' behavior."
Although not explicit, most of the above-described motives seem to speak in favor and explain the
large degree of domestic consolidation when applied to Europe's financial services sector.
Synergies are more obvious and easier to exploit when consolidating domestically and across
industries, becoming ' too big to fail' is an ambition that needs to be undertaken in the domestic
market, and the general fragmentation of the banking industry, which though has decreased
slightly as section 7.2 showed, called for domestic consolidation. Hence, few obvious motives
indicate clear benefits for expanding abroad while there are still numerous opportunities in the
home market to exploit. Countries where domestic consolidation has advanced relatively far
89Theagency problem refers to the fact that if an agent is hired to represent an owner, the two partieswill haveconflicting interests.
Managers are interested in the things that give them more power and more security, sueh as growth, size, and diversification. The
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caused though that these domestic opportunitieshave vanished causing financial institutions to
increasingly look for opportunities beyond national boundaries e.g. Danske Banks recent
acquisition of Northern Bank in Northern Ireland and National Irish Bank in the Republic of
Ireland.
8.2 Ex-Post Merger Stage - Integration
Except for personal motives, which are a rather special category, the value-maximizing motives for
consolidation generally assume some sort of strategic fit, which can broadly be defined as
similarity between organizational strategies or complementaryorganizational strategies that are
believed to create value of some sort to the enterprise. Although Chatterje et al. (1992) 90 note that
there is no clear evidence between financial performance and strategic fit in mergers, it seems
nevertheless intuitive that strategic fit plays an important role in the ex-post stage of most M&A
transactions. On the other hand, assuming that most transactions meet the strategic fit criterion, it
issurprising that more than 60 percent of all M&A's fail to live up to the announced expectations,
and either end up destroying shareholder value or do not deliver improvements to the ex-ante
situation, according to Mercer.9 1 Carleton (1997) supports this finding, showing that between 55-
70 percent of all deals fail to meet the anticipated purpose communicated to shareholders. The
Economist said therefore in July 2000: "A stream of studies has shown that corporate mergers have
even higher failure rates than the liaisons of Hollywood stars".
One explanation of these high failure rates can be related to the actual planning and execution of
M&A transactions. Figure 16 gives an illustration of people involved in the different phases of a
typical M&A transaction. What is prevalent is that the greatest number of people - typically
members of the corporate management - is concerned with the actual deal structuring, while the
ex-ante and ex-post stages receive less attention and involve fewerpeople. It is widely
acknowledged that the ex-ante stage, concerned with analysis of strategic- and cultural fit, is a
crucial parameter in the M&A success, however relatively few people are involved in this process.
Similarly, the decreasing number of people working at the ex-post stage, despite the often vast
number of affected people - both as change agents and change subjects - is likely to impact the
integration and success of the transaction. Parallel to that, the attention of management is often
9O Chatteljee, S., Lubatkin, M., Schweiger, D. & Weber, Y. Cultural differences and shareholder value in related mergers: Linking
equity and human capital. Strategic Management Journal, 1992, 13, 319-34.
91Mercer Human Resource Consulting, "Transatlantic mergers and acquisitions - a success story", 2002, www.mercerHR.com
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turning away as soon as the contracts are signed, perhaps to other M&As, assuming that the most
important part is done, and that integration will not pose a problem.

























Source: Guest lecture during my exchange term at the ERASMUS University by Jacqueline
Lommen, "A glimpse behind the scenes - M&A practice within a leadingintemational
insurance group" Aegon Business Development Group, ERASMUS University, December 8, 2003
Note: MoU=Memorandum of Understanding, SPA =Sales and purchasing agreement,
The 'being-left-alone' situation subsequent to the deal structuring, has therefore received
considerable attention and it is widely acknowledged as beingthe prime source for M&A failure
(e.g. Birkinshaw et aI., 2000; Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Gertsen et aI., 1998; Greenwood et al.,
1994; Ingham et aI., 1992; Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988; Olie, 1994; Shrivastava, 1986). Also
Pablo (1994) notes that academia is demonstrating an intensified interest in examining the human
orcultural facets of M&A's following the failureof traditional explanations to provide adequate
explanations for these great failure rates.
Vaara 's (2003) in-depth analysis of internal decision-making at the upperechelons of the
integrated organization points to four specific factors of the post-acquisition process, which are
often likely to form impediments to effective organizational integration: inherent ambiguity,
cultural confusion, organizational hypocrisy, and issue politicization, which to some extent result
from the dissatisfactory planning at the ex-ante stage.
Subsequent to an agreed transaction considerableambiguity can be expected concerning the roles
of thedifferent units and the changes needed to pursueintegration, which is an indication that
these issues are forgotten or neglected during the structuring the deal. Consequently, this
ambiguity creates impediments to effective integration, but can also be seen as a majorcause of
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~her 'in'ational' features of post-acquisition decision-making. One reason why the concrete
discussions concerning integration issues are often neglected is because they are likely to be
plagued by cultural confusion, misunderstandings and resistance - the second reason - thereby
underpinning ambiguity. Third, especially when the companies seem to be operating successfully,
integration issues are easily 'lost' in routine decision-making, which can be seen as 'organizational
hypocrisy' . And fourthly , over time, specific integration issues easily become politicized
questions, leading to the strengthening of internal divisions and increasing confrontation between
various units within the organization.
These four 'irrationalities' are, according to Vaara (2003), theoretically and empirically
intertwined - though they basically origin from the same source, namely bringing togetherpeople
ofvarious backgrounds, social identities, and cultures, both corporate and national. Also
Cartwright and Cooper (1993) suggest that the dismal success rate of M&As can be attributed to
incompatible cultures, hypothesizing that culture fit is just as important as structural fit in the
analysis and evaluation of potential partners. As a result, it is widely acknowledged that cultures
canbea make-or-break factor in the merger equation." Cartwright and Cooper (1993) concur
saying that financial benefits anticipated from M&A's are often unrealized because of
incompatible cultures.
Not surprisingly then did many researchers draw attention to the cultural differences in
organizations as major causes for organizational problems when studying cross-borderacquisitions
(Altendorf, 1986; Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988; Sales and Mirvis, 1984; Waiter, 1985, Calori
et aI., 1994; Gertsen et al., 1998; Olie, 1994; Very et al., 1997; Weber et al., 1996)93.
Particularly national backgrounds and identity are likely to unite and divide managers in the case
ofcross-border acquisitions, as illustrated in studies in this field not least because they oftencreate
specific problems in terms of communication and understanding (Gertsen and Soderberg, 1998).
As a consequence, M&A's occur more frequently between partners witha close geographic
proximity as such countries are often believed to share similarities in terms of culture, note Buch
and DeLong (200 I), because sharing a common language is likely to lower the costs of melding
two corporate cultures since information needs to be communicated in onlyone language.
9'
. Sec for example Giffin, A. E, Schmidt, J. A. "Why HR can make or break your M&A", Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2002
availableat: http://www.towersperrin.com/tillinghastlpublieationslpublications/emphasislEmphasis_2002_212002052308.pdf
93
For a more detailed review of the importance of culture consult c.g. Buono et al. (1985), Cartwright and Cooper (1 993), Gordon
~199 1), Hofstede et al. (1990), Schraeder and Self (2003). Several of these researchers that adopt a cultural perspective have
ocused on the complex cultural integration processes that follow acquisitions.
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As a result, some researc hers have gone as far as using cultural differences as an explanation for
post-acquisition financia l performance, the argument being that greaterculturaldifferences create
more problems and, ultimately, lower profits and weaker market performance (Chatterjee et al.,
1992; Datta, 1991). On the contrary, Krishnan et al., (1997) found thatcultural differences can also
be a source of value, which Morosini et al. (1998) supports by showing that in the case of cross-
borderM&As, large cultural differences between bidder and target companies have beenfound to
be posi tively related to acquisition performance in terms of sales growth.
The before mentioned Elf-g lobal cross-border deals that occurred in the financial sector are a case
in point. These deals were mostly involving firms in the wholesale banking industry, i.e.
investment banking, which have a global orientation and therefore often a diverse set of national
cultures employed. Nevertheless, the corporate culture between target and acquirer were rather
similar, thereby making the integration of these entities relatively easy compared to e.g. retail
banking operations were both national cultures and corporate cultures are more distinctive.
8.2.1 Integration and Corporate Strategy
The above discussion illustrated that the ex-ante stage of determining motives and evaluating
strategic- and cultural fit intluences the ex-post integration success of M&As, while in the same
time recognizing the doubly complexity of cross-borderdeals. That the corporate strategy in this
process is a decisive factor for particularly cross-border M&As seems therefore evident.
Although no previous work exists on linking the strategy orientationof firms to the ex-ante and ex-
post stage of M&As, at least I am not aware of any, a potentially useful way of doing that could be
by means of the Integration-Responsiveness framework (lR-grid).94 The IR grid has been used
extensively in the international business literature to identify the diverse and often-confl icting
pressures confronted by firms as they expand their activi ties worldwide. The underlying question
is whether firms should be responsive to the local environments in which they operate and adapt
their operations at the cost of efficiency, or should they standardize their 'response' globally and
thereby improveefficie ncy, or find a middle way.
94
The integration-responsiveness (lR) framework of Prahalad and Doz (1987) grew out of earlier evolutionary theories of the
development of multinational enterprises (MNEs) (e.g., Perlmutter, 1969; Stopford and Wells, 1972; Vernon, 1966). The previous
models, although being popular, had limitations due to their neglect of the global business environment-in particular the many
l~chn?l~gical , market, competitive and governmental factors that affect the companies. As a result, the~e mo?e~s provided very
slmphstlcsolutions to complex problems in multinational organizations (Bartlcu, (986). In response to t.lIs orrussion, a number of
~uthors reformulated the classic differentiation and integration approach of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) IIIto the IR framework that
ISrecognized today.
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Source: Prahalad and Doz ( 1987)
As Figure 17 illustrates, the IR framework leads to a simple categorization of corporatestrategy
orientation for firms conducting business in more than one country. The international strategy is
used by firms that operate in an international environment by exporting goods from a home base.
The pressures for efficiency and adapting to local customs are both low,as the focus is to exploit
home-country innovations. While this approach was rather successful in the past, this strategy can
not withstand today's pressures for flexibility and efficiency (Bartlett, Ghoshal, and Birkingshaw,
2004)
Finns that operate in a multinational environment differentiate their products and services in
response to national differences in customer preferences, industry characteristics, and government
regulations. As a consequence, subsidiaries are treated as autonomous entities, making them
unusually flexible and responsive to local needs. The price for this flexibility is the inevitable
inefficiency of various autonomous units.
Companies adopting a global strategic approach focus primarily on developing global efficiency
by centralizing operations, to achieve the best cost and qualityposition for their products. In turn,
the focus on efficiency causes decreasing flexibility in terms of responding to local needs.
The optimum strategy for firms being present around the globeappears to be the transnational
approach. The aim is to simultaneously achieve global efficiency and local responsiveness on a
worldwide scale. And while the global approach calls for centralization of activities to exploit
scaleeconomies, and the multinational strategy calls for decentralization to remain flexible to local
needs, the transnational strategy is more differentiated by locating key resources and capabilities at
home, while other activities are located where the greatestbenefits in terms of flexibility and
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efficiency can be obtained. Unquestionable, this results in a more complex corporate configuration
than in both the global and multinational approach (Bartlett, Ghoshal, and Birkingshaw, 2( 04).
Prahalad and Doz (1987) noted in their early study that in more and more industries, the balance
between the economic imperative of global integration and the political imperative of local
responsiveness requires a high level of both in the form of a transnational strategy. Bartlett and
Ghoshal (1989) support this observation, suggesting that successful MNEs are those that create a
transnational organization with multidimensional capabilities in order to withstand the increasingly
complex international business environment. When projecting the motives, discussed in section
8.1., on the IR grid, as done in Figure 18, it is prevalent that both strategic motives and economic
motives are basically related to the global strategy, as they are mainlyconcerned with extracting
efficiency improvements from M&As.
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The market motive on the other hand is about entering new markets where the objective to actively
respond and adapt to the local market conditions is essential. The personal motive is rather special
in this respect and difficult to classify, though it seems that it neither faces pressures to create
effic iencies nor to respond to local customs, which is the reason for placing it in the lower-left
corner.
From this conceptualization, I will term it the 'motive-strategy grid' , it can therefore be derived
that different motives for M&As require different strategies in order to successfully realize them.
This is however complicated by the before-mentioned interrelatedness of motives and the frequent
presence of several motives when engaging in M&As. Nevertheless, as motives can generally be
categorized as either being efficiency-seeking or market-seeking, one prime motive should in most
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case be identifiable.
The EU-global cross-border M&As that involved predominantly the wholesale segment of
banking, e.g. investment banking, were generally caused by economic and/or strategic motives as
the rational behind them was most probably to increase efficiency. The 'motive-strategy grid' in
Figure 18 therefore indicates that the global strategy orientation appears most suitable. In spite of
being across national boundaries, the global orientation of the business and similarities in
corporate culture made the global strategy orientation viable, as the need to respond to local
peculiarities was very low.
Tosuccessfully pursue a global strategy orientationand realize the strategic and/or economic
motives for an M&A can happen in two different situations. I) It requires a situation where
national cultures do not matter much because the business has a global orientation with uniform
corporate structures and values, similar to the above example of cross-border deals in wholesale
banking, making the integration relatively simple. Alternatively, 2) it requires a situation where
cultures do matter but are very similar and thereby do not pose a major problem when integrating,
which to some extent is the situation of domestic consolidation, which though conflicts the name
'global strategy' . Nevertheless, domestic consolidation activity is particularly in banking
efficiency seeking, resulting in a great deal of centralization, rationalization, and streamlining.
Therefore, one could claim that the strategy orientation banks followed in domestic consolidation
was the 'global strategy orientation on a domestic scale'.
On the other hand, firms that seek to expand their business to foreign markets and are in a situation
where both the business and the culture, national and corporate, are verydifferent, new, and
perhaps incompatible, makes it necessary to be flexible and respondand adapt to these local
circumstances e.g. through a decentralized structure, granting autonomy. Therefore, the
multinational strategy, or ideally the transnational strategy, orientation seems in this situation to be
superior.
From a theoretical point of view, the various measures undertaken by the EU to integrate Europe's
financial markets could indicate that particularly for the banking industry, an almost homogeneous
European market structure exits, making the necessity to respond to local peculiarities obsolete. In
such a homogenous EU market, where it would not matter to companies whether transactions are
cross-border or intra-EU as it is one Single Market, the main strategic focus would then
automatically be on exploiting efticiencies, hence, the IR grid would indicate the global strategy as
being the most viable. Nevertheless, despite the measures to create a single market, I have shown
earlier that the EU is still far from an integrated financial market, and it can for the time being not
be anticipated in reality that customer needs and marketconditions will converge to an extent that
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treating the EU market as a Single Market that makes responding to national differences obsolete.
Therefore, for companies operating across the EU a multinational or ideally a transnational
strategy orientation will be necessary in order to successfully deliver on the M&A promises.
In section 9.3.2.5 I will assess whether the concept of the 'motive-strategy grid ' is applicable in
reality, based on the analysis of the two case studies.
8.2.2 Value enhancing vs. value destruction
As mentioned earlier, the main driver behind M&As is- or should be - the objective to create
value for the acquiring corporation and their shareholders. Hopkins (1999) concluded recently:
"There seems to be clear evidence that mergers and acquisitions often fail. Nevertheless, this
depends on how one defines failure. If failure is used in an extreme sense, such as the sale or
liquidation of the business, then the rate of failure is relatively low. If failure is the lack of
attainment of management's financial objectives, then therateof failure is high."
To estimate and evaluate the performance of merger-related gains there are generally two
approaches. The first approach is to evaluate the pre- and post-merger performance by means of
the stock market reactions, done in event studies.95 Proponents of this approach argue that market
data and the market reaction is likely to be a better indicator of the real economic effects of the
announced deal, compared to the second approach of comparing accounting data, because it more
accurately conveys the implied value of merging two independent entities.96 A study bySirower
(2002/3, EBF) seems to support this notion as he finds that initial investor reactions, which are
based on previous expectations and the new information given by thecompany about the economic
wisdom of the transaction, are powerful forecasts of thefuture. Furthermore, he finds that the first
year of an acquisition is critical to deliver performance promises because it signals the credibility
of those promises. Therefore, he believes that theex-post M&A performance is a persistent
95 Only the event study methodology allows a direct judging on the value implications of a ban~ merger an~/or acquisiti?n. (~i ll~ff
and Santomcro (1998)) as they examine the stock market reaction to a merger announcement. i.e, whether lI1.ve s~ors beheve,l.twlll
create or destroy value. Event analysis assumes information-efficient markets, whichmeans th~t the market,pnce ISvery ~ens~l1ve to
new information will be incorporated into thc price immediately after it has been made public, The stock market reacl1OJ~ IS then
measured by abnormal returns which arc the difference between the expected price without the event and the actual pnce..The
advantages of stock price data is that it is easily available. the calculations are straightforward and it do~s not rely on potentially
" I di . . h di F' t1y the results depend highly on the length of therms ea mg accounnng data, But there arc many problems Wit event stu res. irs , , . ' . .
ti . d ' b " tl arketoften anticipates acqursiuons long before theune Will ow abnormal returns arc computed for and the tune ase smce le mar, , . ,
, I . , ior to th t nay also play a role here. Secondly It ISdifficultuctua announcement day. The Icakagc of information prior to t e announcemen I , '
I ' ." d TI irdl this method assumes effic ient markets thatto se ect a reasonable benchmark in a rapidly consolidating m ustry. ur y. , . f h
' di , " tl ' t th market expectations are a good predictor 0 t eIlIIme lately mcorporate new information and relies on the assumption la e
long-term effects of an event. , . . .
96pilloff, S" Santorncro, A,M., "The Value Effects of Bank Mergers and Acquisitions". WharloTl Flnancial lnstinuions Center, 97-
07
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function confirming the initial perceptions of investors through rapid deliv . d I ' feryor non- e ivery 0
results.
Sirower's findings are therefore conflicting with most otherresearchers (see section 9), who
acknowledge that the great complexity of integration in particularly for cross-border transactions,
might take several years before benefits can be exploited.
The second approach of evaluating the performance is predominantly based on accounting data.
By comparing the ex-ante and ex-post M&A performance lets onedetermine whether
consolidation leads to improvements in reported costs, revenue or profit figures . The strengths of
this method is that accounting performancecan be directly measured andcompared asdata is
easily obtained from e.g. annual reports. However, there are several drawbacks with this measure
such as the fact that the accounting data is based on historical figures andhence neglects market
values and market outlooks. In addition, changes in performance may notbe solely due to the
M&A but instead due to other events that might have occurred which accounting data may not
accurately account for and therefore may lead to improper conclusions regarding merger related
changes.
Regardless of the approach chosen to evaluate performance, there is noconsensus whether or not
M&As create value. Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell (1998) note for example that bank
mergers, on average, neither create value, nor destroy stockholder value, while Houston, lames,
and Ryngaert (200 I) found that announcements of certain types of bank mergers do create value,
e.g. ones hat are predicted to reduce costs. Whatacademia, researching on M&A performance,
seems to agree on is though that shareholder returns for target companies areoften positive
(Delong (200 I), Beitel et al. (2002)) at the expense of the bidders shareholder return (Kane (2000),
Cornett, Hovakimian et al. (2000), Pilloff (1996), Siems (1996), and Hudgins and Seifert (1996)).
In the longer-run however, Houston et al. (2001) and Beitel et a!. (2002) find that that the
combined entity see positive, although small, shareholder returns.
While the above studies are mostly based on US data, studies thatfocus on the EUseem to reveal
different patterns. Beitel and Schiereck (200I) for example found after analyzing transactions
between European financial institutions between 1988 and 2000, thatdomestic (inter-EU) M&As
on average have significantly positive combined (bidder plus target) announcement effects, which
though became weaker towards the end of the period). Furthermore, they found that domestic
cross-industry transactions (particularly between banks and insurers) have on average a positive
value impact, which is also confirmed in other European studies on cross-industry deals between
banks and insurer; e.g. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) who find a positive effect oncombined
value. Smith and Waiter (2003) explain the positive effects from combining commercial banking
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with insurance activities by the fact that the greater diversification of income from multiple
products, cli ent groups, and geographic areas creates more stable, safer, andultimately more
valuable institutions.
When looking more specifically at the value effects of cross-border transactions, Hudgins and
Seifert (1996) for example find no significant difference between US banks acquiring domestic
banks and those acquiring foreign banks. In addition, they also do not find a significant difference
between US banks being acquired by domestic or foreign banks. Altunbas et al. (2004) study on
US-data shows improvements in performanceafter mergers have taken place, particularly in the
case of cross-border M&As. The study by Lowinski et al., who analyzed the wealth creation of
M&As in the Swiss capital market and placedspecial emphasis on thepeculiarities ofcross-border
transactions, found no significant difference in wealth creation between domestic and international
merger activi ty.
Buhner (1992) on the other hand, who examined announcement effects to bidders in theGerman
capital market from a long-term perspective, found a negative stock price reaction during the first
months after the merger announcement, which however turned positive after 24 months. Gerke et
al. (1995) found though no evidence of significant announcement effects forcross-border mergers
inGermany from a short-term perspective, and Corhay and Rad (2000) come to similar
conclusions for cross-border acquisitions of Dutch firms . On thecontrary, Morosini (2004) found
that the higher the national cultural distance between theacquirer and the target company, the
beiter the performance results. Richard Coleman, bank analyst at ABN Amro, says though that
'cross-border consolidation will happen eventually I... ] but how it creates value is difficult to
see.m
Theambiguity whether of not value is created subsequent to M&As sheds therefore a dubious light
onthe e ntire re asoning of engaging in such transactions and in addition underlines thefact that
integrationis an important issue to ensure valuecreation. In addition, there seems to be no
empirical evidence that clearly indicates the superiority of domestic transaction compared to cross-
border deals in terms of value creation.
8.3 Inhibiting Factors to wider Cross-Border Transactions
Inhibiting factors that can explain the marginal frequency of intra-Ell transactions inEurope are
97 Mackinto sh, J. "Weathering the storms", FinancialTimes, June 27, 2001
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various and can be rather idiosyncratic, which is the reason why I will only focus on some of the
major factors.
It is forexample acknowledged that government intervention in Europeappears to be one of the
main obstacles, by favoring the emergence of domestic champions (Boot, 2003) particularly when
itconcerns so-called 'strategic' industries such as utilities, airlines, and in particular banks and
financial institutions. This has meant that governments have favored transactions among large
domestic banks and have been opposed to foreign banksacquiring large domestic banks. These
policies have suppressed cross-border M&A not only directly but also indirectly by delaying the
onset of the point at which domestic banks have felt that they could no longergrow at home and
would, instead, have to grow abroad." Also the European Commission acknowledged this
phenomenon, saying that "one of the reasons for banks' failure to consolidateextensively on a
cross-border basis may be partly due to the intervention of national authorities".99
'Golden' shares 100, which were widely used in the EU, resembled such a protective mechanism
against cross-border acquisitions.l'" Another example of direct government intervention to cross-
border transactions was France's bail-out of Alstom to avoid the take-over attempts of German
conglomerate Siemens.102 As a consequence, acquiring a 'strategic' target is very difficult; first
when it becomes too inefficient and weak and no other way of rescuing it exists, national
authorities tend to prevail and agree to foreign ownership.
Another inhibiting factor could be related to evidence found by Tschoegel (1987) and Dufey and
Yeung (1993), indicating that for markets that are well-developed and competitive there is no
reason to expect foreign banks in general to be better than local banksat retail banking. The
aggregate data supports the argument that when investing in already competitive retail banking
markets, foreign banks have no advantage. Miller and Parkhe (2002) examined the banking sector
in 14 differentcountries and found domestic banks to be more 'profit efficient' than foreign banks.
Also Demirguec-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) and Claessenset al. (2001) found that foreign banks
98Tschoegel, A. E. "Discussion" on Buch C.M. and DeLong, G. contribution "Determinants of cross-border bank mergers, is
Europe different?", in Herrmann, H. and Lipsey, R. "Foreign direct investment in the real and financial sector of industrial
countries", Springer, 2003
99"Cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector: follow-up to Scheveningen informal ECOAN", European
~nllnission - DG Internal Market and Services - Banking Advisory Committee, December 2004 ,
Golden shares are a technique that gives its shareholder veto powers over changes to the a f~ected. company s charter. Golden
shares are held and used by governments to block transactions that arc considered contrary to public policy.
101Ina ruling on 13 May, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) said the British governme~t's golden share in ai~ort operator BAA,
aswell as the Spanish government's golden shares in Telefonica SA, EndesaSA, Argentaria and Tab~calera are .111 breach ~f EU law
as they restrict the free movement of capital within the EU's single market. http://www.euractlv.com/Arl1c1e?temun=tcm:29-
114lI 6-l6&type=News
102 See forexample Lander, M. "France cuts deal with EU to bail out Alstorn", International HeraldTribune, May 26, 2004
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tend to have higher margins and profits than domestic banks in developing countries, but that the
opposite holds true in industrial countries.l'" The implication of these arguments and results
indicate thatcross-border bank M&As might create institutions thatcannotcompete successfully
in the host markets (Buch and DeLong, 2001).
Because cross-border M&As generally contain the sameelements of difficulty as domestic ones,
though with differences in culture and language, it is widely perceived that cross-border deals are
more complex compared to domestic transactions as nocommon framework within which to work
exists. Berger et al. (2000) supports this understanding, although not providing statistical tests on
the relative importance, that "efficiency" barriers such as distanceas well as differences in
language, culture, currency, and regulatory/supervisory structures are factors that inhibit EU cross-
border deals in general and bank transactions in particular. In terms of language barriers Buch and
Delong (200I) present though evidence that the importance of sharing the sametongue has fallen
over theyears as the difference between the percentagesof deals where the partners shared a
common language is significantly smaller in the 1990s than the 1980s.
8.4 Conclusion
The analysis of the ex-ante stage has highlighted four general motives, the strategic-, the market-,
the economic, and the personal motive. It appeared that the former three motives are encouraging
the financial industry to focus mainly on domestic consolidation. Synergies are more obvious and
easier to exploit in domestic M&A's, the fragmentation of the financial industry in Europe lets
firms to focus on domestic roll-up before turning abroad, and growing to a 'too big to fail' size that
ensures government help needs to be achieved in the domestic market. In addition, it is often an
interplay between various motives that result in M&As.
At the ex-post stage it became clear that integration is a majorhurdle to M&As. One reason for the
arisingproblems in integration could be found in the low resource allocation in theex-ante and ex-
post stage which causes ambiguity and confusion, resulting lacking strategic- and cultural fit
between target and bidder. Simultaneously, management often turn their attention to other issues
subsequent to signing the contracts, leaving the company alone when its comes to integration.
This in turn made me hypothesize that the ex-ante motives for M&A determine and require a
specific strategy orientation and vice versa. Hence, the motives that seek efficiency enhancement,
~: Fnr a survcy se~ Bcrger, A.N, DcYoung, R. Germy, H. and Udell, ? F. ·.'Global~za tio~ of Finnacial Institutions: Evidence from
oss-Border Banking Performance", Brookings-wharton Papers 0 11 FinancialServices 3. 23-158,2000.
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i.e, strategic and economic, result in a strategy orientation with focus on centralization and
integration, while the market motive requires the response and adaptation to local conditions.
As thedomestic industry roll-up in banking was generally motivated to increase efficiency, they
refrained from cross-border deals motivated by the market motive, not least because the immediate
gains are less obvious and in addition would require larger investments in 'local responsiveness'.
The few cross-border M&As in banking that actually occurred where motivated by efficiency
seeking motives, implying a global strategy, which though waspossible due to the similarities in
corporate cultures and global orientation of these businesses.
Furthermore has the analysis revealed that there is generally no consensus on whether M&As
create- or destroy value, thereby not specifically explaining the marginal cross-border deals.
However, it was found that foreign banks generally do not seemto be as efficient in well-
developed markets compared to domestic institutions, not encouraging an intra-EUexpansion. In
addition, other factors inhibit greater cross-border activity in Europe such as the widespread
intervention of governments, as well as differences in language, culture.
9 Part 4 - Case Study
In thi s chapter I will use the insights gained from the previous parts and project them onto two
recent cases of cross-border consolidation in Europe' s financial industry, notably the creation of
Nordic banking giant Nordea and HSBC's acquisitionof Credit Commercial de France. The fact
that substantial cross-border M&As have been so rare in Europe resulted in a very limited choice,
particularly for examples that involve a considerableamount of retail banking operations, which
though was not decisive.
The reason for choosing these two cases, althoughseveral othercross-borderdeals have been
announced in recent time, notably the acquisition of Abbey National by Santander Bank of Spain,
isbecause it takes up to three to five years after the acquisition until the acquired company has
adjusted to the new situation (Waiter, 1985). Also Levinson (1970), Marks (1982), Larsson (1990)
and many other acquisition researchers believe that M&Ais an open-ended, ongoing process that
continues to affect an organization years and years after the legal acquisition actually takes place.
Therefore, it would be to my understanding misleading to make a case study analysis on a
transaction that has hardly been executed.
In the subsequent chapters I will present the two respective cases and review their developments
prior, during, and after the merger.
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9.1 Introduction - Nordea Case
In 1995, the merger between Union Bank of Finland and Kansallis hadcreated Merita, a banking
group that at that time was by far the dominant bank in the Finnish market. This merger caused
that the product portfolio of Merita was strengthened significantly with strong life insurance
products and mutual funds - with a 26 percent share, Merita obtained a leading position in the
Finish mutual fund market with. Moreover, Merita had a strong expertise in corporate and
international banking as well as a world-ranking PC banking system. The banks top management
believed that its strong position in the wholesale market would makeit necessary - despite being
burdened by a huge volume of unsold properties from the Scandinavian banking crisislO4- to grow
and be more internationally oriented. Consequently, theycast a glance at Sweden in the fall of
1996, and started in April 1997 to hold merger talks with the Swedish government that was at that
time the majority owner of Nordbanken.
Nordbanken was, after acquiring Gota Bank in 1993, an effic ient middle-sized playerin the
Swedish market with a sharp retail focus, segmenting the market into 'Iow-value' accounts that
were handled through I,100 Swedish post offices, and higher-value accounts, which its own well-
prunedbranches concentrated on.105 Having relatively few large corporate customers, Nordbanken
had a very strong position in the small- to medium-sized enterprises (5ME) area, as well as in the
asset management and mortgage product market.
The negotiation between Merita and Nordbanken concerning strategic fit, synergies, valuation, and
structural issues proceeded well and the merger was announced in October 1997. Its architects,
Nordbankens CEO I-Ians Dalborg and Merita' s CEO Vesa Vainio, saw the 'marriage' as a move
that could strengthen 'F inanzplatz Norden' against competition from Brussels and Frankfurt and
the large continental banks.lOG For Europe's financial landscape, the financi al press, and academia
the mergerwas extraordinary, "the SKr80bn ($1O.6bn) merger [... ] is noteworthy as one of the
first cross-border deals between European retail banks," said the Economist.Y'
Forming a new Nordic super-bank with assets of almost $1Obn, a customer baseof 6.5 million
individuals in Sweden and Finland, close to 300,000 SMEs and more than400 full corporate
customers, MeritaNordbanken ranked 20th in the European Banker's listing of the top50 European
I{)I "F'
105 inally, the great Nordic super-bank", European Banker, October 1997
Ibidem.
106
107 ~ames, H. "Nordic banks get together", The Banker, December I, 1997
Merger Monday", The Economist, October 18, 1997
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;-kS by market capitalization - the largest Nordic bank,SE-Banken, at that timeranked 25th.108
9.1.1 Motives MeritaNordbanken
The purpose of combining forces between Merita and Nordbanken were amongst others to grow
and obtain a wider customer base as well as preparing Nordbanken for the EMU bygranting
, 109 . f I Eaccess to the 'Target transacuon system 0 t le uropean central banks, which would give it a
competitive advantage compared to other Swedish players.I 10 In addition, synergies of Skr970
million a year within three years, of which Skr630 million will be on the cost sideas well as
reducing the workforce by 600 employees to around 21,000 were to be achieved bymerging
forces. JJ I
"We are proud of our achievement as an efficient retail bank [... ] butwe must create earnings
growth for our shareholders, and we see more potential in (merging) than in staying on our own.
This isouranswer to the changes that are sweeping Nordic and European financial services", said
112 "0 . . t N di . h Id .Dalborg. ur nussion was to create a s rong or IC entity t at cou compete against European
heavyweights," recalls Arne Liljedahl, who was e FO of Nordbanken.l"
Analysts remained though skeptical, acknowledging that there were clearlyopportunities forcross-
selling - notably Merita's life insurance products through Nordbanken's Swedish branch network,
and the latter's asset management operations in Finland - but that in itself would not make the
groupa truly pan-European lending group. "People will be disappointed by thisdeal," said Peter
Thorne, European banking analyst at Paribas in London. "It looks defensive and given thecultural
difference between the two banks, it is not easy to see how it would be successful."!"
The fact that the merger was across national boundaries has been subject to a good deal of critical
comment on the grounds that the potential gains for shareholders look rathermeager, as
opportunities for rationalizing the branch network and slimming manpower, which are invariably
the major attractions of mergers between domestic retail banks, were almost impossible to realize.
"Youdon't save a lot of cost and you are not dealing with the same clients. The advantages are
108"N .
109 ordic banks lead way in European consolldatiun", European Banker, October 1997
. The Trans-Europcan Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET) is the EU central banks' real-
limecum gross payment system, 11 consists of 15 national real-time gross settlement systemsand the EuropeanCentral Bank's own
f~6ment mechanism, which are intcrlinkcd to provide a common platform for processing cross-border payments.
II I "Bigger is beuer (Isompi on Parcmpi)", Kauppalchti , October IS, 1997
112"Nordic banks lead way in European consolidation", European Banker, October 1997
uP'
113 1I1ally, the great Nordic super-bank", EuropeanBanker, October 1997
114 Larsen, P.F. "Border crossing", CFO, May 2004
Burt, T. "Mcrged bank aims for Nordic dominance", Financial Times, October 14, 1997
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h F· . I T' 11 5 AD 'harder tosee," says t e mancia rmes, anish bankercommented cynically: "Theonly ones
tobenefit from this merger will be Scandinavian Airlines and Finnair" - a snide reference to the
amount of traveling between the two countries which executives will have to undertake.
Consequently, the shares in Nordbanken, fell SKr4.50 to SKr274 in Stockholm, while Merita's
most commonly traded A shares rose FM2.90 (34p) to FM28.IO in Helsinki. Analysts believed that
Nordbanken share price reflected concerns that it could have achieved greater cost savings by
merging with a domestic competitor, such as SEB.116
Mr Dalborg was though unfazed by these concerns, accepting that Nordbanken might have
enjoyed greater cost benefits through domestic consolidation, which it actually considered earlier
in 1997. Nevertheless, he maintains that MeritaNordbanken will be a happier union in the long
run. l l? "If a cross-border banking merger is ever to succeed, this is the one," saysranMcEwen,
banking analyst at Lehman Brothers in London. "It has able managementcommitted to
restructuring, strong technology and efliciency, plus a natural home market of culturally similar
businesses and consumers."IIHAlso, analysts from Salomon Brothers issued a highly positive
analysis of the merger, suggesting that the gains from rationalization and improved business
opportunities will be greater than the two banks themselves haveestimated.I19
The cause for this optimism was most probably Vainios indication thatMeritaNordbanken had a
broader Nordic strategy in mind: "We are inviting financial companies in the Nordic countries and
Baltic region to participate in this growth", thereby making the first step towards creating a pan-
N di b ki . 120or IC an nng giant,
9.1.2 The 2nd and 3rd Merger
The first bank to answer MeritaNorbanken' s invitation was Denmark's Unibank that has been able
10 establish itself in Poland, making it an ideal partner for Meritalvordbanken.l '" Though before
considering a fusion with MeritaNordbanken, Unibank had to complete its merger with Tryg-
Baltica, oneof Denmark 's leading insurance companies, that created Unidanmark.
Pertti Voutilainen, managing director of Finnish-based MeritaNordbanken was pleased about
115
116 Mclvor, G. "Pause for a breathing space after the frenzy", Financial Times, October27, 1998
11
Burt,T. "Merita plans Nordbankcn merger", Financial Times, October 14, 1997
7"N .
118 ordic banks expect happy union", Finan cial Times, November 12, 1997
119 Mclvor, G. "Golden days for the big four" ,llIl'lJstors Chronicle, March 13, 1998
120 Bames, H."Nordic banks get together", 'I1,e Banker, December I, 1997
121 Burt, T. "Merita plans Nordbankcn merger", Financial Times, October 14, 1997
"Meritn woos Unibank (Mcrita frier kruftigt til Unibank)",/J Ilrsen, May20, 1999
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Unibank's takeover of Tryg-Baltica makinga merger between MeritaNordbanken and Unidanmark
• 122 "0 I U .
even more attracnve. vert le years nidanrnark hashad a sharply focused growth strategy in
theNordic area in order to boost its own competitiveness and tocreatelong-term growth of
dividends for its shareholders," said Joergen Hoeg Pedersen,chairman of the board for
Unidanmark. "The merger [with MeritaNordbanken] is thenext logical step in that direction," he
added. 123 With the increased market capitalization subsequent to the merger withTryg-Baltica,
MeritaNordbanken and Unidanmark could nowconsider a 'merger of equals', valued at E4.78bn
thatwas announced in March 2000 by representatives of both institutions. The newly formed bank,
renaming itself Nordic Baltic Holding (NBH) hadassets under management worth E186bn, a
combined market capitalization of €15.6bn, andserved a customer base, consisting of 8.5 million
private customers, 450,000 SME's and 500 large business customers, from its 1,100 branch
banks.124 "MeritaNordbanken's strong position in theSwedish, Finnish and Baltic state markets
and its leading position in Internet-based services, complement very well with Unidanmark's
strong market position in Denmark and its specialties in wholesale banking and insurance and
b kinz rei " P d 125an u g insurance , says e ersen.
Priorto its merger plans with Unidanmark, MeritaNordbanken attempted in October 1999 to
expand to Norway by acquiring Christiania Bankog Kredittkasse, Norway's second largest
banking group. This, however, turned out to be a more difficult and enduring endeavor than
anyone could have imagined, as MeritaNordbanken met fierce nationalistic resistance from the
Norwegian government, which was the majority owner forChristiania. Norway's Prime Minister,
Kjell Magne Bondevik, argued at the height of the conflict to keep Christiania from being sold:
"We need some big Norwegian banks because Norwegians know Norwegian conditions better than
foreigners." 126
MeritaNodbankens merger with Unidanmark was by many analyst believed to be anessential step
to eventually win over the Norwegian government andget theapproval of merging with
Christiania.V' As a consequence, after one yearof negotiating and renewing the bidfor Christiania
several times, the Norwegian government accepted MeritaNordbankens NKr24.2bnbid in October
122 Ibidem.
123 "Danish Unibank and Swedish-Finnish MeritaNordbanken merge", DeutschePresse Agentur, March 8, 2000
124 Ibidem.
125 Ibidem.
126 Crisscione, V. "Finance flies the nag", Financial Times, October 26,200I
127 Brown-I-1umes, C. and Maccarthy, C. "MeritaNordbanken in4.8bndeal", Financial Times, March7. 2000
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2000, which led to the 'birth' of Nordea, the new name of the Nordic banking group.
9.1.3 Motives Nordea
MeritaNordbanken and Unidanmark cited the rapid structural changes that fundamentally altered
the way financial institutions produce, market, andsell their products and services as the main
reason for the merger. The growing importance of the Internet, mobile telephony, and electronic
trading required both investment and a large volume of transactions, they said. A marked increase
incompetition in the Nordic market following theSingle Market Act, adoption of theeuro, as well
as the general liberalization of credit and capital markets added to these considerations.V''
Subsequent to NBH' s successful bid for Christiania, MrDalborg said that through the transfer of
best practices, cross-selling of products, and the sharing of ITand administration costs, the group
will be able to offer its clients a broader range of services at competitive costs. He added: "We will
focus on customer benefits from sharing Nordic ideas and the realization of synergies".129
Nevertheless, this strategy appeared not convincing for everyone, again due to the rather obscure
cost synergies that these transactions yielded compared to domestic ones. In addition, combining
four banks under a decentralized management by merging, rather than a straightforward takeover,
made it difficult to push through cost-cutting measures,130 Toquote Mr Straarup, Danske Bank's
CEO: "I don't believe that the establishment of so-called equal partnerships is a short-cut to
attaining economies of scale or, for that sake, economies of scope,,,13I Also Bersen, the leading
Danish business newspaper, seemed to agree noting that: "Nordea could face difficulties merging
the four banks due to domestic differences in financial regulations."I32
Nevertheless, the reception of the transactions was largely positive. Moody's Investors Service
announced for example to review for possible upgrade of thelong-term deposit and debt ratings of
the merged group, as well as the financial strength ratings of Nordbanken AB (Al/C»), Menta
Bank Plc (A I/C) and Unibank AIS (A lie) . The Aa3 rating for mortgage bonds issued by Unikredit
Realkreditaktieselskab, a subsidiary of Unibank, has alsobeen placed on review forpossible
upgrade.!"
128"Danish Unibank and Swedish-Finnish MeritaNordbanken merge", Deutsche Presse Agentur,March8, 2000
129G .. , . b d biti t' rt to berealized" Financial Times, October 31,2000eorge, N, Nordic banking and finance, cross- or er am I IOns a,
130 lbidcm.
131 Ibidem
132" . b k litikere for frelles tilsyn), Bersen,June 7, 2001Nordca seeks common Nordic legislation (Nordisk stor an presser po J J
133"MeritaNordbankcn and Unidanmark to merge", Nordic BusinessReport, March 7, 2000
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9.1 .4 Post Merger Developments and lnteqratlon . Nordea
After the merger between Merita and Nordbanken, it was decided to locate the merged bank's
legal home in Finland to avoid the Swedish systemof double taxationof dividends, which would
have caused Merita's shareholders to sell out en masse. MeritaNordbanken's executive
headquarters on the other hand were located in Stockholm, where Nordbankens CEO Hans
Dalborg will be chairman of the I l-person executive board, which is divided 50-50 between
Swedish and Finnish members.P" While section 8.1 showed that tax and accounting considerations
are not main reasons for an M&A transaction, Steger and Kummer (2004) nevertheless note that
they play a role when a deal is executed and decisions about the design and structure of the
transaction need to be taken in order to optimize tax burdens. Especially for 'merger ofequals' ,
which Merita and Nordbanken was, a dual-headed group structure, Le. a 'multi-headquartered'
company, is often favorable in order to exploit the country specific advantages and to satisfy
f b h . 135shareholders rom ot nations.
Outlining what else needs to be done to integrate the twoentities, Dalborg quotes Mao: "It will be
the tyranny of many small steps", starting by reviewing theprofitability ofits three main profit
centers - retaiI banking, corporate banking, and real estate. In retail banking, Merita will have the
opportunity to roll out Nordbanken's successful specialized financial packages across its branches,
while Merita's well-established life insuranceoperations can be distributedthrough Nordbanken's
branch network. On the corporate side, Mr Dalborg wants to build up the underdeveloped stock-
broking and corporate finance activities as "in these areas [the bank] is not good enough to be one
among many, you have to have a unique competence."136 Customers will though hardly notice any
difference as besides assigning the banks a common name and logo, there will beotherwise no
major changes and both entities will continue to operate independently of each other in their
respective markets.137
Boosted by the general economic upturn in the global economy and the stock markets as well as
the smooth integration, MeritaNordbanken shares performed rather well, which made it possible
134T . , kill I sure that the work of his board does nothe personable Dalborg will have to exercise all hIS man-management s I SO en . .
deteri . ' I I d Itures - including business cultures - are veryetenoralc mto trench warfare between Finns and Swedes, w lose anguages an cu . I
d'fr . . " . h d werful people who ruled Finland for severaI terent, and spiced by a Finnish infenority complex vis-a-vis a nc er an more po
hundred years, . ,
135S . , 'I' " "M agingcomplex mergers" edited by Morosiniteger, U. and Kummer, C. "M&A activity in the new cornpeuuve nu ieu ,In an
P. and Steger U. Prentice Hall Financial Times, 2004
: ~~ "Nordic banks expect happy union", Financial Times, November 12,1 997
Barnes, H. "Nord ic banks get together", The Banker, December I, 1997
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for the group to attempt to realize its Nordic strategy by making a take-over proposal for
Christiania less than two years after merging Merita and Nordbanken,
By merging with Unidanmark, Nordea turned in less than three years into ' I fa major payer, ar larger
than anyof its Nordic counterparts, having close to 10 million private and I '11'rru Ion corporate
customers, 1,240 branches and a market share of 20 percent inSweden, 40 percent in Finland, 25
percent in Denmark , and 10 percent in Norway.P" Though with share prices peaking at SK.r79 in
January 200 I , as Figure 19 indicates, just a month after themerger with Christiania, the share
performance started to tumble to a low of SKr31 .5 in October 2002 before recovering to its recent
139(December 2004) level of SKr65.
Figure 19:Nordea's share pertormance
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The disappointing performance can partly be blamed on the way financial markets have developed
atthat time, where Nordea had to grapple with falling stock markets, subdued economies, and the
lowest interest rates for more than a generation140, contrasting the rosy times when Nordbanken
and Merita joined forces in 1997. The second two deals were consummated in 2000,just as the
markets were beginning to weaken, "We had to grab theopportunities while they were there",
argued Mr Dalborg, knowing that adding two banks in such a short time interval, when markets
were unfavorable, added hugely to the difficulty of integrating them. 141
Notsurprisingly then did Nordea fail to deliver on therevenue synergies it had promised, "We
found we couldn't afford to integrate at the speed we had hoped for, because we didn't have the
138
George, N. "Cross-border complexities", Financial Times, August 25, 2003
139G "F' ' 17 " . August20 2002140 eorge, N. and Maccarthy, C. "Bank investors lake account of contrasts , mancta umes, ,
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necessary income because of the weak market," says MrNordstrom.142 To that comes, that only
days after Nordea reported a 44 percent drop in first-halfprofits in 2002 bystruggling to keep
costs under control, Thorleif Krarup, who took overthe position as CEO from MrDalberg, stepped
down from his position. He was leavinghis post "due to the negative impact of my CEO
assignment on my personal situation and thestrainson my CEO obligations due to that
situation".143 Being in a severe crisis, analysts accordingly speculated that the merger had lost its
momentum and that reforms became mired in the cultures of four former nationally-focused
banks.144
Luckily, Mr Krarups CEO successor,Mr Nordstrom, felt it was time to get a grip. "We were
perceived to be over-promising and under-delivering," he says in an obliquereference to the
massive €720m of savings that Mr Krarup had promised.!" "We have too many ofeverything _too
many branches, too many people, too many banks, toomany mangers, too many solutions, too
many products, too many IT systems. The only things we don't have too many of is customers."146
Mr Nordstrom's strong focus on cost-cutting helped Nordea's share price to recover significantly
in 2003, not least by means of scaling back its investment banking ambitions, divesting non-core
businesses such as insurance, and generally prioritizing profitability instead ofproduct range. With
one of the highest cost-income ratios in Nordic banking, hovering around 63 percent, theoriginal
goal was to reach a 50 percent cost-income ratio, though dueto the various problems Nordea
faced, a more modest target 55 percent was to be achieved by2005.147
Theproblems Nordea faced were not just a matter of legislation, currency, and language but of
mindset, which has led to a far too complicatedstructure. Most comparable European banking
deals involved a bank with a strong home market position buying a smaller bank in a neighboring
market. But there was no dominant bankin Nordea's case, which meant that at the outset of
integration process was more consensual than it should have been. "Our mindset was directed
towards integration, towards negotiation, towards being too polite to each other. Instead of people
stepping up and saying: now it's decision time, this is theway we are goingtodo it", says Mr
Nordstrom.
142 Ibidem.
143 George, N. and Maccarthy, C. "Nordea chief replaced after profits slump",Financial Times, August 27, 2002
144 G "F' , I "" September 4 2002eorge, N. "Nordea chief aims to restore faded luster", tnancta 'lilies, •
145 Brown-Humes, C. "One brand too many cultures", Financial Times, April 23,2004
146 George, N. "Cross-border complexities", FinancialTimes, August 25, 2003
147 George, N. "Nordea reduces banking ambition", FinancialTimes, November 19, 2002
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Inevitably, different teams in different banks fought for their own solutions. Nowhere was this
more apparent than in ]T. In mid-2002 Mr. Nordstrom wanted to consolidate theentire bank's IT in
one site. Eight months later, he found that nothing had been done. Thesolution was tooutsource
the operation, which is why an ]T joint venture was formed with IBM late in2003.148"The mistake




Critics argue that the poor performance of Nordea just underlines the difficulties of cross- border
integration as Nordea generally performed worse than Nordic peers such as Svenska
Handelsbanken and Den Danske Bank in measures such as share price performance, return on
equity, and cost-to-income ratio. In addition, it admits that it is still some way from being one
bank. 150While Mr Nordstrorn says "It's somewhere in between but closer toone," others disagree,
saying there "are still four different banks. It's onlywhen you get to theverytopof the
organization that you appreciate there's an umbrella overthe whole thing".1 51
Nevertheless, everybody acknowledges, "the managementchallenge facing Nordeas management
was huge. They have been trying to do something that has notreally been done in banking before,
atleast in developed markets L...]' Retail banking is a local business, whereas investment banking
is a global one," says Rohit Ohose, banking analyst at Citibank in London.152Citibank's Mr Ghose
claims that these problems with integration were triggered because: "Nordea is a hot-potch
collection of banks, many of which were never best of breed in their home markets.,,153
Though Mr Dalborg disagrees strongly, saying that the bank has not been without its successes. Its
scale has for example enabled it to become a much greater force in corporate banking than would
otherwise have been the case.154 In addition, he insists still being "very enthusiastic" about the
merger, saying that "the idea is absolutely right; the execution could have been firmer. Butwe
have started to be firmer and more decisive.,,155
148 Brown-HlI mes, C. "One brand loo many cultures", Financial Times, April 23,2004
149
GeOJ'gc, N. "Cross-bonier complexities", Financial Times, August 25,2003
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9.2 Introduction HSBC - CCF Case
Having introduced the Nordea case, I will now reviewthe acquisition of Credit Commercial de
France (CCF) by the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBC) in2000.
HSBC is a mulLinational banking group that was established in 1865 with the main objective to
finance the growing trade between China and Europe. Due to its continuous growth that was both
organic and through various acquisitions, HSBC became one of the worlds largest banking and
financial services organizations, employing 146,000 people worldwide with a market capitalization
of$118bn and total assets worth $569bn (in 2000).156
Just prior to its acquisition of UK' s Midland Bank in 1992, HSBC relocated its headquarters to
London, realizing that the European market and in particular London was vital for it future
development. 157 Generally, the 1990s were HSBC's most dramatic growth period, with several
acquisitions causing its product portfolio to grow rapidly. Its core activities fell into four main
sectors: financial services, commercial banking, corporate investment banking, and markets and
private banking - in 200 I, 98% of profits were derived from these activities.158As regards the
geographical representation, the HSBCGroupis a truly global player, with 9,500offices in 79
countries and territorie s, and assets distributed evenly between Europe, Asia, and the Americas.159
CCF on the other hand was formed in 1917 afterBanque Suisse et Francaise merged with Maison
Aynard et Fils (of Lyon) and Caisse de Credit de Nice.160 From that moment, the bankhas
expanded steadily both through organic growth andbyacquisitions, ranking in 1969 as the world's
twelfth most active bank in the international financial markets. Under the provisions of the law of
February I I, 1982 the bank was nationalized through the transfer of its shares to the French state.
Under state ownership, CCF achieved a leading position in France with regards to home banking
and euro-franc bond issues. State ownership did though notlast long and in 1987 CCF was re-
privatized.
At the time of HSBC's takeover in 2000, the CCFGroup employed 13,430 people, had a market
t56 . . d 218000 I "HSBCGroup Fact Sheet" August 2003, availableIn2003 the group s assets reached $ 983bn and It employe , peop e. '
at http://www.hsbc.com.
157"G .
roup History" available at www.hsbc.com 8 f
158 . ' t t banking and markets accounted for 3 % 0A closer look into the company's portfolio reveals that corporate mves men , .







f. I F' . II ersonal financial services contn ution equa e 7 0 0commercrat banking profits accounted for 23% of the group tota . ilia y, p ,
HSBC business
159' . "I S h f Global Leaders" Harvard Business Review, August
Green, S. Hassan, F. Immell, J. Marks, M. and Meiland, D. n earc or ,
2003.
160 . • il bl th CCF's official website http://www.ccf.com.The information on CCF is based on the informauon avai a e on e '
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capitalization of €9.l bn and consolidated assets of €69.3bn. The main focus of CCFwas on retail
banking and distribution, corporate and investment banking, and asset management, and its retail
clientele was mainly "mid-to-upper" range withover 500,000 personal customers andhigh-quality
business customers as well as some 50,000corporate customers. To that came CCF's regional
banking subsidiaries that it acquired previously and are operatingunder theirownbrand name.
These regional subsidiaries add a further 550,000 personal customers, 76,000 corporate customers,
some 37,000 professional and small business customers and more than 19,000 associations and
institutional customers to CCF's client group.
9.2.1 Motives HSBC - CCF
The major motives for HSBC's acquisition of CCFwas to develop its wealth management
business - private banking and asset management161_ as well as entering the French retail banking
market
162
with CCF's 650 branches and more than one million customers including major French
companies.l '" By entering the French market, HSBC would moreover expandits presence in the
euroarea, where the bank had been underrepresented. As Sir John Bondsaid, the deal was "a
unique opportunity to acquire a well-managed, fast-growing French bank [...] and to establish a
significant base for operation in the euro zone".164
CCFon the other hand was motivated to become part of HSBC due to the growth prospects in its
own domestic market that this deal would allow. As Charles de Croisset, the Chairman of the CCF
Group, put it, " the conditions of globalizing markets made it necessary for CCFtojoin a leading
banking group in order to accelerate its growth and development,,165, thereby being progressive in
thedemands for improved services and products. Becoming a part of the HSBC group, allowed
CCFto broaden its product and service offerings by drawing on HSBC's leading international
position and its recognised expertise in certain fields such ascash management. Apart fromthe
willingness to grow and develop, CCF was also motivated by the simple drive to achieve financial
stability. This need has resulted from the fact thatall French banks suffered from profitability
problems in the beginning of the 1990s.166
161 "Global Balancing Act" Private Banker International, April 14, 2000.
I~ ,
"HSBC feels hoost from CCP deal", Financial News, February 26, 2001.
163 Johnson, A., "HSBC pays GB? 6.6BN in French BankTakeover", The Express, April 3, 2000.
164"Global Balancing Act" Private Hanker International, April 14, 2000.
165 '
The official web site of CCP: http://www.ccf.com. .
166 . , d b t ti I' in costs associated with them, following a huge
. The r~cessilln of the early 1990s led to an incr~ase 111 r!sksa~ a su s an I ~ nse 1 aI hallen e forcredit institutions. This effect
lllcrease 111 demand For credit. The high rate of business failures 111 France became a re c g
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What was remarkable about the deal was that HSBC which is a bank that id 't If ..
, pn es 1 se .on acqumng
targets on the cheap, has paid - at three-and-a-halftimes book value _top euro for CCF, even
though it has made so many concessions to the French bank, such as keeping the CCF brand name,
refraining from layoffs, and leaving CCF's headquarters in Paris.167 These requirements were set,
not so much by CCF itself, but by its most influential stakeholders, namely the French government
and the financial regulators, that were very reluctant to leta French bankbeing acquired by a
foreign corporation .
Nevertheless, "the agreement is the result of in-depth discussions between the two groups, which
took place on a totally friendly basis and led to a clearand concerted plan for CCF. The offer is an
excellent one for our shareholders", says de Croisset. 168
Theoverall strategic tit between the two entities was very promising giving HSBC its fi rst sizable
foothold in the euro zone - which HSBC' CEO thinks is a must: "You cannot be a credible player
in theeuro zone if you don't have a signifi cant on-the-ground presence".169
From a product line perspective, CCF was able to bring some "welcome expertise" into HSBC's
own fund-management operations and adding some of CCF's fund-managed products that had
appeal in the UK. 170 Moreover, CCF's focus on an affluent clientele, neatly dovetails with Bond's
strategy of building up HSBC's asset-management portfolio. "CCF is a very good-quality bank
whose businesses are an excellent tit with HSBC", says also banking analyst at Salomon Smith
Barney, John Leonard .!"
9.2.2 Post Merger Development and Integration- HSBC
With the French government being the main shareholder, it was essential for HSBC to make
various concessions and guarantee that the decision centres remained in France in order to get the
permission from the French authorities. Because HSBC was itselffounded and developed as a
locally present but centrally coordinated bank, the plan was to keep CCF as an autonomous uni t,
but withcertain structural changes to rationalize, gain synergies, and avoid overlaps.
was strengthened by turmoil on foreign exchange and interest rate markets in th~ ~am~ p~riod and resulted in. stagnant net b~n~ng
income. In fact, in the worst year of 1994, the net banking income for a~1 c~edlt mstltull?nSfell by m?re than 7.pe:~ent. ~ ~ ~d
between 1994 and 1998 the profitability of Freneh banks has increased significantly, which helped to IIlcr~ase banks capra
, . F h b: ki sector seemed to be recovenng at a fast pace, themake France s bankmg system more solvent. Although the renc an mg .
f . . . . bi I h '11' ess to avoid similar troubles III future.memory 0 recent profitability problems 11IIght give i rt I to t e WI mgn .
167
"HSBC treads Softly" , nle Economist, April 8,2000.
168 Ibidem.
169 Capell, K. Stanley R. "The Long Reach of HSBC", Business Week, April 17, 2000
170 " . 00
Johnson, A. "HSBC pays GBP 6.6BN in FrenchBankTakeover", The Express, Apnl3, 20 .
171Capell,K. Stanley, R., "The Long Reach of HSBC", Business Week, ApriIl7, 2000
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Consequently, while CCF would maintain its French management team headquartered in Paris, all
ofHSBC subsidiaries present in France, which though were not many, were integrated with CCF
and controlled by it as it was closer to their specific business area.
Because no major parts of CCF's operations were to be integrated into HSBC's structure, the
cultural and organizational fit between the two corporations was in thiscase not an essential factor,
asCCF was virtually left autonomous. A good illustration of CCP's autonomy and 'special' status
was its exemption from HSBC's policy of common branding under the HSBC name. eCF was
allowed to remain its initial name and branding strategy, just the logo and the sameletter-style was
changed to the hexagon symbol of HSBC.
CCF excellent performance record before the merger caused HSBC's management tohold on to
thealready established structure. Due to a large degreeof complementary in e cp's and HSBC's
operations, in itsel f limiting the needs for rationalizing jobs, caused that there were only marginal
job losses. Completing its integration into HSBC in only four months, also the legal integration of
CCF into the HSBC structure appeared to run without greater difficulties and opposition, much due
to the thorough preparations and strategic planning of the two parties, and an excellent cooperation
between the two parties. Thus, the authorities andfinancial regulators approved the terms quickly,
and the trade unions showed no signs of agitation in the weeks following the deal's
announcemenl. l 72
Nevertheless, integration would most probably not run as smooth, if CCF would notbe performing
as good as it did. In 2000, CCF was the most profitable French bank, and in fac t oneof the most
profitable European banks, with an annual return onequity over the past 13 years of 19 percent
compared to average returns for French banks of about 14 percent. 173 Simultaneously this meant
that cost-cutting was limited; only one third of the EI50 million of the promisedsynergies could be
d . d f' . 174enve rom cost cutting.
CCF's employees and shareholders were satisfied hearing that HSBC paid a large premium for
their bank' s assets, while HSBC's shareholders reactedwith more concern. Consequently, the
shares of HSBC fell nearly 4 percent on news of itsE II bn bid for CCF.
175
This reflected
shareholders' worries that the bank was paying a too high price in its friendly acquisition with a
I72 lskander, S. "French Put Different Gloss On FriendlyTakeover", The Banker, Vo!. 150, No. 891. May I. 2000
113 Capell, K. Stanley, R., "The Long Reach of HSBC", Business Week. April 17,2000
114
"HSBC treads Softly", 71,e Economist, April 8, 2000
115 "HSBC dives on ccr deal" , Hong Kong Standard(China), April 04,2000.
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~.to-book valuation 3.5 times acquisition price.176
Though HSBC's share price soon recovered and did notseem to be affect d I b h . , ,e great y y t e Initial
dI'ssatisfaction of HSBC shareholders, experiencing as Figure 20 illustrates . if' " a srgm icant share
Price increase till the end of 2000. It is nevertheless important to note that both th he growt towards


















I "AcqUisitions boost HSB credit rating", ltoni; Kong iMail(China),Scp 19, 2000, ifi
18I k TA ' French Banking Interests lntensi es,
s andcr, S, "Foreign Banks Exploit Gup In French Defence - As The Race 0 cquirc
~~nsolidat ion Is The Only Escape Route", Tlte Banker, Vol. ISO, No. 892, June 1, 2000
Ibidem,
Incontrast to shareholders, the international rating agency Fitchassigned a positive outlook to the
AA-long-term debt rating of HSBC, reflecting the bank's recentacquisition of the ceF. HSBC's
already internationally diverse global banking franchise had been, accordingtoFitch, significantly
strengthened.m Moreover, HSB 's profitability will benefit from a more diverse revenue stream,
bothin terms of markets and products, which will help reduce income volatilityand maintaincore
operatingearnings. Also, Samer Iskander l7K was positive about the HSBC - CCF deal, terming it
"a textbook example of how to avoid the pitfalls that threaten cross-border transactions in general
andbanking takeovers in particular".
As HSBC's CEO puts the F deal: " It [CCF] will also significantly increaseour wealth
management basis, onc of the key objectives of our strategic plan, and expand ourability to meet
theneeds of our global corporate and institutional c1 ients".179
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Figure 20: Weekly share prices for HSBC, listed on London Stock Exchange in the period of1998-2003
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~Analysis of the Cases
Having introduced the two cases and outlined the major developments prior duri d, urIng, an
subsequent to the respective transactions, I will now proceed with analyzing them indepth to
evaluate the applicability of my findings from the previous sections.
9.3.1 Financial Regu lation & Supervision
Integrated financial regulation and supervision in which banking, securities, and insurance
regu lation and supervision is combined within a single agency was first tried inScandinavia
almost two decades ago. Norway was the first country to establish an integrated financial sector
supervisory agency in 1986, followed by Denmark in 1988 and Sweden in 1991 . According to
Taylor and Fleming (1999) IHO there arc a number of similarities in the general outline of their
systems. The scope, powers, and governance arrangements of the three agencies bear a strong
familyresemblance. The Scandinavian agencies each have a broadly similar regulatory scope.
They regulate bank, non-bank investment fi rms, and insurancecompanies, mainly to ascertaintheir
solvency. Finland though, has not adopted an integrated financial sector supervisory agency due to
thedifficulty of combining its unique systems of compulsory pensions and othersocial insurance
withmarket-based fi nancial supervision (Taylor and Fleming, (1999)). Hence, Finland's Financial
Supervision Agency regu lates only banks and securities fi rms, with insurance companies and
compulsory private sector pension schemes regulated by the Insurance Supervisory Agency.
Despite the widespread similarities in the f nancial supervisorystructure of the Nordic countries,
Nordea 's cross-border merger caused diIficulty as the institutions from four countries were
involved in the decision making and approval, all of them having slightlydifferent approaches and
represent different national interests e.g. in respect to job losses and supremacy. Nevertheless, the
Nordeacase caused the cross-country cooperation to improve between the Scandinavianregulators
andsupervisory institut ions. This was underlined in autumn 2000 when the four Nordic countries
concluded on a Memorandum of Understanding covering supervisory matters, which calls for
increased information sharing and co-operation regarding planning and executing on-site
inspections.1Nl
TheHSBC-CCF case was in this respect more straightforward as it only involved regulatory and
ISO Taylor. M. and Flcming A. " Integrated Financial Supervision _ Lessons of Scandinavian Experience". Finance and
Del'elopmelll 1999
181"S . .' . ' 28 oeed orgldataoecdl2912711 939320.pdf &
upervision of Pinanciul Services in the DECD Area", DEeD Publication, p, www. .
guest lceturcby Fiuunstilsynet
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-;-isory bodies from two countries. Nevertheless these two countries F d hsup " ranee an t e UK, are
in this respect very differen t from the Scandinavian countries. TheUK adopted in 1997 a single
fi nancial services regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which, according toGardener
andMolynellx (2002)182 is a reflection of the ongoing universalisation of the UK banking industry
in Europe's most important and sophisticated financial market. Inaddition, the Bank ofEngland
transferred in June 1998 its responsibiIities for prudential supervision ofbanks to theFinancial
Services Authority (FSA).18J As a result, the UK has with the FSA one single body that is in
charge ofregulation and supervision of fi nancial institutions,
In France, however, regulation and supervision was at that time more complicated as it did not
haveanintegrated financial regulatory body. Hence, several agencies and regulators had
responsibility for regulatory investigation and enforcement in the financial services sectors with
theirjurisdictions overlapping from time to time. Generally, there was the Commission des
Operations de Bourse ( oui'". the onscil des Marches Financiers (CMF)1 85 and the
Commission Bancaire ( 8)18('. For banks and investment firms, prudential supervisionis
performed by the 13 , licensing by the ornitc des Etablissements deCredit et des Entreprises
d'lnvestissement ( E El ) and regulation by the ornite de la Reglernentation Bancaire et
Financierc (CRBP) and the ' M P. The 013 had sole responsibility for authorized investment firms
providing essentially management services. Par insurance firms, the main supervisoryagency was
theCommission de ontro le des Assurances (CCA), while the Ministry ofFinance was
responsible for licensing and regulations.
Financial institutions were subjec t to ongoing supervision by Banque de France inspectors, acting
onbehalfof the CB, which is in charge of credit institutionssupervision inFrance.
l87
Besides the
rather complicated structure of 11 nancial regulation and supervision at the time of HSBC's
acquisition of p11l8, HS13 had to expect and cope with significant government intervention, as
182 G d - r d i "B k' 'In the New Europe" Gardener E. P,M.ar cner, E.I'.M., and Molyncux, 1'. "United Kingdom", to be roun 111 an II1g . '
~lJolyneu x, P. anti Moore . B. Palgrave Macmill un. Ll/I u/OIrJlJasill}:s/Oke.2002 , "
C . EU t
University of Bologna, 2002,
ervellnu, E, M. "Financial regulation and supervision III • coun nes ,
~~w . cfmacfm.orglAeccpledPapcrs20031 ervcllutiEnrieuMllrialCervcllatiEnricoMaria.pdf




187 PI'h " " G d E PM Molyneux, P. and Moore, B. Palgrave
I on, D. Fruncc", to be found in "Bankin ' in the New Europe, ar encr, . . .
Ma '/l188 cml /Ill, LOIul/JIrJlJasillgsrok/~ , 2002 . I ulatory body
The F h Mini . I I J I 2002 tint he intended toset upa smge reg ,
lb' rcnc 1 Iinistcr of Economy and Industry announced on u Y , . be ' If d ed before parliament in
IS projcct will be included in the druft loi de sccurilc Iinancicre (Financial Secunty Act) to . 111 0 vid
Septe b Th ., f k t d investmentservices provi ers.m er, e merger should simplify the regulatory supcrvrsron 0 mar cs an
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~t'dared' to make a take-over attempt of a French bank resulting in the bel' .
I ' ' Iore-mentloned
SBe' id Ill'Jconcessions from H s SI e.
Hence,when comparing the institutional set-up of the twocases, it appears that althoughthe
Nordea case involved regulatory and supervisory institutions from four countries, the rather similar
structure of relying on one institution that is in charge of both regulatory and supervisory activities
forall financial institutions, Finland's insurance industry being anexception, reducedthe hurdles
significantly. HSBC on the contrary, who also has a centralized insti tution dealing with regulation
andsupervision at home, had to cope with the complicated and fragmented French Structure of
fi nancial regulation and supervision, while complicating matters even furtherthrough direct
government intervention.
9.3.2 Motives
While there is no doubt that HSB made an outright acquisition ofCCF, the transactions in the
Nordea case are slightly less obvious. The deal between Nordbanken and Mcrita was announcedas
a'merger of equals ' because both entities were similar in size. The subsequent transactions with
Unidanmark and Christiania would, due to MeritaNordbankens and then NBH' size dominance
indicate that they were acquisitions, however, they were termed 'merger of equals' due topolitical
reasons related to obtaining shareholder acceptance. Subsequent to Krarups departure as CEO of
Nordeaone former Nordca manager noted: "The merger died with ThorleifKrarup. Insteadof
I1 . I . , I S di I k ,, 190eo egia co-operation, It iecamc a we IS 1 ta reover.
9.3.2.1 Strategic Motives
Strategic motives played certainly a role for both HSBC and Nordea to justify the transaction
although anticipated syncrgics were, as mentioned earlier, of less substantial value than in case of
domestic consolidation and therefore not the prime motive. Nevertheless, the static synergy effects
throughsavings and rationalization were estimated for both Nordea and HSBC to lay between €
100-1 50million spread over several years. More synergy potential was thoughto be in the
dynamic synergy effects through the transfer of knowledgeand expertise fromits new entities.
Whi le HSBC gained wealth management expertise from CCF, Nordea's benefited from Merita
189 F I ''11 fi . I services sector in Europe - Regulatory'or mure on flnancial rcgulation in Francc and the UK see for cxump e IC mancra . 2002
in . . . F .. L' lift lds Bruckhaus Deringer,VeslIgalloa and enforcement issues 111 rancc • r res I le .' . ' . EU
( f I1 . E M "I" ancial regulation and supervision 111www. reshfie lds.coIl1/practiccJfig/pub licatiolls/pdfsl3928.pdl)andCerve all... 1I1
countries", University of Bolognu, 2002. . , .
:,w.efmaefm.org!AcccplcdI'apcrs2(Xl31 crvcllntiEnricoMarin/CervcllatiEnncoManu.pdf
Gcorge. N. "Nordca chief aims to restore faded lustcr", Financial Times. September 4, 2002
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--phisticated internet-ban king system, which helped the other three entities t . b .so 0 gain a su stantial
foothold in the internet banking market in Scandinavia that led tocost savings in the longer run.
Also the asset management expertise of Nordbanken, and the insurance products from
Unidanmark, resemble dynamic synergies that the group benefited from. However, one should be
aware that expressing synergics in numerical values is often very complicated and biased bye.g.
management that needs shareholder approval, which is why synergy announcements should
generally read with care. Another indicator that questions thevalidity of synergy estimations is the
high failure rate of M&As when it comes to the delivery of synergies in the form ofcost-savings.
Becoming a large player in Europe's financial market that wouldput it ina position towithstand
Iheongoing changes in the EU and the increasing competition in the banking landscape was the
underlying strategic motive of Nordea. Similarly, HSBC's motivation toenlarge itspresence inthe
important EU market where it at that time was underrepresented can also betermed a strategic
motive, though it is interrelated with the market-seeking incentive, discussed next.
9.3.2.2 Market Motives
Besides improving its wea lth management expertise, HSBC was seeking for an opportunity to
expand to EU markets wh ' re it felt undcrrepresented. Hence, the combination ofacquiring,
although not at a bargain price, one of Franccs' top-ten banks, that inaddition had a track record of
being one of the most efficient banks in Europe, with a well-developed wealth management ann,
anda large retail banking network, seemed a great opportunity toachieve that.
Theunderlying motive of Nordea was not so much concerned with expanding its presence inother
markets, though due to the relatively small size of the Nordic countries in terms of population, it
was inevitable to expand to ncighboring countries to realize the goal of achieving a respectable
size. Hence, the market motive seems to be interrelated with thestrategic motives of becoming a
'banking giant', as one caused the other. onscquently, it appears that for both cases the strategic
motives were dependent, in one way or another, on the market motives, and vice versa.
9.3.2.3 Economic Motives
Despite the divergence on the existence of scale and scopeeconomies in the financial industry,
• 191 • I h
thesearguments were certainly used in both cross-border transactions. Inparticu ar t e
191 S r r. • • d meetings with analysts available at
cc ror example the prc scnuuions III press conterenccs .111 • k
hUp'/1 ' • "-20 k/I lorrclalions/2000 umdanmar .,WWw.nurdca.com/sitclllod/uploUlVRootlwww.nonlca.com%20-'iv u · nves • . . - S/2001 TK
pdf and bu '/1 ' I Ol 20 %20ukllnvestorrelallon - -p. www.nordea.cnm/sllclIlodluploadlRnol/www.norlea.colll/o .
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possibilities for cross-selling each others products, e.g. life insurance, mutual funds, and
investment bankin g expert ise, it is repeatedly mentioned as an opportunity to increase revenues
and decrease costs. In addition, by combining and transferring expertise, potential advantages in
terms of product development, information search, and raising capital were anticipated.
While being interrelated with the strategic reasoning, creating a Nordic bankinggiant was certainly
also an economic motive that would help the group to withstand thecompetitive pressures that
advancements in technology, the EMU, and changes in regulation initiated. In addition, achieving
the size of a ' banking giant' is also relates to the ' too big to fail' incentive, which though is not
communicated officially , as is the political influence that follows size.
In both cases though the economies of scale and scope arguments were used rather carefully, and
were usually 'wrapped' in the synergy argument.
9.3.2.4 Personal Motives
Whether personal motives of top management are at leastpartially involved forone of the above
transactions is obvi ously speculation. Nevertheless, creating a Nordic 'super size ' bankand being
involved in the first-ever cross-border merger between banks fromfourdifferent countries,
undoubtedly was prestigious, and could indicate that it wasa greatchance for e.g. Dalborg and
Vainio to make history by building an 'empire'. In addition, thecomplexity of sucha merger could
have furthermore motivated the involved decision-makers as they could prove their abilities that
this, despite widespread doubts, can be done.
Also the fact that de Croisse t obtained an executive position in HSBC subsequent to the acquisition
ofCCP could indicate that personal motives were present in this transaction as becoming an
executive director in J-1SBC most probably had significant impacts on his personal wealth.
Nevertheless, as the presence of personal motives is difficult to prove, it should though never be
disregarded from M&A incentives. In both of the abovecases the weight of thismotive was
though not central as the transactions could be justified by means of theother, value-creating
motives.
Tosum-up, it appeared that strategic motives coupled with economic incentives led to thecreation
ofNordea. The small market and restrictions on monopolistic market structures madeit simply
impossible for eithe r one of the respective banks to a gaina competitive size at home, leaving
Stockholm_180401.pdf
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~oss-border M&As as the only way forward.In HSBC on theother hand w . '1 ., as pnman y mouvated
market motives to expand its branch network and strategic motives toextract synergies.
9.3.2.5 Motives and Corporate Strategy
In accordance with the before proposed 'motive-strategy grid', presented in section 8.2.1 , Nordea's
motives called for a global strategy orientation as the focus was onefficiencyimprovements. With
the specific characteristics of retail banking one would initially anticipate that this is a fooli sh
approach as it is conflicting with the notion that particularly retail banking requires local
responsiveness to succeed, and that incompatible corporate structures and cultural peculiarities
would prevent integration. Nevertheless, the global strategy approach became feasible because the
Nordic countries are very similar, "we share the same history, thesame cultural background, the
same Lutheran value system," said Dalborg.193 An issue that complicated the pursuit of the chosen
global strategy significantly was the fact that the four merged entities were pursuing a very
consensus-driven •merger of equals', hampering its ability to drive through changes and deliver on
various cost-cutting synergies. " It was a necessary choice at first, but later there were a number of
problems related to always having to watch the balance of power between the banks", notes
Vaara. 194
As a result of choosing a strategy that did not seem to suit thetype of transaction, aiming for
effic iency on the one hand, and responding to anddealing with unanticipated national differences
and resentment on the other hand, caused the performance of thegroup todeteriorate (see section
9.3.3 .1).
However, with a Swede to replace Danish Krarup as CEG, many senior managers sawtheSwedish
contingent becoming the dominating force in key parts of thecompany (Vaara, (2003)), thereby
transforming the ' merger of equals' to moreof a Swedish takeover, starting thesecond wave of
integration. l'" Nordstroms focus was to move away from thedecentralized structures of four
different banks under one name196 and to instead integrate and centralize acti vities and processes,
making Nordea converge to one bank. Hence, after some delay, caused by internal ambiguity,
192
Larsen, P. P. "Border crossing", CFO, May 2004
::: Brown-Hullles, C. "O nc brand lOO many cultures", Financial Times, April 23, 2004
Larsen, P.P. "Border crossing", CFO, May 2004
195 Ibidem.
196 • f IT ' I ited notonly from the four banks, but
An example of Nordeu's decentralized infrastructure was Its patchwork 0 systemsmnen od th still uses live
I f '11L h' nalysts note "Even today, e groupaso ram a slew of national mergers that preceded Nordea. As Merri ync s a IT li f s on 13 server platforms
separate IT data centers, 60 separate back-office processing center~ , 13 call eenters25~OO applea Ion
and fourcountry-specifie product sets." ( Larsen, P.F. "Border crossing", CFO,May )
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Nordea eventually pursued its 'proposed' strategy orientation, and starts to deliver on the
announced integration promises, although slowly.
In comparison to Nordea, the integration of CCF intoHSBCs corporate structure was fast anddid
not cause any signi ficant problems. An explanation for a company's success in integration
subsequent to acquisitions is according to Lubatkin (1983) a firms acquisition expertise and
experience. HSBC' s long history of acquiring banks in many countries ranging fromAsia, over
Europe, to the Americas caused that HSBC was very familial' with the banking industry ingeneral
and learned form its M&As in foreign countries. Therefore it was aware that it does not know
markets where it did not operate before, which explains that HSBC kept CCF's management.
Astudy by Very, Calori, and Lubatkin (1993) of French-British acquisitionsrevealed that, in
addition to corporate cultural differences, there are also national cultural differences thatcan affect
the fi nancial outcome or an acquisition. Hence, managers need to take the fundamental differences
into consideration to understand the acquired company and to deal with potential conflicts. HSBC
seemed to have done that as it was aware that it "should pay particularly close attention to issues of
cultural compatibility, and try to establish when possible leadership styles, rules of conduct, and
administrative procedures [... J that are consistent with the national values of the employees at the
acquired organization" (Very, Calori, ancI Lubatkin, 1993).
Knowing that it would not be very simple to acquire a French bank - lNG was a case inpointl97 -
HSBC gave many concessions to the French authorities and CCF in order to achieve its goal.
Hence, this strongly suggests that the strategy I-ISBC pursued when acquiring and integrating CCF
was in accordance with its slogan ' think global, act local' , putting a great deal of emphasis on local
197 HSBC's takeover attempt of ccr was not the first time that CCFwas in the situation of being a target in an acquisition. In.fact
only some four months ear lier, on Friday December 10th, the largest Dutch BankINO has made an attempt to takeover CCFWIth a
bid that was valued €IObn, some 15 percent more than CCP's market value. Though, by the time Europe's markets reopened on
Monday December 13th ING had already withdrawn its bid, as CCFwasunenthusiastic about the deal. There has been a great deal
, " . . 11 "th shortest takeover bailieofspeCUlation why ING withdrew its offer so soon and the Economist termed INO s attempt rromca y e
in history", . .
As the two banks already co-operated in a number of areas and ING even had a seaton CCFs board, il came very surpnsmgto ING
th CC . b ks I d b liscussing a tie-up for several months, andat F showed them the cold shoulder. ING claims that the two an s la een ( .
, I ' . . . br ki Id complement CCPs strength mFrench asset-SCC l11e( a good fit: ING's global expertise In Insurance and investment an mg wou ., , .
, " . I f I Ifs d ffered attracuve posiuon to CCPs bosses Inmanagement and corporate blinking Besides ING even refrainer rom ay-o s an 0 , INO' bid
de , .. " . h h different story. It charactenzed s 1 asor er to please French sensitivities. ccr as the Economist reports, presents t oug a d ' f it
h ' d dli th tlNG had attached for a recommen anon 0 ISrus cd and short on detail while also being displeased by Ihe 48-hour ea me a k th bl k
ff . . . . th rarity value of a French ban on e oc .o Cl', Asa result, ccr may have simply been holding out 10 1' a higher pnce,given e f F ' t I bank he
B 1 ' J ' Cl' de Trichet governor0 ranees cen ra ,uttl ere may be other explanations for its snub. When ING s bossesmet ean- au, k rt tl t
' , • • .c r . t' k of a French bank. The Ban er repo S, laISsaid to have expressed reservauons about what would be the first roreign a eover I k bid r F nch
Ii . I I' tors are allowed to boc a I tor a reeven though EU law states that neither the French government nor mancia regu a r • b ks
' • , . , I I tI t they would findways to stop toreign an
Company on the grounds that the bidder is foreign, both institutions warned c ear y la . iti taget as few could
f ' " CCF 'ned in playas an lICqU1SI IOn ,ram entefl ng the French market. As a result of ING s failed attempt, remal , I r months afterINO's
in ' ' " . ifvi E e And indeed on y some touriagme that It IS big enough to survive without a partner III a unt ymg urop . . I '. b tween these two companies.
attempt, HSBC put forward an offer to takeover ccr,even Ihough there were no previous re ations e
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~ponsiveness and autonomy as this was necessary to succeed. Whether HSBC followed a
IJIultinational - or a transnational strategy orientation is not entirely clear, though it seems
reasonable to conclude that it is more on the transnational side than on the multinational side as the
deal had a positive impact on HSBC's overall performance, not least through the synergies.
The outcome of brief analysis and applicability of the 'motive-strategy grid' on the two cases
appeared to speak in favor of this conceptualization. In thecase ofNordea thegrid showed
correctly that Nordea ' s motives for its transaction were requiring a global strategy to take effect. In
the case of HSBC, the grid also indicated that HSBC's motives called for a strategy that responded
to the local peculiarities, ancl as such resulted in a rapid and smooth integration. As the verification
of the 'motive-strategy grid' is based on the selected examples, one should interpret these results
with care as it is not representative.
9.3.3 Performance of Transactions
An initial idea of the performance of the two transaction gives a panel of 13 experts l98 that was put
together by The Banker to evaluate which of the M&As in2000 involving the financial sector
would lead to a happy marriage and which will end in acrimony and possibly divorce. 199 As
depicted in Table 4, the domestic Barclays/Woolwich deal received themost positive outlook,
though followed by MeritaNordbankens merger with Unidanmark, and its subsequent deal with
Christiania. The panelists likeclthe strong logic to both Nordic deals and they had nothing but
admiration for CEO Dalborg' s acquisitive run against the background ofregional banking
consolidation.
HSBC's acquisition of CCF, resulted in a ill place, and although thedeal has been understood as a
solid transaction by an experienced cross-border acquirer that gave it a 'toehold' incontinental
Europe, it fail ed to ignite the panel's imagination. Professor Roy Smith from theStern School of
Business says: "No foreign company has yet managed to turn around a former state-owned French
198 S . ' G li di tor at First Consulting; Raphael Soifer,leven Davis, Davls International Banking Consultants; Claire ouzou I, a tree , .
, I ' " . BN A ' PI '1' Middleton European financial strategy partner,consu tant, Soifcr Consul ting: IJryan Crossley bunking analyst, A mro; HIp , . N Y k
KI'MG ' . ' : . S S h I f Business' Professor David Rogers, ew or; Prof essor Roy Smith New York University's Leonard N. tern c 00 0 ' . b kit ABN
U ' " ' . I El & Company' RIchard Coleman, an anays ,IIIversilys Leonard N. Stern School of Business: Bcrt Ely, consu taut, y , . KIP fessor lng
A ' ' h L d b k : nalysts Fox PIll e ton; roressor n 0rnro; Martin Green bank analyst Merrill l ynch' Vasco Mareno and Gart e er, an a , . . t
W " ", ~ " . . A liS Hislop financial services par ner,~lter, New York University's Leonurd N. Stem School of Business; ng ,
i~~ce.waterhou seCoopers Merger rankings
Plggoll, C. "Will They Bc Happy?" 'l1,e Banker, Vo!' ISO, No. 898, December I, 20~. h t ths and weaknesses of deals
The survey was done by asking these experts a total of more than 1000 questions to an~ yz~ tfie s ~:ng ) and potential pitfalls (six
?nd the experts were asked to give marks out of five for both the likely benefits (a list o. ived emsming the results the study
lte~s), By working out u bank's average positive and negative scores across the categones an sum
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10 -0.13 HypoVereinsbanklBank Austria
11 -0.27 UBS/PaineWebber
12 -0.39 Chase/JP Morgan
13 -0.45 CSFB/DLJ
14 -1.20 DresdnerlWassersleln Perella
_. 7 . I 0.20 _. IHS~.<?/~OF .. . .._. 1
--- '.. ...
gOll, C. "Will They Be Happy?" 71,e Banker, Vu!. 150, No. 898, December I, 2000.
c: Piggou, C , "Will They Bc Happy?", The Bunker, Vol. 150, No. 898, December 1,2000.
pany, but if they did it, then it would be seen as a boldmove".200
n looking at Nordea's share price performance over theprevious five years, as illustrated in
'e 21, it appears that almost simultaneously to its final mergerwith Christiania inOctober
, its shares started a constant downturn, tumbling to its absolute low ofSEK 31.5 in March
. Despite the general downturn in the stockmarket, its Nordic peers, particularly Den Norske
and Danske Bank, but also SHB and SEB, all performed better. Only SwedishFSPA (not on
e4: Expert evaluation of cross-border M&A's in thefinancial sector, in2000
verall Ranking Overall Score
e experts expected that HSBC would run into problems when integrating CCF, however,
h the above review though showed was not the case.
preliminary evaluation of the two transactions, leads me now toreviewand evaluate their
ective financial performance subsequent to the deals. As mentioned already, the integration in
cases might not be final yet, which is why the outcomein terms of financial performance
t not be final yet, meaning that improvementsor deteriorations canstilloccurand shed a
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the economic downturn and the costs of consolidating Nordea's operations.
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and Finnish Sampo had a similar mediocreperformance as Nordea.
99B
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upper right-hand side: Den Norskc Bank (red), DanskeBank (green), SEB (silver),SHB (dark red),
e), Sampo (grey)
ccounting based approach, illustrated in Table 5, it appears that the operating profit
rom €2,4bn in 2000 to € I,5bn in 2002, a decline of almost Elbn, which though partly
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dca' s Annual Reports 2000-2003
s for 2003 showed therefore improvements with the operatingprofit to increase to
hich indicates that Nordstrom's cost cutting measures in Nordea were finally making an
sin € bn
er share In €
orne ratio
elected accounting based figures of Nordea's financial performance
hing its absolute low in March 2003, Nordea's share gained strength, as did the general
particular though saw Den Danske Bank and Den Norske Bank, butalso SEB and SHB,
t improvements in their share performance. Nordea however could not follow suit. Also,
dic stock market indices, except for the Swedish SX40-Financials, outperformed
shares. It therefore seems that shareholders and the market were rather disappointed by
rs and the realized syncrgies and cost reductions, indicating that it didnot succeed in
iareholder value.







































Why Are They Only Slowly PickingUp?
Low Level or Cross Border Mergers and Acquisitions in EU Banking Sector
;;act on its balance sheets. In addition, Nordea could reporta 15 percent increasein operating
profit to €I,648 miIlion from January to September 2004 compared to 2003 figures, furthermore
illustrating that performance improvements are takingeffect.
Nordea's ambition to gain size through the four-way merger was though undoubtedly realized with
both deposits, lending, and total assets increasing markedly between 1999 and 200l
Nevertheless, the cost-to-income ratio of 63 percent in 2003 compared with 47 percent at SHB and
just under55 percent at Danske Bank, gave reason forconcern. In an interview in the CF020!,
Liljedahl , Cl-O of Nordea, argues that the market's focus on this is "somewhat unfair". Thecost-
to-income ratio "doesn' t reflect thc efficiency of a bank," he says. Nordea 's business mix, where
retail banking makes up some 70 percent of turnover, means it is bound to have higher costs than
peers that aren't as heavily involved in retail. Nevertheless, Liljeahl reckons that "Our cost-to-
income ratio is just north of 60 percent, but it should be possible to come closer to55percent".
Figure 22: Nordiccomparison of cost-to-income ratio, 2001-2003
Costlincome ratio 2001 -2003







0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60 % 70%
Source: Annual Report lslnnd sbanki 2003
Figure 22 displays the development of the cost-to-income ratios of several Nordic banks, and it
shows that Nordea remains to have the highest percentage . Nevertheless, the first three quarters of
2004saw slight improvements with respcctively 59, 63, and 61 percent. 202
2111
202 ,~arsen , P.F. "Border crossing", CFO, May 2004
h Prcscntation for investors" , Nordca, October 27,2004 available at:
ttp:llwww.nordca.colll/sitelllod/upload/roo t/eu/il1terilll ll1veslocprcsclltatioll_Q304.pdf
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;;ilarly, Nordea's return on equity (RoE) went througha phase ofdeterioration SUbsequent to the
merger, declining from 16.1 percent in 2000 to only7.5 percentin2002. Following Nordstroms
appointment the RoE recovered in 2003 by increasing to 12.3 percent. Whencomparing Nordea's
RoEto Figure 23, illustrating RoE's from banks in the EU and the US, one notices that Nordea's
2001performance with 13.8 percent is pretty much in line with other banks from the European
Union. Nevertheless, its poor 7.5 percent in 2002 most certainly would have been far below
European average. It is though striking from this figure that US banks are onaverageperforming
much better than European banks, with an RoE's on average 5 percenthigher than Europe's.
Because both the market based approach and the accounting-basedapproach indicate a rather
mediocre performance of Nordea, which though is improvingnow, it seems that the creationof
Nordeaby consolidating across the Nordic region took more time than expected. The unknown
complexity of a multi-cross-border merger combined with the unfavorable economicconditions
infl uenced the delay in the realization of promised synergies. Nevertheless, with the appointment
of Nordstrom as CEO and the subsequent clarity about the (global) strategy orientation, substantial
improvements in the fin ancial performance started to shine through.
Figure 23: Return on equity of banks
251. ,..--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----- - - - - 1
20% - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -::.-;:.:--:.:-:.:-:.:-~-..:.-;;;.;- -::,or.a--......",~~
-- -- ---- -- -- -- - -5% - - _
1lXl3 19G4 lOllS gO? 1099 l B~O 2000
2001
1_ Eurap an Lillon - Euro area - USI
Source: GEeD, Bank profitability (2002 cd.); Date of publication (last data available):Apr. 03 (2001)
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Arecent edition of the FT203 agrees saying that "promised synergies have taken longer to
materialize than expected. However, the bank sprang a surprise with its second-quarter [2003]
results, with evidence that some of the synergy benefits were starting tocome through."
9.3.3.2 HSBC
Evaluating HSBC' s post acquisition performance by looking at its share price performance reveals
that over the past five years it was outperforming theFfSE 100 significantly (Appendix I),
Particularly between the middle of 2000 till the first few months of 2001 a significant increase in
HSBC's share performance occurred. Despite the fact that it coincides with the acquisition ofCCF,
it is unlikely that this increase can solely be traced back to this event, not least because also the
other large VK banks saw a similar pattern in their share performance. Nevertheless, it appears that
HSBC was the third best performing UK bank behind RBS and Barclays. HBOS', Lloyds' and
Abbey' s performance on the other were particularly since themiddle 01'2002 deteriorating
constantly, not keeping up with the three top-performing banks. And although the acquisition of
ccr was relatively small in comparison to HSBC's 'almighty' size, impacting HSBC share
performance only marginal, it is nevertheless reasonable to assume that from a share performance
perspective, the deal was a success, despite of HSBC's initial shareholder reaction.
Looking at HSBC' s post-acquisition performance from anaccounting angle the acquisition of CCF
would yield an initial economic value of £95 million. CCFwas expected to post a net profit of
€650 million in 200 I, to which £150 milIion of synergies will beadded. Subtracted from this are
€420 million of financial charges from the operation and £285 million representing the cost of new
capital issued, leaving £95 million. John Bondexpected thegroup to realize around two-thirds ofa
projected total £ 150 miII ion of synergies through revenues and one-third through cost savings. As
he said, HSBC was emphasizing the revenue- enhancing aspects of thedeal, "because weintend to
growthebusiness, not to shrink it".204
Table 6 summarizes several accounting indicators that illustrate HSBC's financial performance in
the period I999-2()()3. Particularly astonishing was HSBC's operating profit, which increased
significantly to more than $ 12bn in 2003, though with a decrease in 2001 due to 9/11 and the
economic downturn. In addition, both I-ISBC's deposits, lending, and total assets increased
203 " k . B kin growth beyond their home markets, Brown-Humes, C. "Banks running out of options: Nordic Cross-Border Lin s. ut see g
~~ngs its own problems" Financial Tim es, October 8, 2003




1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
7,409 9,477 7,153 9,035 12,297
354 416 413 448 493
398 487 504 548 579
570 674 696 759 1,034
18.1 16.8 13.3 12.6 13.8
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6: Selected financial data on HSBCGroup in theperiod 1999-2003.
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n on equity (RoE)
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derably over this period. One of the reasons for this growth was HSBC' . . .
s acquISItIon of CCF
he accompanied assets and large customer base. Nevertheless HSBC' ., s various other
sitions of banks in this period, notably its $14.3bn acquisition of Household Bank of the US,
[buted greatly to his development.
to Income ratio 53.2 55.4 56.9 57.4 51.3
e: HSBC Holdings plc. Annual Report and Accounts 1999-2003.Available at hltp://www.hsbc.col11
aUng Prollt In US min .
" .. B d R ti , Service December 2004 available utng. R. and Hughes, D. "UK bank comparison study . DOl1l/lll011 0 11 a /118 •
www.dbrs.com!wcb!sentry?COMP=2900&Docld=146591
C's acquisition frenzy affected though its profitability, with its RoE decreasing from 18.1
nt in 1999 to 12.6 percent in 2002. The RoE recovery to 13.8 percent in2003 is compared to
K peers still the lowest, with RoE's from Barclays, HBOS, and Lloyds reaching 17.5, 17.9
7.3 percent respectively.Y' Nevertheless, the first half of2004 saw a further recovery of
C's RoE increase to 16.3 percent, indicating that the banks profitability is improving.
pect to its cost-to-income ratio was HSBC's performance though rather good; infact its 2003
vement of 5 1.3 percent was the second lowest amongst its UKpeers just topped by HBOS.
this brief review of HSBC share- and accounting performance subsequent toits acquisition
CF, it appears that the outcome can by no means be regarded as a failure. Furthermore, it is
rtant to know that HSBC acquired several other banks in the period 2000-2003, influencing
lance sheet both positively in terms of growth and negatively in terms ofprofi tability.
use CCF was in comparison to HSBC rather small, the directeffects of CCF's integration are
eflec ted as pronounced and obvious on HSBC's balance sheet and performance indicators. On
her hand, I-lSBC' s performance also did not deteriorate to anextent that would indicate that
ration of France' s most profitable banks failed. Hence I agree with The Banker, that writes in
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The two cases studies have illustrated several interesting points that underline the previous
fi ndings. The differences in the institutional set-up in terms of financial regul t' d . .. a IOn an supervision
were highlighted, with the UK and the Nordic countries having one main body, compared to
France' s complex and fragmented structure. Furthermore, it appeared that several motives, which
often seem interrelated, are present in M&As. Nevertheless, the analysis of the motives generally
reveal two broad categories for engaging in these M&As, the efficiency seekingmotive of Nordea
versus the market seeking motive of HSBC - with the personal motives resembling a special case
not investigated further here.
Another finding from the case studies was that integration is potentially 'make or break' for the
successor failure of the transactions. On the one hand was thecomplex 'merger of equals' in
Nordea's case, that was very consensus-driven but not delivering on promises. About to collapse,
the new CEO Nordstrom changed Nordea's integration approach by means of a global strategy
orientation, which was in line with the 'motive-strategy grid', and started to deliver on the
announced promises by substantial performance improvements. On the other hand was the HSBC-
CCFcase that was simpler in terms of involved parties, two insteadof four, but morecomplex in
terms of national and institutional differences. Its expertise and strategy choice, the market-seeking
motive suggested, according to the 'motive-strategy grid', a strategy that 'prescribed' a flexible
and decentralized approach, let HSBC integrate CCFrapidly and smoothly into its organizational
structure.
Consequently, the two cases are supporting Morosini's (2004) finding that fast , assertive, andclear
approaches to M&A integration end up being more beneficial than consensual approaches focusing
on balancing the joining companies' stakes equally at every possible leveI.
206
10 Conclusion
Significant measures have been undertaken to create a level playing field that would encourage the
integration of Europe's financial markets and thereby result in widespread cross-border M&As in
the Europe' s banking industry. And while Europe can beconsidered as one of the most integrated
banking market worldwid e from a legal perspective (Buch and Heinrich (2002», thesystematic
206M " . 'I" . "M' , ,. g complex mergers" edited byMorosini P.andorosuu, P. "Arc mergers and acquisitions about crcaung value , m anagm
Sleger U. Prentice Hall Financia l Times, 2004
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analysis of four key segments of Europe's financial market has revealed th t th' a ere appear tobe
large differences in the progress of integration. Whereas the money mark t Ie appears a most
perfectly integrated, the retail market remains very fragmented.
Inhibiting to further integration, and thereby to wider cross-border M&A activity, is the slow
materialization of directives caused particularlybydiverging national interests and a lacking
unified supervisory structure. Furthermore, the different legal, administrative accounting t d, , ax, an
consumer protection systems will need to be dismantled to achieve the objective of anintegrated
European financial market.
The unprecedented M&A activity in the 1990s across all industries underlines this as it was
predominantly of domestic nature, with the financial services industry, and banking inparticular,
being noexception. Nevertheless, the recent trend of gradual increasing cross-border activity,
seems to indicate that the 'integration measures' , such as the SBD, CAD, and not least theEMU
are starting to take effect, causing particularly financial institutions from smaller EU Member
states to look beyond it national boundaries forgrowth opportunities. Yet, thefrequency ofsuch
intra-EU deals is still marginal, especially in the larger EU countries, indicating that domestic
consolidation is hitherto not completed to a degree that lets firms seekfor expansion targets
outside their domestic market. The 'ultimate' test of an integrated European financial market
therefore seems to have failed.
The analysis of the micro pcrspective furthermore revealed that thestrategic-, the market-, and the
economic motives for M&As arc encouraging thebanking industry to focus mainly ondomestic
consolidation. Synergies are more obvious and easier to exploit indomestic M&A's, the
fragmentation of Europe's financial industry lets firms toexploit firstdomestic opportunities
before turning abroad, and attempting to grow to a 'too big to fail' size needs to beachieved in the
domestic market. The micro-level analysis additionally showed that the ex-post M&A integration
resembles a major hurdle to realize the anticipated benefits of M&As. The doubly complexity of
cross-border transactions with differences in language and culture combined with evidence that
forei gn banks generally do not seem to be as efficient compared todomestic institutions, (which
though does not mean that cross-border M&As are performing worse than domestic deals) adds to
this and deters cross-border activity further.
This in turn made me hypothesize that the motives forM&As require specific strategies todeliver
on the transactions, which I conceptualized in the 'motive-strategy grid' that isbased on the
Integration-Responsiveness grid. Hence, motives thatseek efficiency enhancement require a
t ' .. . . , d . ti hile the market motive requiress rategy onenianon with locus on centralization an integra Ion, w
firms to respond and adapt to local conditions.
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The two cases of Nordea and HSBC revealed that, besides illustrating the differences in the
institutional set-up in terms of financial regulation, supervision, andgovernment intervention, the
proposed ' motive-strategy grid' appears valid. Nordea' s expansion on the one hand was driven by
effic iency-seeking motives, calling for a global strategy orientation. The ambiguity and poor
performance in the first years that were caused by theconsensus-driven 'merger of equals'
approach, was followed by considerable improvements inperformance when Nordstrom got
appointed as CEO, and focused stringently on the global strategy orientation. The strategy
orientation that the ' motive-strategy grid' suggested in HSBC's acquisition ofCCFalso proved
successful. When acquiring a target where largedifferences innational and organizational culture
canbe expected, it requires the bidder to be flexible andpursue a decentralized approach to
integration granting autonomy to the new entity. Though to verify theapplicabilityof the grid
further research is needed.
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Appendix A:Overview of individual measures in the Financial Services Action Plan
- . , Strategic objective 1: a single EU wholesale market
Upgrade the two Directives on Prospectuses.
Update and upgrade the Regular Reporting Requirements.
Directive on Insider Deali~g a~d Market Manipulation (marketabuse).
communication on and Directive to.upgrade th~ InvestmentServices Directive (ISO).
communication on Conduct of Business Rules In the ISO (distinction between professi Id"
Amend the 4th and 71t,1 Company Law Direc,tives to allow fair value accounting. ana an retail Investors).
communication updating of t~e EU a?countlng strategy followedbylegislative action.
Modernisation ?f the accou n t~ng provls~ons of th~ 4thand 7thCompany Law Directives.
Recommendation on EU auditing practices (quality assurance and auditor independence)
Implementation of Settlement Finality Directive. .
Directive on financial collateral arrangements.
Adoption of the proposed Directive on Take Over Bids,
Politicalagreement on the European Company Statute.
Review of EU corporate governance practices.
Amend the 10thCompany Law Directive.
14thCompany Law Directive.
Commission Communication on Funded Pension Schemes.
Adoption of the two Directives on UCITS.
Directive on the Prudential Supervision of Supplementary Pension Funds.
Strategic objective 2: open and secure retail markets
Political agreement on proposal for a Directive on theDistance Marketing ofFinancial Services.
Commission Communication on clear and comprehensive information for purchasers.
Recommendation to support best practice in respect of information provision (mortgage credit).
Commission report on differences between national arrangements relating toconsumer-business transactions.
Interpretative Communication on the freedom to provide services and thegeneralgood ininsurance.
Proposal foramendment of Insurance Intormediaries Directive.
Commission Communication on a slnglo market for payments.
Commission Action Plan to prevent fraud and counterfeiting Inpayment systems issue.
CommissionCommunication on an o-cornrnerce policy for financial services.
Strategic objective 3 : state-ol -the-art prudential rules and supervision
Adopt the proposed Directive on the Reorganisation and Winding-upofInsurance Undertakings.
Adopt lhe proposed Directive on the Winding-up and Liquidationof Banks.
Adopt the proposal for an Electronic Money Directive.
Amendment to the Money Laundering Directive.
Commission Recommendation on disclosure of financial instruments.
Amend the Directives Governin the Capital Framework forBanks and InvestmentFirms(8aseI 2).
Amend the solvency margin requirements In the Insurance Directives.
Amendment of the Insurance Directives and the ISOto permit information exchange with third countries.
Adopt a Directive on Prudential Rule" for Financial Conglomerates.
Commission Decision for a Securities Committee and a Committee ofSecurities Regulators.
Generalobjective: wider conditions for on oplimal single financialmarket
Adopt a Directive for ensurin taxation of Interest income from cross-border investment ofsavings.
Implementation of the December 1997 Code of Conduct onbusiness taxation.
Review of taxation of financial service products.
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Appendix B: Illustration of the 'Lamfalussy model'
Appendix C: Cross-sectional standard deviation of unsecured lending rates among euro area (30-day
moving average, basis points)
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Appendix G: Share of the five largest credit institutions in total assets (%)
( U III ~r! 1'1971 1998 ] 1999 j lUUU I IUUI lUUl l U.\
DE D~I\;lum 54 63 76 75 78
82 8~
OK Denmark 70 71 71 60 68 68 6i
DE Germany 17 19 19 20 20 20 21
GR Greece 56 63 67 65 6i
67 6i
ES Spain \ ' 35 41 46 45 44
44
fR France 40 41 43 47
47 45 47
lE Ireland 41 40 41 41 43
46 .j.j
IT ltaly 25 25 25 23
29 31 n
LU Luxembourg " 25 26 26
28 30 32
c»
NL Netherlands 79 82 82 81 83
8 ~ 84
AT Austr ts .j.j 42 41 43
45 46 44
PT Portugal 46 45 44 59
60 60 63
f l Flnlaud S8 86 86 &i l'IJ
79 81
SE Sweden 58 56 56 57
55 56 54




MUI2 Monetary Un ion 45 47 ..-
EU15 46 48 50 51
52 52 53
EuropeanUnion
Source: "Report on EU banking structure", ECB,November 2004
Note: For Finland the chnage in 200 I is due to a reclassification
Source: Bacle et al. (2004)
AdPpen,d
t
ix F: Cross-sectional standard deviation of interest rates on consumer and mortgage loans and time
eposlS
_ mo i gdge loans
••••• f w 'i! Ep ...L S
• •• CO_5uxue 1~
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Appendix H: Herfindahl index for credit institutionstotal assets
('oulllr! 1997 1 199&1 1999 L 2Uuo 2001 1 1 111 1
BE Bdgium 69;1 909 1,518 1.506 1.58i 1.905 2,065
DK Denmark 1,431 1.442 1.499 863 1,11 9 1,145 1.1 14
DE Germany 114 133 140 151 158 163 173
OR Greece 885 1,165 986 1,122 1,113 1.164 1,130
ES Spaln 2&5 329 441 581 551 519 521
~R I'rJllce 449 485 509 587 f()6 551 597
lE Ireland 500 473 480 486 m m 562
IT 1I3 1y 201 210 220 190 260 270 240
LU Luxembourz 210 222 236 242 m 296 JI5
NL Netherlands 1,654 1,802 1,700 1,694 1,762 1.788 1,744
AT AU5 lr i~ 515 515 511 548 561 618 557
PT Portugal 577 575 566 986 9;1 1 %:.1 1,044
1'\ I'inland 2,150 2,120 1,960 2.050 2,240 2,050 2,420
SE Sweden 830 790 790 800 760 800 7ro
UK United Kingdom 200 221 250 264 282 307 347
IvlUI2 MonetaryUnion 31B 429 468 508 544 55J 581
ElII5 IluropeanUnIon J7~ 411 445 464 497 m 541
Source: "Report 0 11 EU banking structure", ECB, November 2004
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I HS9C 11. 14 'n~. ' UIQ;
Source: http://ww.hsbc.com
Appendix I: Share performance of Abbey National, Barclays, HBOS, HSBC, Royal Bank of Scotland, and
Lloyds in the period (2000-January 2005) compared to the FTSE 100.
